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PREFACE 
This paper is an attempt to explore a meaningful and fresh 
interpretation on the purpose of all the major reshufflings of regional 
military leaders in China from 1954 to 1991. To Mao Zedong, Deng 
Xiaoping and most scholars of the Chinese military, reshuffling was a 
measure to eradicate regionalism. Instead of viewing reshuffling as a 
means, my research had led me to the view that reshuffling was also the 
effect of political events. 
i 
By tracing how regional military leaders were reshuffled, it is 
also possible to examine the military elite distribution within the PLA 
and to arrive at certain tentative conclusions about the persistence of 
Field Army informal ties within the Chinese military. 
My major arguments are then that most of the reshufflings in the 
Mao and Deng eras were 1) influenced by and reflected political 
struggles, 2)intended to accumulate their support, 3) reflected the 
predominant role of FA loyalty ties, and 4)followed by ideological 
indoctrinations and/or institutional changes. 
Although no specific study is available on the topic of 
reshuffling of regional military leaders, I am indebted to the 
pioneering scholars for their findings and contributions on the role of 
military and the civil-military relationship in China. 
I would like to acknowledge the debt I owe to a number of people 
for their assistance in writing this paper. Dr. Peter N. S. Lee, as 
dissertation supervisor, gave his time most generously, going over 
iv 
every manuscript page and giving me incisive suggestions and comments 
for improvement. My board members Dr. C.Y. Chang and Dr. Tony K.S. Liao 
have read the entire manuscript and given me other useful suggestions. 
Dr. Benjamin Ostrov assisted me by first introducing the historical 
research on reshufflings of regional military leaders and factionalism 
within the PLA. 
I am also thankful to two personal friends: Mr. Don Clarke, 
Assistant Professor at the University of Washington, for his 
constructive suggestions and comments on the introduction and Mr. 
Michael Sullivan, a Ph.D candidate at the University of Wisconsin, for 
his efficient proof-reading of every manuscript page of this paper. 
I am also grateful to my parents who made life very pleasant for 
me. Without their love and patience, this paper would never have been 
possible. 
Also to be acknowledged is Mr. Simon Chan for his constant source 
of moral encouragement. 
Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the views expressed 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Evolution of the Military Regions in China 
After the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese 
Communis七 Party (CCP) formed six Military Regions (MR) - Northwest, 
Southwest, East China， South Central, Northeast and North China. While 
originally commanded by five Field Armies (FA) until 1954, the MRs 
continue to be placed under the jurisdiction of tl)e CCP Military 
i 
Commission (MC) in order to uphold the Party control. 
In the period between 1949 and 1954, each FA had its own sphere of 
influence. The Northeast MR, garrisoned by the 1st FA, dominated 
Chengdu, Lanzhou and Xinjiang. The 2nd FA was responsible for the 
Southwest MR, which included Chengdu, Wuhan, Kunming and Tibet. The 
provinces of Jinan, Nanking and Fuzhou were placed into the East China 
MR, which was run by the 3rd FA. The South Central and Northeast MRs 
were placed under the control of the 4th FA which was stationed at 
Shenyang and Guangzhou. The 5th FA, or the North China FA, dominated 
the North China MR which consisted of Peking, Jinan and Inner Mongolia. 
In September 1954, the FA system was deactivated. The six MRs were 
reorganized into ten MRs and three autonomous MRs. These 13 MRs were 
Peking, Shenyang, Jinan, Nanking, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Lanzhou, Fuzhou, 
Wuhan, Kunming, Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia. The ten MRs were 
also subdivided into military districts (MD)Similar to the 1949-1954 
1 
organizational system, each MR was headed by a military Commander and 
Political Commissars. 
In early 1971, the CCP reduced the number of MRs from 13 to 
eleven. Nearly the entire Tibet MR was integrated into the Chengdu MR. 
A portion of the Western Tibet MR became under the command of the 
Xinjiang MR. The Inner Mongolia MR was divided among the Peking, 
Shenyang and Lanzhou MRs. In integrating parts of Tibet and Inner 
Mongolia into other MRs, the Tibet and Inner Mongolia MRs were 
downgraded to provincial level status. In mid-1985, Deng Xiaoping 
drastically reduced the manpower of the PLA by one million. The number 
of MRs were then also reduced to seven by merging the Wuhan MR into the 
Guangzhou MR, the Kunming MR into the Chengdu MR and the Urumqi MR into 
the Lanzhou MR. 
Reshufflings of Regional Military Leaders 
Besides gradually reducing the number of MRs since 1954, the CCP 
leadership has also undertaken major reshufflings of regional military 
leaders. Since the formal establishment of the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) of China in 1949， seven major reshufflings of regional military 
2 . leaders have taken place. These seven reshufflings took place in 1967， 
1971, 1973, 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1990. These reshufflings will be the 
central focus of this paper. 
While these reshufflings do not appear to have occurred on a 
regular basis, this paper will examine 1) the political context within 
which these reshufflings occurred and 2) the manner that they were 
conducted. This paper argues that these reshufflings were not only 
related to specific political events, but also reveals the 
L characteristics of factionalism within the PLA since 1949. 
2 
The Chinese leadership explained the reshufflings they undertook 
as a means to eradicate the factionalism that had resulted after the 
PLA regional leaders had been stationed at their specific 
"mountaintops" for a period of time. In seeking to prevent the 
establishment of separate "independent kingdoms", Mao argued that: 
What we want to oppose and destroy is the erroneous 
inclination of mountaintopism. We want to oppose and 
destroy it because it hampers the unification and unity of 
our party. Mountaintopism was produced by the objective 
conditions of the Chinese revolution and has served certain 
purposes in the history of the revolution. It is a thing 
existing objectively and cannot be eliminated by an 
announcement. Our principle should be to recognize the 
existing mountaintops, then weaken them and finally destroy 
them. 
Deng stated in 1975 that, in addition to: 
exchange of commanders among the eight greater military 
regions, there should be an interchange of cadres, among the 
provincial military regions and some departments, because 
it is not good for cadres to function in one place for too 
long. Since some cadres have become involved in 
factionalism in civilian units to the detriment of the work 
there, it would be best to transfer them elsewhere. 
Wherever a "mountain stronghold" exists, we must get rid of 
it - demolish it by transferring the cadrea involved so 
that they don't gather in one place. 
Mao and Deng both saw reshuffling as a means to diminish the political 
role of the PLA. Their efforts to avoid regionalism through reshuffling 
was also meant to strengthen the political control of the central 
authority over the military regional commands. 
These reasons only provide a partial explanation to these 
reshufflings. If the reshufflings were designed to destroy the 
"mountain-strongholds", why were they conducted in such a sporadic 
manner? This study investigates how political factors influenced the 
occurrence and outcomes of the reshufflings. As Harry Harding has 
posited, the role that "PLA has assumed in China's civilian politics is 
8 . related to the political context at the same.“ An analysis of the 
3 
political context, especially before and after the reshufflings, can 
provide some additional insights to understand the political factors 
influencing the military's role in Chinese politics. 
This paper also examines how these reshufflings were conducted in 
order to illustrate how these reshufflings reflected both the 
alignments of regional military personnel and the changes of alignments 
after each reshuffling. If the new military elite assignments mirror 
the results of political events, it can be further confirmed that 
reshufflings in China were very much related to political events. In 
order to understand how reshufflings affect the distribution of 
military personnel, it is necessary to first understand factionalism 
within PLA. … 
• • 广-
I ！ t -
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Factionalism of PLA 
The factionalism model has been used to analyze many aspects of 
Chinese politics.^ Among scholarly studies that examine the role of the 
military in Chinese politics, a major debate since 1970s concerns the 
influence of factionalism within the PLA on the Chinese politics. 
Beginning with William W. Whitson's advocation of the FA system 
approach, three different conceptual models have been proposed to 
explain PLA factionalism. Whitson*s approach considers the alignment of 
military personnel (e.g. promotion and recruitment) to be determined by 
the five FAs that were formally organized in February 1949. Whitson's 
model studies that the FA system has influenced the alignment of 
military personnel even after this system was deactivated in 1954. 
William Parish, in contrast, promoted a theory of bureaucratic 
behaviour to study the division among PLA factionsParish posited 
that promotion and recruitment of military personnel were normally 
4 
impartial and based on merit and random selection. Harvey Nelsen 
explained PLA factionalism by the organizational approach. The third 
model holds that the division of central and regional PLA 
12 
organizational structures resulted in the factional behaviour of PLA. 
By and large, this study argues that Whitson's conceptual model 
best explains factionalism in the PLA. The promotion and recruitment of 
personnel are based more on specific informal personal ties than on the 
bureaucratic system introduced by Parish. In contrast to Nelsen’s 
organizational view that the competition between the central and 
regional PLA organizations resulted in factionalism, this paper argues 
that the FA at both cental and regional levels competed among each 
other. ” 
Although Whitson's theory was only based on empirical findings up 
1 I 
I 
to 1971， this study finds that his hypotheses remain valid in 
understanding the tendency of factionalism within the PLA until 1990. 
This study, however, does not totally support all of Whitson's 
hypotheses especially the hypotheses on the importance of geography in 
factional struggles. As Lucian Pye has found, factions are based more 
on the "power constellations of clusters of officials who for some 
reason or other feel comfortable with each other, who believe that they 
can share mutual trust and loyalties, and who may recognize common 
13 
foes,’ than on the importance of geography in the formation of 
factionsFactionalism in China, as Pye posits are not formed 
"primarily in response to policy issues, bureaucratic interests, 
generational differences, or geographical bases, although these 
15 
considerations do play a part." While geographical factors may be an 
important factor in military separatism, this factor loses its 
importance since the reshufflings of military personnel has dispersed 5 
16 the members of different separated factions to different regions. It 
is unfortunate that Pye is too reserved to suggest what the "some 
reason of other" might be. Probably, the hardiness of FA system, even 
after numerous reshufflings, is due to nian-.i iu zhi-qing (feeling of 
keeping old relationship) of the PLA personnel. While it is outside the 
scope of this paper to determine whether this factor is the reason 
behind the power constellations, however, this paper will show that the 
FA mentality within the PLA personnel can be put to test even by a 
series of reshufflings. 
Methodology 
Although Andrew Nathan has been at the forefront in formulating 
the factional model for the study of Chinese politics, William Whitson 
was the first to employ such an approach to study the distribution of 
117 
power within PLA. While only studying the CCP's political history, 
Nathan occasional considered the factional model to be useful in 
studying the PLA. He stated that as: 
the Party/Army grew, I would argue, each major leader 
played upon his personal network of clientelist ties to 
cultivate a personal faction,丨严eding his followers in 
important Party and Army posts. 
In desiring to use the factionalism model to study the behaviourial 
characteristics of PLA personnel, this paper will use Whitson，s FA 
system since he has systematically used this model in studying the PLA. 
While useful, Whitson，s model will be used with certain qualifications. 
As this paper* s discussion on the 1990 reshuffling reveals, the 
influence of FA system had gradually lost it significance. Even so, 
other informal ties have actually become the primary basis of elite 
assignment 
The methodology used in the factionalism model has also been ripe 
6 
with controversy. Parish has criticized Whitson's statistical evidence 
as placing too much focus on numbers rather than on the exact positions 
of the PLA leaders.如 Similar to Parish's comment, Gerald McBeath 
annotates that a certain percentage of the elite of a MR originated 
from one FA system could only imply the power of that particular FA. 
McBeath argued that Whitson did not show the percentage of the key 
21 . 
positions were occupied by the military elite. The evaluation on the 
domination of a single FA in the MRs should not simply rely on the 
total strength of a particular FA. The FA background of the top 
regional military leaders serves a more apposite index. 
In light of these criticisms as well as the lack of sufficient 
data on the total numbers of the top regional military leaders and 
deputies, I will only concentrate to employ Commanders 丨（Cdrs) and First 
I I 
Political Commissars (1st Pol Cmrs) of each MR as indexes. These two 
posts are the highest and the most important ranks at the regional 
military command level. The central authority made careful and 
pertinent judgements before they appointed the appropriate PLA 
personnel to such posts. 
In considering these methodological issues, this paper attempting 
to determine the reasons for and the nature of reshufflings that have 
taken place in the Chinese military. These two issues are related to 
the following arguments. Firstly, reshufflings of regional military 
leaders in the Mao era were basically dictated by and reflected 
political struggles. Secondly, reshufflings of the regional military-
leaders in the Deng era were less dictated by political struggles since 
the reshufflings were intended to promote professionalism at the 
regional command level. Thirdly, nearly all of the reshufflings in both 
the Mao and Deng eras operated as a means to accumulate the support for 
7 
their respected leadership. Reshuffling can therefore be seen as an 
instrument for the consolidation of political power. Fourthly, the 
accumulation of support through reshufflings reflected the predominant 
role of loyalty ties within the FA system. Most of the FA loyalists of 
the winners or, of the persons that supported the winners in the 
political struggles were awarded with a promotion. In contrast, most of 
the FA loyalists of the loser were demoted from the regional military 
leadership. Lastly, after the accumulation of support, the reshufflings 
of regional military leaders were generally followed by ideological 
22 
indoctrination and/or institutional changes within the PLA. (As will 
show later, Mao focused more on indoctrination while Deng placed more 
emphasis on institutional changes). Reshufflings, in the, final 
analysis, were a prelude to the consolidation of political power. 
j 
This paper will address these issues in a chronological fashion in 
order to grasp the complexity of each specific reshuffling. Each 
chapter clearly presents the sequence of events on each reshuffling in 
order to illustrate the above arguments. Arguments 1, 3, 4 and 5 will 
be examined in relation to the Mao era (in Chapter 2 and 3). Arguments 
2 , 3 , 4 and 5 will be studied in relation to the Deng era (in Chapter 
4 and 5). Since this paper does not focus primarily on the nature of 
political struggles, these political events that influenced each 
reshuffling will only be briefly summarized. 
8 
PART I 
RESHUFFLINGS OF REGIONAL MILITARY LEADERS 




THE 1967 RESHUFFLING 
Although most scholars considered that the 1973 reshuffling as the 
first major reshuffling of the military regions after the 
reorganization of PLA in 1954, a series of personnel changes occurred 
as early as 1967 at the PLA，s central and regional levels. This 
reshuffling affected seven Cdrs and ten 1st Pol Cmrs of the 13 MRs. 
Similar to most of the other reshufflings, this reshuffling was 
i 
officially announced^ and occurred after a power struggle. 
In light of the fact that the specific reasons for each of the 
reshufflings had been hidden behind a veil of secrecy, an analysis of 
the political context preceding the 1967 reshuffling of military-
personnel is then important. ‘ 
The 1967 reshuffling was designed by Mao to uproot the groups of 
military personnel who were resisting his policy. The first group of 
military personnel was Peng Dehuai and associates who were mainly the 
members of the 1st FA. While Peng and some of his prominent supporters 
had already been purged in 1959, some of the regional leaders who had 
earlier served under Peng were the target of Mao's purges in the 
Cultural Revolution (CR). The second group under attack was Liu Shaoqi, 
Deng Xiaoping and their associates who were mainly from the 3rd and 2nd 
FA respectively. In order to understand why Mao wanted to purge them, 
the first section will focus on the conflict between Mao and Peng and 
9 
the second section will focus on the conflict between Mao and Liu-Deng 
faction. Even though such power struggles are not the major focus of 
this paper, an examination of these elite conflicts can provide 
insights into why and how the regional Chinese command was reshuffled 
in 1967. 
Conflict between Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai 
The first intra-Party power struggle after the establishment of 
the PRC began with a party-army conflict. Scholars of Chinese politics 
have presented two major explanations on the events that precipitated 
the confrontation between Mao and Peng. One explanation holds that this 
confrontation resulted from the Minister of National Defense (Mjffi) and 
the former leader of 1st FA, Peng Dehuai，s criticism丨of Mao，s Great I ( 
Leap Forward in 1958.^ In the CCPCC Lushan Conference of August 1959, 
Mao reacted to Peng‘s petition by stating that he: 
would go to the countryside and lead the peasants to 
overthrow the government. If you (Peng) from the PLA do not 
come with me (Mao), then I will build a Red Army. I believe 
the PLA will come with me.” 
While taking a risk in creating an open rift within the leadership, Mao 
succeeded in winning over the majority of the Central Committee's 
support for his actions against Peng. This fierce debate between Mao 
and Peng resulted in a victory for Mao and the dismissal of Peng. 
The second explanation for the Mao-Peng conflict concerns their 
different perceptions on army-building. Mao believed in politization of 
the PLA. Peng, in contrast, focused on the professionalization of PLA 
due to the PLA，s experience in the Korean War. In the aftermath of the 
Korean War Peng Dehuai implemented a series of measure like the 
"Regulations in the Services of Officers", rank system, and a 




expertise were sprung up. While Peng focused on both modernizing the 
PLA and relying on foreign assistance, Mao focused on political 
education. Mao percieved Peng's military line as "counterrevolutionary 
revisionism" and "rightist opportunism"^ which Mao aimed to destroy. In 
order to enable the PLA to become an independent entity, Mao supported 
ideological education based on his military theories and the thought of 
Marxism-Leninism in order to uphold both party leadership and his party 
line. Numerous "Study Mao's military theories" campaigns were 
inaugurated, "Go down to the companies and soldier" and "Everyone is a 
Soldier" movements were also launched. Their contradiction on military 
lines and the wave of professionalism finally came to an halt when Peng 
was dismissed at the Lushan Conference. .. :: 
Although Peng was eventually purge from his military and party 
！ 
！ 
positions, Mao's power was already weakened by the disastorous Great 
Leap Forward and, especially, by the promotion of Liu Shaoqi to Party 
Chairman. While in power, Liu launched a large-scale of investigation 
and evaluation on the failure of Mao's "Three Red Banners" campaign. He 
also supported the calling of rehabilitation of Peng and claimed that 
5 
much things which Peng suggested in the Lushan Conference were true. 
Despite such misgivings, Mao was able to appoint his loyalist Lin Biao 
as the new MND, which allowed Mao to retain control of the PLA and the 
base to fight back later. Lin Biao, a prominent leader of the 4th FA, 
was regarded as Mao's "best student and closest friend.“ He was also 
the major advocate of "holding high the great red banner of Mao's 
Zedong's thought and giving prominence to politics." 
Following the appointment of Lin Biao in September 1959, a small 
but important numbers of personnel changes, especially at the central 
military levels, were made to replace the posts of the dismissed Peng 
11 
f 1 
‘ and his associates. This provided an opportunity for Mao to kick out 
•f J 
his challengers replacing them with people who supported his polices. 
ii 
i The 1959 reshuffling was only a rather minor reshuffling because new 
k, 
I appointments were only made to the vacanted post when the Central 
Committee members of the Lushan Conference accepted the dismissal of 
m 
Peng and some of his associates. It was only in the 1967 reshuffling 
• 
j that Mao managed to manipulate both state and party apparatus by 
‘ launching a full-scale reshuffling. Before going to this reshuffling, 
I j the following section will first briefy examine the small-scale I 
I reshuffling in 1959 
d 
I 
i A Small-Scale Reshuffling in 1959 — I ‘ 
！ Lin Biao and Luo Juiqing, who was from the 2nd FA, became MND and 
I 
i the Chief of PLA General Staff Department (GSD) with the purge of Peng 
Dehuai and Huang Kecheng, who was also a 1st FA loyalist. Tan Cheng, 
Director of PLA General Political Department (GPD) was replaced by a 
I - , 
I 4th FA subordinate Xiao Hua. Hong Xuezhi, Director of PLA General 
Logistics Department (GLD), was replaced by Qiu Huizuo, who was a 4th 
FA loyalist. Apart from the three general departments, Deng Hua, Cmr of 
the Shenyang MR from the 1st FA, was replaced by Chen Xilian of the 2nd 
FA. 
Those who were also being labelled as "Peng-Huang Anti-Party 
Clique" and purged at the same time included: Vice Minister of National 
Defence, Xiao Ke (1st FA)； Deputy Chief of Staff, Zhang Aiping (1st 
FA) ； the Politburo members, Lin Boqi and Chen Yun; Politburo Alternate 
member, Zhang Wei-tien, Editor-in-Chief of PLA Newspaper Office, 0 Yang 
* Wen, and Pol Cmr of Former 1st FA Army, Xi Zhongxun,and First Secretary 
7 of Hunan Provincial Party, Zhou Xiaozhou. 
12 
In analyzing these purges of the so-called "Peng-Huang Anti-Party 
Clique", most of the individuals purged were the members of the 1st FA, 
i while their replacements were PLA men mainly from the 2nd and 4th FAs. 
On the other hand, the dismissal of Peng and his associates resulted in 
a loss of 1st FA representation in PLA. As Jiirgen Domes has suggested, •j 
；i 
"until the 1971, no new major PLA appointment went to anybody from the 
;i � 0 
I First Field Army's loyalty group." It is therefore rather untrue for 
Parish to comment that no concurrent purges of the 1st FA associates 
occurred after Peng was purged in 1959. With the help of another 
factions within the PLA, Mao was able to rely on another faction to 
redistribute the power of PLA. Party could then still command the gun 
and even resist of the gun. The 1959 reshuffling also suggests that Mao 
realized the strong affiliational ties within the FA faction even 
t 
！ 
though such kind of military distribution had been abolished, he no 
longer trusted those who were from the 1st FA. 
Steps After Reshuffling for the Consolidation of Power 
In the wake of these events, Mao took steps to prepare for the 
consolidation of power, institutional changes and ideological 
indoctrinations were followed. Following the 1959 Lushan Conference, 
Mao felt isolated. Mao percieved Party leaders Liu Shaoqi, Deng 
Xiaoping and Peng Chen as not supporting his policies. 
With the help of Lin Biao, Mao relied on another portion of PLA to 
fight against the "revisionism" tendency. After the adoption of "Two 
Recollections and Three Investigations",^^ steps were taken to establish 
the party organization in PLA. The "Regulations for PLA Management and 
Education on Company Level" and "Four Sets of Regulations on Political 
work in Company Level Units of PLA"^ ^ were implemented to strengthen 
13 
16 I • 
I the PLA's internal unity. In these movements, it has been estimated \ \ I 
I that 80% of the party organizations were reorganized at the company 
i 12 
I level. Approximately 229,000 new Party members were recruited in PLA j 
•丨 13 and 2,000 unreliable party members were dismissed. In the final 
I analysis, about 78,000 people were transferred from other levels to the 
,1 1 1 U I company level. 
I The second step taken was to promote the political and ideological 
I •I 
I standards in PLA through the indoctrination of Mao Zedong Thought. 
！ i 
I Numerous campaigns, publications, regulations and study groups were 
1 
I 1 • 
made to study Mao‘s thought within the PLA.^ ^ In 1963, the first "All-
i 
Army Political Work Conference was held to adopt the important and 
I 
well-known "Regulations Governing Political Work in the PLA," which 
provided guidelines for the PLA's activities. The "Fpur Firsts", the 
I I 
"Three-Eight Work Style", the "Five Good Soldiers", the "Four Good 
17 
Companies" were all implemented to encourage the PLA to support Mao. 
The third step taken was to use PLA as an educational model to 
reform the masses. In 1964, Mao announced to the whole nation to "Learn 
from the Experience of the PLA in Political Education and Ideological 
Work". The purpose of this campaign was, as stated in the RMRB, "to 
learn from the Liberation Army was to learn the revolutionary spirit of 
18 
the proletariat. ” This campaign was promoted not only for the general 
public but also for the various governmental and non-governmental 
organizations, enterprises and factories. 
Gradually, the Mao-Lin faction successfully exploited the PLA to 
attain their political and ideological goals. Despite these efforts, 
the Mao-Lin faction, as Parris Chang has posited, did not originally 
19 
plan to replace the Party with PLA. With these campaigns, the 
expansion of PLA's power to non-military activities followed. Although 14 
they established party control over the military, numerous PLA 
personnel were also being transferred to civilian duties. About 200,000 
ex-PLA personnel were working in the governments and financial 
sectors.^^ It seems that the Mao-Lin faction realized the importance of 
21 a party-army alliance in order to gain sufficient strength. 
j 
In the process of moving army personnel into the political arena, 
i there was no indication that Mao wanted the army to command the party 
！ 
since Mao believed that politics should be in command. It appears that 
Mao only wanted the army to act as an instrument to re-consolidate his 
power and to check Liu Shaoqi，s growing political influence and power. 
As Ellis Joffe has noted, Mao "used the army not to replace the Party, 
and certainly not against it, but to reinvigorate. it and ^  other 
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organizations with revolutionary elan.” Parris Chang further 
suggested that Mao "did use the PLA for political purposes, but 
initially these purpose and the political role of the PLA were 
limited. 
The Cultural Revolution and the Field Army System 
Although the seeds of the intra-party power struggle had been 
implanted as early as in 1959, it was only the CR that an overt clash 
between Mao-Lin and Liu-Deng factions occurred. 
Most interpretations consider the CR to be essentially an 
ideological and political conflict between these two blocs. The Mao-Lin 
faction has been treated as representing the revolutionary road that 
oppose "those in power but who follow the capitalist road.” Beneath 
this ideological confrontation, the Mao-Lin facction aimed at toppling 
the Bourgeoisie line of the Liu-Deng faction. While numerous 
comprehensive studies have analyzed the causes and results of the CR, 
15 
it is noteworthy to focus how the PLA-FA loyalty system existed within 
this factional struggle. The basic reason for the importance of this 
loyalty system was that Mao had former 4th FA，s Cdr Lin Biao on his 
side while Liu Shaoqi, who was formerly the Cdr of 3rd FA, had the 
support of Deng Xiaoping, the key leader of 2nd FA. Due to limited 
sources and the complexity of the CR, it is difficult to see how the FA 
loyalists sided with their former superiors in the CR's power 
struggles. Even so, one can surmise from the purged personnel during 
the CR that they were mostly affilitated, at one time or another with 
the 3rd or the 2nd FAs. 
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Since the CR was aimed to struggle, criticize and reform, the 
first person struggled against was Luo Juiqing, a former member pf 2nd 
FA, the Vice Premier of State Council, the Vice-MND,. the Secretary-
i 
General of CCPCCMC, the Chief of GSD and the Minister of Public 
Security. Luo was a close associate of Liu Shaoqi and Peng Chen. Apart 
from his emphasis on the importance of professionalism, the main reason 
for his purge was reporterly due to his opposition to Mao's advocation 
on "People's War" strategy against the United States in the Vietnam War 
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while Luo urged for conventional strategy. 
Following Luo's purge in November 1965, Marshall He Long became 
the next target through the "February Rebellion" campaign. He, the 
senior leader of the 1st FA, the Vice-Premier of MC and the Vice-
Chairman of the National Defence Council, was accused of plotting a 
rebellion to overthrow the Mao-Lin faction. It has been claimed that He 
prepared to mobilize his army to Peking so as to protect the capital. 
The Mao-Lin faction reacted by sending Lin's 38th Army into Peking to 
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protect their position within the Communist regime. With the purge of 
Luo, He and many others, Liu Shaoqi was in a threatening position. The 16 
Mao-Lin faction sought to aim their serious attack at Liu Shaoqi and 
his other supporters. 
As the CR spread throughout the whole nation, the attack of top 
Party and military leaders spread to the Party Committees in Beida and 
Qinghua Universities. The students were then formed into Red Guards to 
launch massive criticisms against "the landlord class, the bourgeoisie, 
the imperialists, the revisionists and their running dogs to rebel 
against the handful of Party persons in authorities taking the 
i og 
capitalist road.” Making use of the Red Guards to terrorize the 
followers of capitalist road, Mao began to confront with difficulties 
in controlling the Red Guards. In 1967, the PLA was officially ordered 
to intervene into politics to restore order. This was.the very,first 
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time that PLA was directly intervened into the Chinese politics. 
Furthermore, with the "Decision of CCPCC, the State Council, the 
CCPCCMC, and the Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee 
on Resolute Support for the Revolutionary Masses of the Left" in 
January 23，1967, the PLA was asked to "seize power from the handful of 
Party power-holders taking the capitalist road.“ This directive stated 
that "all past directives concerning the Army，s non-involvement in the 
Great Cultural Revolution in local areas and other directives which 
violated the above-mentioned spirit are all null and void...[so as] to 
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support the broad masses of the Left." The PLA was then ordered to 
carry out the "Three Supports and Two Militaries" throughout the 
nation. This campaign included supporting the Left, the workers and 
31 the peasants, while implementing military control and training. At the outset, the PLA faced difficulties in distinguishing between the Left 
and Right. The confusion and ambiguity led to the "February Adverse 
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Current.“ The CCPCCMC had to issue an order to prohibit any arrests 
17 
without the approval of central authorities on April 6, 1967• 16 
I It is important to recognize that the PLA's role in the 
suppression of the "capitalists" was not coherent. Some PLA regional 
leaders were accused to be followers of "capitalist road" and were 
I 
！ suppressed by the Mao-Lin faction. It is too simplistic to assess as 
most scholars do, that the PLA was involved in the suppression. The PLA 
cannot be viewed as a single entity, it was divided into factions 
associated with Mao and Lin and with Liu, Deng and He. The latter 
group, in particular, reluctant to fight against their superiors, which 
i made them to be regarded as anti-Maoists. 
丨 The "pro-Mao-Lin PLA" was finally successful in not only 
i 
suppressing the Red Guards but also in defeating Liu*s faction, Liu, 
I 
Deng and many of their supporters in the party and the military were 
! ‘ 
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dismissed. On the Central Committee level, 39% of the purged personnel 
were military men, which does not include Liu, Deng and He who were 
part of the party apparatus. The majority of the military men purged 
associated with the 1st, 2nd or 3rd FAs. None of them had ever served 
in the 4th FA. The loyalists of the 3rd FA included Tan Zhenlin and Tao 
Zhu, Ye Fei, Jiang Weiqing, Jiang Hua, Tang Liang and Tan Qilong were 
purged. The 2nd FA loyalists purged included Zhang Jichun and Deng 
Zihui, who were full members of CC; Yang Yong and Su Zhenhua who were 
the alternate members. Whereas the purged 1st FA included Xu Quangda, 
Zhang Zongrun and Deng Hua, who were full members and Li Zhimin, Liao 
Hansheng, Wang Shitai and Wang Shangrong, who were alternate members. 
There were a few exceptions. Xu Xianqian, Wei Guoqing and a few 
members, who were members of the 2nd and 3rd FAs, remained as full 
members of CC. Nonetheless, the members who remained neutral only 
represented a rather small percentage. The 4th FA loyalists were not 
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only unaffected by these purges but many of them replaced the purged 
membersWithout a doubt, the main reason why the PLA 4th FA gained 
such party authority was that after an exhaustive power struggle, Mao 
was not able to reorganize the Party and the state immediately. Mao had 
to rely on Lin and his FA supporters to achieve both his attack on the 
Liu-Deng faction and his consolidation of power which resulted in 
rewards for the 4th FA supporters. 
The 1967 Reshuffling 
Mao instructed that "military cadres must be transferred to other 
posts and the armed forces units must also be dispatched to other 
places. "35 Although this reshuffling was explained by Lin to be a "good 
way to rotate troops for construction, production and training,"" the 
！ -
reshuffling of MRs in early 1967 did not seem to be only an 
administration consideration occurring after an intense political power 
struggle, such personnel reorganization appeared to be an emergency and 
political policy. 
The purge of Liu, Deng and He signified the loss of their 
supporters. The 1967 reshuffling reveals the disappearance of their 
loyalists from the regional command who stood against the Mao-Lin 
faction. 
On the MD level, 13 to 19 Cdrs and 17 to 20 Pol Cmrs were newly 
appointed by Lin Biao. Half of the Cdrs and nearly all of the 1st Pol 
Cmrs on the MR level were reshuffled. After the purge of He Long who 
was one of the most significant leaders of the 1st FA, Table 1 shows 
that 1st FA members Huang Xinting, Li Jingquan, Yan Hongyan, Wang Enmao 
and Tan Guansan disappeared. Of the 23 Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs, six of 
them were the 1st FA elites. Zhang Dazhi, Cdr of Lanzhou MR, was the 
19 
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TABLE 1. THE 1967 RESHUFFLING 
COMMANDERS & 1ST POL COMMISSARS PREVIOUS POSTS OF THE 
MILITARY y COMMANDERS AND 
REGIONS Before 1967 After 1967 1ST POL COMMISSARS 
Yang Yong 2 Zheng Weishan 2 Deputy Cdr - Peking MR 
PEKING 
Li Xuefeng 2 Xie Fuzhi 2 Cdr -Public Security Force 
Chen Xilian 2 Chen Xilian 2 Unchanged 
SHENYANG 
Song Renqiong 2 Pan Fusheng 2 1st Pol Cmr-Heilongjiang MP 
Yang Dezhi 5 Yang Dezhi 5 Unchanged 
JINAN ^ 
Tan Qilong 3 Wang Xiaoyu Vice-Mayor-Qinghai Municipal 
Xu Shiyou 3 Xu Shiyou 3 Unchanged 
NANKING — 
Vacant Zhang Chunqiao 3 Secretary - Shanghai MFC 
Huang Yongsheng4 Huang Yongsheng4 Unchanged 
GUANGZHOU 
Tao Chu 3 Wei Guoqing 1st Secretary-Guanxi PC 
Huang Xinting 1 Liang Xingchu 4 Deputy Cdr - Guangzhou MR 
CHENGDU 
Li Jingquan 1 Zhang Guohua 2 Cdr - Xinjiang MR 
Zhang Dazhi 1 Zhang Dazhi 1 Unchanged 
LANZHOU 
Liu Lantao 5 Xian Henghan 1 Director-North West PD 
I 
Han Xianchu 3 Han Xianchu 3 Unchanged , 
FUZHOU 
Ye Fei 3 Zhou Chiping 4 Unknown 
Chen Zaidao 2 Zeng Siyu 5 Pol Cmr - Shenyang MR 
WUHAN — 
Wang Renzhong 3 Liu Feng 2 Deputy Cdr - Wuhan MR,s Navy 
Qin Jiwei 2 Vacant 
KUNMING 
Yan Hongyan 1 Tan Furen 4 
Wang Enmao 1 Long Shu j in 4 Cdr-Hunan MD 
XINJIANG 
Wang Enmao 1 Zhang Zimin 4 Unknown 
Zhang Guohua 2 Zeng Yongya Deputy Pol Cmr - Tibet MR 
TIBET — 
Tan Guansan 1 Ren Rong 4 Deputy Pol Cmr - Tibet MR 
INNER Ulanfu Teng Haiqing 3 Deputy Cmr - Peking MR 
MONGOLIA 
Ulanfu Wu Tao 5 Deputy Pol Cmr-1 .Mongolia MR 
1-5 lst-5th FAS 
Sources ： CCA� Vol.4 (October 1967), pp.41-44 
see, Vol.8, No.3 (March 1974), p.3 
only person survive that was associated with the 1st FA. 
The reason for their dismissal was not simply due to their 
background as 1st FA subordinates. What is more important is that in 
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j 
being loyalists to their FA faction, they harboured with Mao and Lin's 
attack and purge of their leaders especially Peng and He. Huang 
Xinting, Cdr of Chengdu, was purged and criticized for having close 
connection with He Long.^ ^ Li Jingquan, 1st Pol Cmr of the same region, 
was arrested because he opposed the Mao-Lin faction and took a massive 
39 action to quell Red Guards in Congqiang area. Yan Hongyan, 1st Pol Cmr 
of Kunming, was referred to as an "agent of Liu Shaoqi", after which he 
40 was dismissed and committed suicide, Wang Enmao, Cdr and 1st Pol Cmr 
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of Xinjiang, was exposed to severe criticism for opposing the CR. Tan 
Guansan, 1st Pol Cmr of Tibet, confronted a similar charge and fate. 
Only Zhang Dazhi, who was not involved in the criticism against the CR 
and the Red Guards, was able to maintain his post. From Zhang's 
example, it can be surmised that Mao did not really see the entire 1st 
1 
FA as his enemy he wanted to eradicate. He seemed only to dismiss them 
for opposing his CR policies and the Red Guards. It, however, appears 
that most members of the former 1st FA still percieved themselves as a 
faction rather than being divided in accordance to different MRs. They 
responded and reacted in a similar pattern of behaviour. 
The purge of Liu and Deng led to the eclipse of both their loyalty 
groups and, especially, the Pol Cmrs which Liu and Deng had been 
responsible for training. Those belonging to Liu's 3rd FA that were 
dismissed included Tan Qilong, Ye Fei and Wang Renzhong. Both Ye and 
Wang were formerly working under and had a long-term association with 
10 
Tao Zhu, It is obvious that the loyalty system may not be only at one 
level. 
Those dismissed 3rd FA Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs were purged for 
supporting their former 3rd FA leader Liu Shaoqi included for instance, 
Tan Qilong who was arrested for being an "anti-Party and anti-Mao" as 
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well as a member of the "Liu-Deng sinister gang•"“ Tao Zhu was purged 
for being a "chieftain of Liu-Deng faction."'^ Ye Fei was not only 
46 
branded as counterrevolutionary, but also purged with Liu. Wang 
Renzhong was arrested for opposing Mao-Lin faction, quelling pro-Mao-
Lin elements and for arresting those who had criticized members of the 
Provincial Party Committee.^^ Xu Shiyou, a former 3rd FA subordinate, 
remained in post due to his shift in supporting the Mao-Lin faction. It 
has been believed that Xu was initially in great trouble but when pro-
/g 
Mao Zhang Chunqiao went to Nanking to persuade him, he yielded. As we 
can see, there is always an exceptional case. But generally speaking, 
nearly all of those dismissed 3rd FA loyalists followed and supported 
the direction of their FA leader. -
As seen in Table 1，the dismissed 1st Pol Cmrs who belonged to 1 [
Deng's 2nd FA faction included Li Xuefeng of the Peking MR and Song 
Renqiong of the Shenyang MR» The purged Cdrs of the 2nd FA included 
Yang Yong of the Peking MR, Chen Zaido of the Wuhan MR, Qin Jiwei of 
Kunming MR and Zhang Guohua of Tibet MR. Both Qin and Zhang were 
formerly under the command of Liu Bocheng's 2nd FA. Similarly, Li 
Xuefeng was purged for opposing the Mao-Lin faction and for resisting 
the CR.49 Song Renqiong was purged for pursuing a "wrong l i n e . "50 chen 
Zaidao was arrested for organizing the Wuhan Incident, while Qin Jiwei 
was forced to attend ideological re-education for his close connection 
with D e n g . T h e exceptional case this time included Chen Xilian, Cdr 
of the Shenyang MR. He supported Jiang Qing and was later banned as a 
member of "Little Gang of Four" in the early 1980s. Xie Fuzhi of the 
Peking MR was regarded as Deng's betrayer because he was the first to 
CO 
expose Deng*s crime. Liu Feng of the Wuhan MR was promoted through 
Lin, because Liu supported him in the CR. Their shifting of sides 
22 
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helped them to prevent their dismissal. As these events reveal, there 
was a very small numbers of individuals who reacted differently from 
their colleagues that belonged to the same FA faction. The FA system 
might not be the only explanation for loyalty and power distribution 
but it is still existing and dominating the behaviour of most PLA 
members. They still had a rather strong identity for being FA members 
and tended to flock together in times of crises. 
Liu Lantao, 1st Pol Cmr of Lanzhou MR, was the only one from the 
North China FA with a 5th FA background that was dismissed. While 
Ulanfu, Cdr and 1st Pol Cmr of Inner Mongolia MR, did not belong to any 
,** 
FA faction.^ Still Lin Lantao was charged for being "agent of Liu 
Shaoqi" of Northeast China and Ulanfu was arrested for being "a,.fierce 
fighter of Liu's sinister g a n g . A l l of the above-mentioned dismissed 
Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs were banned as an anti-party clique, anti-Maoist, 
followers of the "capitalist road" and charged of suppressing the Red 
Guards during the CR. 
The 1967 reshuffling was the result of political factor. Before 
the 1967 reshuffling, six Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs were from the 1st FA. 
Only two survived after the CR. Seven originally from the 2nd FA while 
six remained in the same post after reshuffling. Six from the 3rd FA 
while five remained. As for the 4th FA, it was not only unaffected with 
the purges and dismissals but was the only faction that increased its 
representation after the reshuffling. 
The domination of 4th FA elites in the posts of Cdrs and 1st Pol 
Cmrs is seen by the new appointments of Liang Xiangchu, Cdr of Chengdu 
MR; Zhou Chiping, Cdr of Foozhou MR; Long Shujiu, Cdr of Xinjiang MR; 
Zeng Yongya, Cdr of Tibet MR and Ren Rong, 1st Pol Cmr of the same 
region (see Table 1). While the 4th FA originally had one 
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representative in the leading position, of now had seven. Yang Dezhi, 
Xu Shiyou, Han Xianchu and Wu Tao also joined Lin Biao's faction. In 
all, there were eleven military leaders who belonged to Lin's loyalty 
group. Indeed, the increasing power of Lin Biao during the CR also 
affected the fate of his subordinates and followers. These 
reshufflings allowed Lin a stronger power base in the regional 
military. 
Although most of Liu Bocheng and Deng's 2nd FA Cdrs and 1st Pol 
Cmrs were dismissed, the representation of 2nd FA did not really suffer 
a significant decrease due to the neutrality of its key leader, a 
Regimental Cdr of the 115th division under Lin Biao, Xu Xianqian. He 
was claimed to be in relatively good standing with Mao and Lin after 
the power struggle.“ Xu who was being regarded as th^ symbolic leader 
of the 2nd FA was even appointed as head of the Cultural Revolutionary 
Group of the arm forces as well as being elected to the CCP Politburo 
in August 1966. It has been suggested that Xu's promotion was due to 
Mao's need to take advantage of Xu’s relation with the 2nd FA in order 
r/J 
to consolidate his power. His neutrality also led to the promotion of 
his followers to the MR level. They included: Zheng Weishan, Cdr of 
Peking MR; Xie Fuzhi, 1st Pol Cmr of the same region; Pan Fusheng of 
Shenyang MR and Liu Feng of Wuhan MR. Besides being Xu's subordinates, 
their appointments were also due to their non-involvement in the CR. 
Even after the reshuffling, the 2nd FA still controlled the Peking 
and the Shenyang MR, suggesting that despites Mao's attempt to prevent 
factionalism, the Mao-Lin faction was not able to eliminate the 
existence of a Cdr and 1st Pol Cmr of the same FA together in one 





j As for Zhang Guohua of the 2nd FA, who was being transferred from 
Tibet to Chengdu, survived due to the complexity of the Tibet MR. When 
i I 
j factional rivalry occurred in early 1967 in Tibet, it was only Zhang, 
'i 
1 1 the "native emperor" of Tibet and the only Cdr of Tibet since 1952 (see 
j 
51 Appendix), who could control the situation• In order to maintain 
！i 
I stability, Mao even established the Military Control Committee in Tibet 
！ • 
丨  with Zhang as its chief. This committee served as both an intergrim 
；i 
I government and "a major channel for the growing political power of the 
j 
j C Q 
I regional military network.“ Zhang, therefore, still maintained his 
i • 
authority in Tibet. Although the Mao-Lin faction desired to dismiss '1 “ 1 -j
I Zhang because he had organized his own Red Guards to fight against 
j 
I rq 
Mao's, such external factor hindered their eagerness. In广sum， 
including Chen Xilian, there were now still six 2nd FA；in the posts of 
Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs. But except Zhang, all of them maintained an 
hand-off policy in the power struggle. 
Of the 24 Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs after the 1967 reshuffling, only 
two of them, Cdr of the Wuhan MR, Zeng Siyu and 1st Pol Cmrs of Inner 
Mongolia, Wu Tao had a 5th FA background. More importantly, Zeng was a 
former subordinate of Lin Biao suggesting that his appointment may have 
been due to his personal connection with Lin. While Wu Tao was able to 
replace his enemy, Ulanfu, on April 19. There was also only three 
representatives of the 3rd FA, Zhang Chunqiao of the Nanking MR, Wei 
Guoqing of Guangzhou and Teng Haiqing of Inner Mongolia. The only newly 
appointed 1st FA representative was Xian Henghan of the Lanzhou MR. 
Obviously, the 4th FA dominated the top leadership of MR, the 
second would be the 2nd FA. A sudden drop of representation of 1st and 
3rd FAs while the 5th FA remained the same low representation. 
In short, the result of the 1967 reshuffling reflects the result 
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of the power seizure. The winners had more control over the regional 
military leadership while the losers were either demoted or 
disappeared. The reason why Mao and Liu-Deng faction was able to 
snowball from a mere intra-Party struggle to the involvement of the PLA 
was because the latter had close connections and loyalty support of 
their FA subordinates while Mao received the backing of another portion 
of PLA, Lin and his 4th FA members. It can be imagined that without the 
help of Lin and his associates, Mao may not be able to be the winner. 
Therefore, when Liu and Deng were purged, their loyalists in the PLA 
were also forced to step down while Lin Biao became the key figure and 
his loyalists were also promoted to important posts. 
Other Causes of the 1967 Reshuffling 丨 
！ 
( 
Instead of eradicating the regional mountaintopism, the 1967 
reshuffling proved to be a policy that destroyed the power-base of 
Mao's former colleagues whose interests were so different from Mao that 
would affect his position in the political arena. If this reshuffling 
was aimed to destroy localism, we should expect massive transferals. By 
transferring the regional leaders to other regions, they would be 
separated from .. their loyalists where mountaintops could not be 
established. In this round of personal rearrangement, all those 
regional leaders except Zhang Guohua, who was transferred from Tibet to 
Chengdu MR, had been transferred. Those who did not pose a threat to 
Mao or favoured by Mao remained at the same posts, refer to Table 1* 
Henceforth, the eradication of mountaintopism was not the exact reason 
behind this reshuffling, the eradication of Mao*s challengers and the 
untrusted was more appropriate. 
The reason why all of the Pol Cmrs were being dismissed was not 
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only because most of them were trained by Mao，s challengers, Liu Shaoqi 
and Deng Xiaoping, but rather because they were angered with the sudden 
drastic decrease of power. 
With the establishment of the GPD, Pol Cmrs were used as a 
political control over Cdrs who were more prone to military, rather 
than political functions. The Pol Cmrs enjoyed high prestige when Mao 
wanted to use the PLA as an instrument for ideology transformation and 
power struggle in the period between 1960 and 1966. At the same time, 
it was the Pol Cmrs whom Mao relied on. They educated the mass with 
Maoism, acted as a model in the "Learn from PLA." These Pol Cmrs helped 
to organize and train the Red Guards. As W. W. Whitson argues the Pol 
Cmrs were in the forefront of the CR working in various non-
governmental levels to eradicate "revisionism". The 1st Pol Cmrs of 
all MRs, MDs, military sub-districts, garrsion command and people's arm 
department were appointed as First Secretaries of CC Bureaus, 
Provincial Party Committees, Municipal Party Committees, Prefectural 
M 
and even County Party Committees. With the increasing role and status 
of the Pol Cmrs, conflicts occurred between these Cdrs and the local 
party organs. It finally reached a climax which led to the bloody 
confrontation between the Pol Cmrs and Red Guards, on one side, and the 
g2 
Cdrs and the local Party organ on the other side. Also with the 
uncontrollable activities of the Red Guards, Mao finally relied on the 
PLA Cdrs instead to intervene to restore order in January 1967. 
Mao removed all the 1st Party Secretaries who were concurrently 
1st Pol Cmrs. As posited by H. Nelsen, only two out of the 13 1st Pol 
. 6 3 
Cmrs of MRs remained in their positions by June 1967. Mao granted 
further authority to Cdrs at both central and regional level to 
suppress disorders. Not only being removed from their posts in the 
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local party apparatus, most of the 1st Pol Cmrs decided to stand on 
Liu-Deng side because the CR was used to struggle against their 
leaders, superiors and trainers. 
While the PLA men were able to overthrow the Mao-Lin* s 
challengers, we can see from Table 1 that not all PLA Cdrs were 
supporting Mao. They tended to prefer a hands-off policy and did not 
ei agree with the army*s involvement in politics. One of these Cdrs even 
overtly turned against Mao-Lin faction. This incident was even 
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interpreted as a kind of intention towards warlordism. As Jiirgen Domes 
argued that the centre no longer trusted the loyalty and reliability of 
the regional Cdrs. This Wuhan Incident in July 1967 occurred with the 
command of Wuhan MR's Cdr Chen Zaidao and his Pol Cmrs, Zhun Hartghua. 
A million of people was said to resist Mao-Lin's Red Guards and rebels. 
i 
When Vice-Premier of the State Council and Chief of Public Security 
Force, Xie Fuzhi and the first assistant Editor Chief of Red Flag, Wang 
Li were sent to Wuhan to settle the mass, they were kidnapped. Mao 
responded by sending the 8191st Unit, stationed in the outskirts of 
Wuhan, and 15th corps of PLA from Xiaokan County to suppress Chen and 
associates. In order to strengthen centralized control over the 
regional command, Mao then reshuffled the Cdrs who were not supporting 
him. 
Steps after the 1967 Reshuffling 
After securing himself with trusted men around him, Mao began to 
place on politico-ideological education within the PLA. Apart from the 
insistence on the continuation of "politics in prominence" policy and 
the "Four Good" movement, all of the PLA*s general departments and arm 
services were ordered to accelerate the "Great Criticism" movement in 
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order to clean up the influence of "capitalism". Besides learning Mao 
Zedong's thought, the PLA men were ordered to hold militia conferences 
to exchange their experiences in the application of Mao's thought. 
In terms of institutional changes, Mao reorganized the units in 
charge of conscription. The Conscription Standing Committee and the 
Conscription Council were disintergrated after the power struggle. Such 
work was replaced by the Office of Army Employment, which was divided 
into the Militia Departments of each province. Mao also had the PLA 
controlled Revolutionary Committees to replace the Provincial Party 
Committees. (See Chapter 4 for more details). The Military Control 
Committees were also set up in each province and at the Ministries and 
Commissions of the State Council. -
In various parts of China, the "Better Soldiers and Simpler 
Administration" movement was highly propagated. It aimed to both build 
up a unitary leadership of administering the functions of PLA and break 
up the concept of class within the army. To carry out this movement, 
the numbers of PLA personnel were cut in different provinces in order 
to maintain the quality of better soldiers. The institution of one 
office above groups were made so as to attain a simpler 
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administration. 
In sum, the 1967 reshuffling, to a great extent, was successful in 
eradicating the Peng, Deng and Liu subordinates who had challenged Mao. 
All of the dismissed vacancies were not however replaced completely by 
Lin's loyalty faction. As seen in Table 1, there were still a rather 
high representation of other factions in these military positions. Even 
so, the representation of 4th FA increased in the central military 
leadership, suggesting the predominance of Lin's influence. 
With the rise of Lin Biao to the central MND, his 4th FA also 
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expanded its representation in the GPD, GSD and GLD. Qiu Huizuo became 
Director of GPD. Huang Yongsheng, who was originally the Cdr of 
Guangzhou MR was appointed as General of GSD. Zhang Zimin became Pol 
Cmr of GLD; Huang Zhiyong became Deputy Director of GPD. Wu Faxian 
became Cdr of the Air Force. Many other 4th FA loyalists were also 
recruited as the top personnel in the PLA general headquarters. 
From this chapter, it is clear that the 1967 reshuffling was 
dictated by political struggles. By reshuffling, Mao dismissed his 
challengers and gathered his supporters (or at least the neutral 
personnel). Furthermore, most of Mao's supporters were the 4th FA 
loyalists mainly because he had a right hand who was the leader of the 
4th FA. After reshuffling, Mao had introduced further measures to 
maintain his control over the PLA. The next chapter will examine two 
i 
other reshufflings to show the similar pattern. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE 1971 AND 1973 RESHUFFLINGS 
In the early 1970s, two reshufflings were conducted to 
redistribute the military power balance. The 1971 reshuffling was a 
quiet but revenging one. It was devised to exterminate Lin Biao ‘ s 
loyalists after the "September 13 Incident". While the 1973 reshuffling 
was officially announced at an Enlarged Meeting, Mao did not give an 
explanation for this reshuffling. It can be surmised that this 
reshuffling was an attempt to resecure the Party's control over the 
military. This is because when Mao used Lin and a portion of the PLA to 
support him in the political struggle against Liu-Deng faction, the end 
of the power struggle did not signify the end of the military's 
involvement in the political arena. In fact, the PLA continued to 
expand its role in politics. Although such domination did not mean that 
the Party lost the total control over the gun but, at least, as Ellis 
Joffe suggested that it was doubtful on the second part of Mao's dictum 
that "gun shall never be allowed to control the Party. 
In order to return PLA to the barracks, Mao used the 1973 
reshuffling as a means to curtail the military’s role in politics. 
In terms of time sequences, the present chapter will first 
illustrate the extent of the PLA's political role by examining the 
composition of the PLA in the major organizational structures in this 
period. Particular focus will be placed on the PLA's role in the 
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Revolutionary Committees, the local Party Committees, the Central 
Committee and the Politburo. In this period, the PLA enjoyed one of its 
highest proportions in having representation both on the regional and 
central levels and within Chinese politics in general. In the 
composition of the PLA in these non-military organizations, an obvious 
FA distribution can be discerned. The following section will examine 
the political conflict between Mao and Lin which resulted in the 1971 
reshuffling. The final analysis of this chapter will then go to the 
1973 reshuffling which halted the politization of PLA. 
The Domination of the PLA in Non-Military Organizations 
The PLA's Role in the Revolutionary Committees ；、 
In order to understand the 1973 reshuffling, it! is necessary to 
I ！ 
examine the role the PLA played in non-military organizations prior to 
this reshuffling. The first Revolutionary Committees (RC) was 
established on 31st of January 1967 with the purpose of serving as a 
temporary organization. These committees replaced both the old 
provincial, municipal and autonomous regional party committees and the 
state's provincial and city People's Councils. These provincial 
organizations were based on a "three-way alliance" of the leaders of 
revolutionary mass organizations, the representatives of the PLA，s 
2 
local units stationed locally and the leading revolutionary cadres. 
Up until September 1968, the RCs were set up in 29 provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions. The official purpose of RCs was 
to be the "political and organizational guarantee for the victory of 
the proletarian revolutionaries‘ struggle to seize power.“ 
The PLA played a major role in these organizations. Out of the 29 
provinces, all of the Chairmen of RCs were from the PLA men. Of the 235 
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Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen in these RCs, 122 were PLA men, 50 were 
representatives of mass organizations and 33 were representatives of 
the party cadres/ Domes and Joffe also further reveal that of the 479 
5 
Standing Committee members of the RCs, 235 were from the PLA. 
Based on the above figures, it is not an exaggeration to say that 
the PLA controlled the RCs. Although Mao was successful in toppling his 
Party's opponents, the expanding role of PLA to consolidate their local 
power through the RCs facilitated localism. In a sense, Mao had 
difficulty in ensuring that the party controlled the gun. During the 
early 1970s, the expanded role of the military in this period was one 
c 
of the major problems within Chinese politics. 
Almost all of the PLA men in control of these RCs were military 
regional leaders. Eight of the Chairmen were the Cdrs 丨of MRs. Chairman 
of Fujian RC, Han Xianchu, was the Cdr of the Fuzhou MR. In Guangzhou, 
Huang Yongsheng was the Chairman of its RC and the Cdr of its MR; Zeng 
Siyu of Hubei was the Cdr of the Wuhan MR; Teng Haiqing of Inner 
Mongolia was the Cdr of its MR. Xu Shiyou of Jiangsu was the Cdr of the 
Nanking MR. In Shenyang, Chen Xilian occupied the chairmanship of 
Liaoning and was the Cdr of the Shenyang MR; Zeng Yongya of Tibet was 
the Cdr of its MR. Finally, Long Shu j in of Xinjiang was the Cdr of its 
MR. Seven Chairmen of RCs were the 1st Pol Cmrs of the MRs. They 
included Xian Henghan of Gansu was the 1st Pol Cmr of the Lanzhou MR; 
Wei Guoqing of Guangxi was the 1st Pol Cmr of the Guangzhou MR; Pan 
Fusheng of Heilongjiang was the 1st Pol Cmr of the Shenyang MR; Xie 
Fuzhi of Peking was the 1st Pol Cmr of its MR; Wang Xiaoyu of Shandong 
was the 1st Pol Cmr of the Jinan MR; Zhang Chunqiao of Shanghai was the 
1st Pol Cmr of the Nanking MR and Zhang Guohua of Sichuan was the 1st 
Pol Cmr of the Chengdu MR. 
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In this period, a Cdr and/or a 1st Pol Cmr of each MR became 
Chairmen of the RCs. The reason this was allowed was probably due to 
the fact that Mao wanted the newly appointed military personnel to be 
trusted regional leaders. But these regional leaders were not to be 
just military leaders, they also became under the control of the Party 
when they occupied the position of the RC. In a sense, Mao was trying 
to harness the military. 
These leaders were not randomly selected. The FA loyalty system 
was significant in the composition of these RCs. Out of the 29 Chairmen 
of RCs, only one of them was without a FA background. As Table 2 
reveals, the 1st FA suffered the most since only two RC Chairmen were 
from this faction. As for the 4th FA, there was only one 1st Secretary 
of a local PC that has as affilitation with from this FA before RC was 
i “ 
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established. Even so, there was a sudden increase of appointments of 
the 4th FA loyalists to the Chairmanship of RCs when these RCs began to 
replace the local PCs. Even when the local PCs were reestablished in 
1971, there were still ten 4th FA members serving as the 1st 
Secretaries of PCs. The predominant position of the 4th FA in these 
non-military organizations was primary due to Lin Biao's predominant. 
Although Table 2 also indicates that the 4th FA had dominated about 32% 
of the chairmanships, the subordinates of the 2nd and 3rd FAs still had 
a high level representation despite the fact that their leaders were 
1 
under severe attack during the CR. Fourteen out of the 28 PLA FA 
loyalists were from the 2nd and 3rd FAs. This suggests that Lin Biao 
was not that successful in manipulating the provincial level. The 
representation of the 2nd and 3rd FAs was too strong for his men to 
penetrate. He could only replace his men in either the dismissed posts 
which were formerly occupied by the 1st FA or the posts which were 
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occupied by those who were purged and with no FA identity. 
TABLE 2. COMPOSITION OF THE PCs AND THE RCs 
29 First Chairmen First Chairmen 
Provinces Secretaries of RCs Secretaries of RCs 
and of PCs of after PCs 
RCs before RCs established re-
established PCs established 
Anhui Li Baohua Li Desheng 2 Li Desheng 2 Li Desheng 2 
Fujian Ye Fei Han Xianchu Han Xianchu 4 Han Xianchu 4 
Gansu Wang Feng Xian Xian Xian 
Henghan 1 Henghan 1 Henghan 1 
Guangdong Zhao Ziyang Huang Liu Ding Sheng 4 
Yongsheng 4 Xingyuan 4 
Guangxi Wei Guoqing Wei Guoqing 3 Wei Guoqing 3 Wei Guoqing 3 
Guizhou Jia Qiyun Li Zaihan 2 Lan Yining 4 Vacant 
Hebei Lin Tie Li Xuefeng 2 Liu Zihou 2 Liu Zihou 2 
Heilongjiang Pan Fusheng Pan Fusheng 2 Wang Jiadao 3 Wang Jiadao 3 
Henan Liu Jianxun Liu Jianxun 2 Liu Jianxun 2 Liu Jianxun 2 
Hubei Wang Zeng Siyu 5 Zeng Siyu 5 Zeng Siyu 5 
Renzhong 
Hunan Zhang Li Yuan 4 Hua Guofeng Hua Guofeng 
Pinghua 
Inner Ulanfu Teng You You 
Mongolia Haiqing 3 Taizhong 2 Taizhong 2 
Jiangsu Jiang Xu Shiyou 3 Xu Shiyou 3 Xu Shiyou 3 
Weiqing 
Jiangxi Yang Cheng Cheng Vacant 
Shangkui Shiqing 4 Shiqing 4 
Jilin Zhao Lin Wang Wang Wang 
Huaixiang 4 Huaixiang 4 Huaixiang 4 
Liaoning Huang Chen Xilian 2 Chen Xilian 2 Chen Xilian 2 
Huoqing 
Ningxia Yang Kang Kang Rang 
Jingren Jianmin 1 Jlanmin 1 Jianmin 1 
Peking Li Xuefeng Xie Fuzhi 2 Xie Fuzhi 2 Xie Fuzhi 2 
Qinghai Yang Liu Liu Liu 
Zhilin Xianquan 4 Xianquan 4 Xianquan 4 
Shaanxi Huo Shilian Li Ruishan 4 Li Ruishan 4 Li Ruishan 4 
Shandong Tan Qiling Wang Xiaoyu Yang Dezhi 5 Yang Dezhi 5 
Shanghai Chen Pixian Zhang Zhang Zhang 
Chunqiao 3 Chunqiao 3 Chunqiao 3 
Shanxi Wei Heng Liu Geping 5 Xie Zhenhua Xie Zhenhua 
Sichuan Liao Zhigao Zhang Zhang Zhang 
Guohua 2 Guohua 2 Guohua 2 
Tianjin Huang Xie Xuegong 5 Xie Xuegong 5 Xie Xuegong 5 
Huoqing 
Tibet Zhang Zeng Yongya 4 Ben Rong 4 Ren Rong 4 
Guohua 
Xinjiang Wang Enmao Long Shujin 4 Long Shujin 4 Vacant 
Yunan Yan Hongyan Tan Furen 4 Zhou Xing 2 Zhou Xing 2 
Zhejiang Jiang Hua Nan Ping 3 Nan Ping 3 Nan Ping 3 
11 Jl I 
Sources : David Goodman, China. 's Provincial Leaders Directory 
1949-1985, Vol.1, (New Asia Centre:University College, 
Cardiff Press, 1986, pp.13-15. 
Who's Who in Communist China, pp.801-804. 
W. W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command. 
The PLA's Role in Local Party Committees 
In the period following the establishment of RCs, there was a 
complete vacancy in all of the Provincial/ Municipal and Autonomous 
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Region Party Committees (PC). All of the 1st Secretaries of the local 
PCs, with the exception of Wei Guoqing, who became the Chairman of the 
substituted Guanxi RC, had been purged (see Table 2). Successful in the 
power struggle, Mao began to consider rebuilding the local PCs. In 
November 1967， the "Directive Concerning Reactivating the Party in 
Units where Revolutionary Committees Have Been Set Up" had been 
proposed to reestablish the party organs. The plan for reestablishing 
the PCs was not put forward again until the 9th NPC in April 1969. Once 
Q 
again, it was shelved after meeting strong opposition. After a habitus 
of nearly four years, 29 PCs were finally reestablished on December 13， 
1970 by Mao. 
Of the 29 administrative units, 19 Chairmen of the.RCs were placed 
on the PCs as 1st Secretaries (see Table 2). Among those not placed in 
these positions, with the exceptional of Huang Hongsheng who was a 
former loyalist of the 4th FA and the original Chairman of Guangdong 
RC, had been purged. Huang was appointed as the Chief of General Staff 
Department (GSD) of PLA in March 1968 to succeed Yang Chengwu. Tan 
Furen, Chairman of Yunan RC and a close associate of Lin Biao, had died 
in December 1970. While the dismissal of Xie Xuegong, Chairman of 
Tianjin RC was unknown. Others being purged included Li Zhihan, 
Chairman of the Guizhou RC; Li Xuefeng, Chairman of the Hebei RC; Li 
Yuan, Chairman of the Hunan RC; Pan Fusheng of the Heilongjiang RC, 
Teng Haiqing of the Inner Mongolia RC, Wang Xiaoyu of the Shangdong RC, 
Liu Geping of the Shanxi RC and Zeng Yongya of the Tibet RC.^ The exact 
reasons for these purges are not quite well known. In anycase, we can 
in 
surmise that they all had some type of political problems. 
The exclusion of these 12 Chairmen of the RCs did not really imply 
the decrease of PLA men in the composition of the re-established PCs. 
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With the exception of Hua Guofeng, all of the 28 First Secretaries were 
PLA men. Although it can be argued that most of them were also elected 
as members of the Party's Central Committee, they had deep-rooted 
background in military. Most of them had served in the PLA for rather 
a long period of time and were placed in relatively top-level positions 
in the PLA's hierarchy. Despite these developments, the domination of 
regional military leaders in the PCs were not affected. When Huang 
Hongsheng, the Chairman of Guangzhou and concurrently the Cdr of its 
MR was promoted, Yang Dezhi, another Cdr of the MR became the 1st 
Secretary of Shangdong. When the Cdr and Chairman of Tibet MR and RC, 
Zeng Yongya, was dismissed, the post of the 1st Pol Cmr of the Tibet 
MR, was superseded by Ren Rong, who was the Chairman of the Tibet-PC. 
In terms of FA affiliation, the 4th FA 丨 remained their 
representation. Their representation was still the highest among other 
FAs. 
The new PCs were composed not only by the 1st Secretaries but also 
by the 2nd Secretaries, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries. And it has 
been calculated that there was a total of 158 secretaries in the 29 
administrative units. Out of these 158， 94 were PLA men, only 56 were 
revolutionary cadres and five were representatives of mass 
11 ‘ organizations. At the county level, of the 67 local county Party 
12 
Committees, 80% of the Secretaries were with PLA background. 
It can be surmised that Mao's decision to establish the PCs was an 
attempt to reduce the domination of PLA in the RCs. While occurring 
after regaining his momentum in the Party, this turned out to be a 
failure. The entire PC level was still represented by those with 
military background. The interlocking role of the Party and PLA 
remained inchanged in China. In short, most of the regional military 
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leaders in this period were commanding not only their own MRs but also 
the PCs and the RCs. 
The PLA's Role in Central Committee and Politburo 
Besides the regional levels, the PLA played a significant role at 
the central level. During the 9th NPC in April 1968, the PLA gained an 
increasing representational role. Mao and Lin Biao were elected as 
Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively. For the 170 full member 
13 
positions, the PLA had a representational percentage of 45%, which 
marked an increase from its representation of 25.3% at the 8th NPC. ^^ 
Only 37 full members at the 8th NPC were re-elected. 54 of the full 
members had already been purged during the CR and five .died of natural 
reasons 丨  
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Out of the 11 MRs, seven Cdrs were the full members. Chen Xilian 
of the Shenyang MR, Zheng Weishan of the Peking MR, Xu Shiyou of 
Nanking, Liang Xingchu of Chengdu, Lung Shuj in of Xinjiang, Zeng Siyu 
of Wuhan and Yang Dezhi of Jinan. Again, none of them were with 1st FA 
background. 
There were also nine full members with concurrent post as the 1st 
Pol Cmrs of MR. They were Zhang Chunqiao of Nanking, Zhang Guohua of 
Chengdu, Zhou Chiping of Fuzhou, Xie Fuzhi of Peking, Xian Henghan of 
Lanzhou, Liu Feng of Wuhan, Liu Xingyuan of Guangzhou, Wang Xiaoyu of 
Jinan and Wu Tao of Inner Mongolia. 2nd FA, however, still gained an 
upper hand in this round but the 1st FA subordinates were disappeared. 
As a matter of fact, out of the 170 full members, 40 of them were 
Cdrs and Pol Cmrs of MRs and MDs. Totally, there was an increase from 
1 c 
the previous 2.2% to 26.6% of regional military representation. This 
suggests the increasing role of MR and is an indicator of regionalism. 
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As Domes conceived that it was rather usual in China when the central 
11 
authority was heavily involved in internal problems. In terms of the 
loyalty system, Domes had already calculated that 39 of the military 
full members had originated from the 4th FA, 15 from the 2nd FA, 13 
18 
from the 3rd FA and only seven from both the 1st and 5th FAs. Again, 
the 4th FA gained the majority which was even more obvious than their 
representation at the provincial level. 
Parris Chang has discovered out of the 21 full members, 11 of them 
had either direct or indirect connection with PLA, while four of them, 
(Xu Shiyou, Chen Xilian, Zhang Chunqiao and Xie Fuzhi) were even 
19 
leaders of regional PLA. 
As seen from these figures, the PLA enjoyed the highest 
representation at both regional and central levels it ever had in the 
entire Chinese history. While some scholars perceived this as a 
resurgence of warlordism, Parris Chang correctly argues that the 
central leadership was still able to limit and to control the PLA's 
involvement in politics. Among the measures used to restrain the 
military, the central leadership specificially used (i) its power of 
appointment and dismissal, (ii) its possession of military power, (iii) 
its control of resources allocation, and (iv) its control of legitimate 
20 
political symbols of the systems. 
This uncontrollable expansion of PLA in 1971 was one of the major 
reason for the 1973 reshuffling. But before Mao ended the domination 
PLA in non-military organizations by a reshuffling, the clash between 
Mao and Lin Biao served as a catalyst for another reshuffling in 1971. 
Conflict between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao 
While using loyal military groups on the regional level to attack 
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I his challengers, "power base", Mao primarily relied on Lin Biao to 
‘ attack his challengers at the central level. Why did Mao choose Lin 
Biao? Mao's use of Lin may have been based on Lin's connection with the 
PLA. But even more important, it was only Lin became Mao's close 
comrade did the PLA was involved in the socialist education and later 
impelled to involve in the politics. Logically, the expansion of Lin's 
power correlated with that of PLA. Even though there was no sufficient 
information, we can, however, realize that Mao by this time, became to 
aware of Lin，s moves. 
While it remains unclear on the factors causing the conflict 
between Mao and Lin Biao, the Second Plenary Session of the 9th NPC in 
August 1970 played an important role. At this conference, there ‘were 
three main items on the agenda. The first two items had been smoothly 
( 
approved. Problem did arise with the third item which was about the 
revision of the state Constitution. Prior to this conference, Mao had 
already proposed that the Chairmanship of the State should not be 
reestablished in March 1970. Despite Mao's position, Chen Boda and 
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seven top military leaders supposely with Lin's approval launched a 
"surprise attack" to reestablish this Chairmanship. After this 
"attack", Mao accused this group of opposing： 
the line set forth by the Ninth Party Congress, and 
overthrow the three items on the agenda of the Second 
Plenum of the Ninth Central Committees. A certain person 
was very anxious to becom转 state Chairman, to split the 
Party, and to seize power. 
In return to Lin Biao, Mao also overtly listed the seven military 
leaders which included: 
The big generals, including Huang Yongsheng, Wu Fahsien, Ye 
Chun, Li Zuopeng, Qiu Huizuo and also Li Xuefeng and Zheng 
Weishan, maintaine^ airtight secrecy and suddenly launched 
a surprise attack. 
After this "struggle between two headquarters", party-wide 
40 
rectification campaign was launched to criticize Chen Boda on September 
15, 1970. Later, a similar campaign occurred in December to criticize 
the seven military leaders at the North China Conference. Desiring to 
diminish and eliminate Lin's power-base, Mao reorganized the Peking MR 
in January 1971 by removing the pro-Lin 38th Army from Peking which was 
being sent into Peking to assist Mao for power struggle against Liu. 
Mao also dismisseed the pro-Lin Cdr and 1st Pol Cmr of the Peking MR. 
Lin's faction fought back. It has been reported that Lin's son Lin 
Liguo, the Deputy Director of Operations of Air Force, organized 
"Project 571" in Shanghai to prepare a coup against Mao. This coup 
25 
d'etat was believed to have included some of the military leaders. 
Whether true or not, Lin，s demise as Mao，s chosen successor ended with 
the fatal plane clash in Mongolia on September 13，1971. With Lin's 
exit from the political scene, his subordinates at the central and 
local levels became the target of a purge to eliminate all of the pro-
Lin 4th FA loyalists. 
The 1971 Reshuffling 
Following the fall of Lin Biao, an unofficial-announced 
reshuffling of the MRs occurred from the end of 1971 until the 
beginning of 1972. This reshuffling which affected five Cdrs and six 
1st Pol Cmrs schemed to get rid of the pro-Lin 4th FA loyalists. 
As seen in Table 3，all of the 4th FA members were purged with the 
exception of the Cdr of Guangzhou MR, Ding Sheng. The exact reason for 
Deng's survival, especially in his role in the "struggle between two 
headquarters". It is likely that, Ding was not involved in this affair. 
Besides the removal of Liu Xingquan, Liang Xingchu, Zhou Chiping, Tan 
Furen and Long Shujin, two 2nd FA members were also purged. Zheng 
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Weishan, the Cdr of the Peking MR, was disappeared when Mao reorganized 
this MR in January 1971. 
TABLE 3. THE 1971 RESHUFFLING 
COMMANDERS & 1ST POL COMMISSARS PREVIOUS POSTS OF THE 
MILITARY [ = = ^ j = = = ^ COMMANDERS AND 
REGIONS BEFORE 1971 AFTER 1971 1ST POL COMMISSARS 
Zheng Weishan 2 Teng Haicheng 3 Cdr-Inner Mongolia MD 
PEKING 
Xie Fuzhi 2 Xie Fuzhi 2 Unchanged 
Chen Xilian 2 Chen Xilian 2 Unchanged 
SHENYANG 
Pan Fusheng 2 Vacant 
Yang Dezhi 5 Yang Dezhi 5 Unchanged 
JINAN 
Wang Xiaoyu Yuan Shengping 5 Deputy Pol Cmr - Jinan MR 
Xu Shiyou 3 Xu Shiyou 3 Unchanged 
NANKING 
Zhang Chunqiao 3 Zhang Chunqiao 3 Unchanged 
Ding Sheng 4 Ding Sheng 4 Unchanged 
GUANGZHOU 
Liu Xingyuan 4 Vacant 
Liang Xingchu 4 Vacant 
CHENGDU 
Zhang Guohua 2 Zhang Guohua 2 Unchanged 
Zhang Dachi 1 Bi Dingjun 3 Deputy Cdr - Lanzhou MR 
LANZHOU 
Xian Henghan 1 Xian Henghan 1 Unchanged 
Han Xianchu 3 Han Xianchu 3 Unchanged 
FUZHOU 
Zhou Chiping 4 Vacant 
Zeng Siyu 5 Zeng Siyu 5 Unchanged 
WUHAN 
Liu Feng 2 Wang Liusheng 3 Deputy Pol Cmr-Nanking MR 
Vacant Wang Bicheng 3 Deputy Cdr - Nanking MR 
KUNMING 
Tan Furen 4 Zhou Xing 2 Dir-Public Security Dept. 
Long Shu j in 4 Seypidin Aziz 1 Deputy Cdr - Xinjiang MR 
XINJIANG 
Zhang Zimin Zhang Zimin Unchanged 
1-5 refer to lst-5th FAs 
Sources : 1972 Yearbook of Chinese Communism, Part VIII, pp.110-122. 
see, Vol.6, No.1 (January 10, 1972), pp.33-36. 
see, Vol.8, No.3 (March 1974), pp.4-15. 
see, Vol.7, No.6 (June 10, 1973), p.54 
The second one was Liu Feng, the 1st Pol Cmr of Wuhan MR. His 
removal was strongly related to his close association with Lin since 
42 
Lin had promoted him to Wuhan. Apparently, there were some people not 
associated with the Lin faction that shared the similar fate. Even so, 
these men represented a small proportion. The FA loyalty system was 
still a valuable measure for the distribution of military power. When 
Lin was in power, his FA loyalists benefitted and when Lin fell from 
power so as his loyalists. 
The 1971 reshuffling also suggests that Mao lacked extensive 
support. In the 1967 reshuffling, Lin Biao's loyalists filled the 
vacuum when the 1st FA members were purged together with Peng Dehuai. 
This happened because Lin was Mao's associate and main supporter at 
that time. After Lin fell from power, Mao did not obtain a supporter 
with a strong FA background. Being the case, some of the posts jwere 
then left vacant (see Table 3). For instance, when Pan Fusheng 
Of 
disappeared in 1970， he was not succeed by anyone. When Liu Xingyuan, 
Liang Xingchu and Zhou Chiping were purged, their posts were also 
unfilled. 
Even so, the power distribution was geared toward the 2nd and 3rd 
FA loyalists probably because nearly all of their members had not 
supported Lin. Although only six new appointments were made, four of 
the new appointees were the loyalists of the 2nd and 3rd FAs. Namely, 
Bi Dingjun, Cdr of the Lanzhou MR; Wang Liusheng, 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Wuhan MR; Wang Bicheng and Zhou Xing, Cdr and 1st Pol Cmr of the Wuhan 
MR. The other two new appointees would not be the 4th FA loyalists 
either, one of them were Yuan Shengping, the 5th FA and one from the 
1st FA, Seypidin Aziz. 
The likely reason that some of the 2nd and 3rd FA loyalists were 
unaffected by this reshuffling is because they stood against Lin Biao 
and his 4th FA. Such internal conflicts occurred within the PLA when 
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Lin and his 4th FA central military leaders and a minority of regional 
leaders stood on one hand while Zhou Enlai, some civilian members and 
a majority of regional leaders who disagreed with the excessive 
27 politization of PLA on the other. Majority of these regional leaders 
28 
were the subordinates of 2nd and 3rd FA loyalists. Their conflict, as 
Domes notes was mainly over the issues of national security, the 
decentralization or centralization of economic and management policy, 
29 the duration of the CR and agricultural policies. Frederick Teiwes 
posits that some regional army Cdrs sided with Zhou because Lin failed 
to protect these Cdrs when they were under violent attack by the Red 
30 
Guards. Even at the Lushan Conference, the former were all those who 
opposed Mao's instruction while the latter supported Mao. This wa^ the 
beginning of the 2nd and 3rd FA to acquire Mao's favour. 
Another reason concerns how some of the regional leaders were 
involved in the movement to criticize "revisionism". The Cdrs and 
fighters of the Jinan MR, for example, overtly stressed the need to 
31 continue the revolution to against the class struggle. Also, it was 
the Nanking PLA who took the lead in criticizing Liu Shaoqi as a 
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reflection of class struggle. That is why both Xu Shiyou and Zhang 
Chunqiao were unaffected even though they were 3rd FA loyalists. Other 
military leaders of Nanking were also promoted. Table 3 reveals Wang 
Liusheng and Wang Bicheng, who were also 3rd FA loyalists, were 
promoted to the 1st Pol Cmr of Wuhan and the Cdr of Kunming 
respectively. On one hand, these PLA men seemed to sell out their 
leader as a means of survival. In the final analysis, the CR had, to a 
certain extent, weakened the FA loyalty system in China. 
The central military leadership was even more affected by the 
purge after Lin Biao Incident. Altogether there were 54 PLA personnel 
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who were being dismissed and 32 of them were significant leaders of 
PLA. They included Lin's five closest associates from the 4th FA who 
had become the leading military personnel after Lin was appointed as 
MND. They were Huang Yongsheng, Chief of Staff; Wu Fashian, Cdr of the 
Air Force and Deputy Chief of the GSD; Li Zuopeng, 1st Pol Cmr of the 
PLA Navy and Deputy Chief of the GSD, Qiu Huizuo, Director of the GLD 
and Wen Yucheng, Cdr of the Peking Garrison. Besides, two Deputy Chiefs 
of the GSD, one Deputy Director of the GPD, five Deputy Directors of 
the GLD, four Deputy Cdrs and Pol Cmrs of the PLA Navy, 13 Deputy Cdrs 
and Pol Cmrs and Chief of Staff and Air Force, one Deputy Cdr of the 
Artillery, one Deputy Pol Cmr of the Missiles Force and one Minister of 
34 the Machine Building were also purged. Including Lin's, wife Ye Qun and 
his son Lin Liguo, 65% of the top military personnel were subordinates 
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of the 4th FA. And about 80% of the total disappeared military men 
were from the 4th FA faction. 
The End of PLA's Domination and the 1973 Reshuffling 
With the rise of Lin Biao correlated with the rise of the 
political role of PLA, the downfall of Lin, however, did not see the 
same effect (except his FA loyalists). The dismissed 4th FA PLA men 
were either replaced by the 2nd and 3rd FAs at the central or were left 
vacant at the regional level. The general representation of PLA in PCs 
and RCs also remained nearly unchanged in 1971, except three 
chairmanships which were left vacant when these 4th FA members were 
purged (see Table 2). 
Nonetheless, sign of Mao's intention to reassert Party control 
over the gun can already be seen by now. Mao did not appoint a new MND, 
the Chief and Director of GSD and GLD, a Cdr of Air Force and a Pol Cmr 
4 5 
of Navy. After two years time of firmly consolidating of his power, Mao 
gave instructions in his New Year's message of 1973 that "the 
Liberation Army should learn from the people of the country.” He also 
stressed the "Three Great Democracies" of the PLA- political democracy, 
37 economic democracy and military democracy. This, in other words, 
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suggested the reestablishment of Party control over the PLA. 
After this announcement, the effort to eliminate the PLA's 
political role began with the 10th NPC in August 1973. Out of the 319 
full and alternate members, only 110 were PLA men, which represented 
35% of the total numberWhile in the previous NPC, 45% of the total 
membership were PLA men. It has been estimated that 46 PLA men were not 
re-elected to this 10th NPC and most of them were -believed to be 
associated with Lin* s faction. ^^ Indeed, Lin's 4th FA! representation 
i 
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dropped from 39 to 17 full members. While although PLA representation 
were low, the 2nd FA increased from 15 to 17 and the 3rd FA was from 13 
to 1 9 A s in the Politburo, there was a decrease of PLA men from 11 to 
42 7 as full members. 
At the PC level, 15 1st Secretaries who were all PLA men were 
removed from their posts after the early 1974 while 30 Secretaries were 
n 
disappeared. Most of the newly appointed Secretaries returned to 
u 
civilian cadres. Similarly, the representation of the 4th FA decreased 
from 18.5 weighted total to 13.5, a slight increase of 18 to 18.5 for 
the 2nd FA and the 3rd FA remained the same." A slight increase implied 
a rather great increase when we remembered that the total number of PLA 
representation were actually decreasing. 
And according to Domes, nine Chairmen of the RCs were being 
purged, three were transferred to other posts and three died. As for 
the Vice-Chairmanship, 121 were dismissed, eight transferred and one 
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died. Out of the 113 new Vice-Chairman, 61 of them were civilians. 
Actually the pattern of changes in PCs and RCs was similar because most 
of the 1st Secretaries of PCs was also the Chairman of the RCs. 
Apart from controlling the PLA members in the CCPCC, the 
Politburo, the PCs and the RCs, Mao also announced the decision to 
reshuffle 8 MRs at an Enlarged Meeting of CCPCCMC on December 12 1973. 
Before this meeting, Mao even asked the presented generals to sing "The 
Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention" so 
as to remind them that the PLA was always under the command of Party. 
The eight reshuffled MRs were Peking, Shenyang, Jinan, Nanking, 
Guangzhou, Lanzhou, Fuzhou and Wuhan. Chen Xilian exchanged posts with 
Li Desheng; Zeng Siyu exchanged posts with Yang Dezhi；- Ding Sheng with 
Xu Shiyou while Han Xianchu with Bi Dingjun. ！ 
Actually this 1973 reshuffling not only involved eight MRs as most 
of the official announcement, documents and articles claimed. After 
collecting data from various reliable sources, Table 4 reveals that, 
except for Kunming, both Chengdu and Xinjiang had personnel changes. In 
other words, this 1973 reshuffling involved ten of the eleven MRs. 
Unlike the 1967 reshuffling, the 1973 reshuffling saw the rotation 
of posts rather than the dismissal of military personnel. It was 
because those Mao wanted to disappear had already gone away with the 
1971 reshuffling. 
Instead, this reshuffling was meant to end the MR leaders， control 
of their local Party and administrative organizations. In Table 2, 3 
and 4, we can discover that before the 1973 reshuffling, most of the 
Cdrs and even the 1st Pol Cmrs controlled the PCs, RCs as well as the 
MRs of the same region. For instance, Xie Fuzhi, the 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Peking MR was concurrently the 1st Secretary of the Peking PC and the 
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TABLE 4. THE 1973 RESHUFFLING 
COMMANDERS & 1ST POL COMMISSARS PREVIOUS POSTS OF THE 
MILITARY ^ = = = | p = = — ^ COMMANDERS AND 
REGIONS BEFORE 1973 AFTER 1973 1ST POL COMMISSARS 
Li Desheng 2 Chen Xilian 2 Cdr - Shengang MR 
PEKING — 
Xie Fuzhi 2 Ji Dengkul 2 V. Chairman - Honan RC 
Chen Xilian 2 Li Desheng 2 Cdr - Peking MR 
SHENYANG 
Vacant Vacant 
Yang Dezhi 5 Zeng Siyu 5 Cdr - Wuhan MR 
JINAN 
Yuan Shengping 5 Bai Rubing 2nd Secretary-Shandong PPC 
Xu Shiyou 3 Ding Sheng 4 Cdr - Guangzhou MR 
NANKING 
Zhang Chunqiao 3 Zhang Chunqiao 3 Unchanged 
Ding Sheng 4 Xu Shiyou 3 Cdr - Nanking MR 
GUANGZHOU 
Vacant Wei Guoqing 3 1st Pol Cmr - Guanxi MD 
Vacant Qin Jiwei 2 newly-reactivated 
CHENGDU 
Liu Xingyuan 4 Liu Xingyuan 4 Unchanged 
Bi Dingjun 3 Han Xianchu 3 Cdr - Fuzhou MR 
LANZHOU 
Xian Henghan 1 Xian Henghan 1 Unchanged 
Han Xianchu 4 Bi Dingjun 3 Cdr - Lanzhou MR 
FUZHOU 
Vacant Vacant 
Zeng Siyu 5 Yang Dezhi 5 Cdr - Jinan MR 
WUHAN 
Wang Liusheng 3 Wang Liusheng 3 Unchanged 
Wang Bicheng 3 Wang Bicheng 3 Unchanged 
KUNMING 
Zhou Xing 2 Zhou Xing 2 Unchanged 
Seypidin Aziz 1 Yang Yong 2 newly-reactivated 
XINJIANG 
Zhang Zimin Seypidin Aziz 1 Cdr - Xinjiang MR 
Sources ： RMRB, (2 January 1974), p.1. 
Trend, No.18 (March 16, 1980), p.9. 
Yearbook of Chinese Communism 1973, pp.49-53. 
I&S, Vol.XI, No.8 (August, 1975). 
see, Vol.8, No.l (January 1974), pp.17-37. 
see, Vol.8, No.3 (March 1974), pp.4-15. 
see, Vol.8, No.10 (November 1974), pp.55-56. 
Chairman of Peking RC； Chen Xilian, the Cdr of Shenyang MR (which 
included Liaoning Province) was the 1st Secretary of the Liaoning PC 
and the Chairman of the Liaoning RC; Yang Dezhi, the Cdr of Jinan MR 
(which included Shandong Province) was the 1st Secretary of the 
Shandong PC and the Chairman of the Shandong RC. 
This similar pattern of "one man, three identities" also occurred 
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on Han Xianchu, Cdr of the Fuzhou MR; Xian Henghan, 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Lanzhou MR; Liu Xingyuan, the former 1st Pol Cmr of the Guangzhou MR; 
Ding Sheng, Cdr of the Guangzhou MR; Wei Guoqing, Cdr of the Wuhan MR; 
Xu Shiyou, Cdr of the Nanking MR; Zhang Chunqiao, 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Nanking MR; Zhang Guohua, the former 1st Pol Cmr of the Chengdu MR; 
Zhou Xing, 1st Pol Cmr of Kunming and Long Shuj in, the former Cdr of 
the Xinjiang MR. 
In order to diminish the military influence, the 1973 rotation was 
made to destroy the MR leaders， control. Although most of these MR 
leaders were still the 1st Secretaries of the PCs and the Chairmen of 
the RCs before 1974, they were no longer able to manipulate their 
respective area after the 1973 rotation. For instance, Chen Xilian 
again, who was still the 1st Secretary of the Liaoning PC and the 
( 
concurrent Chairman of the Liaoning RC, was transferred to the Peking 
MR to be its as Cdr. Yang Dezhi, who was still the 1st Secretary of the 
Shandong PC and the Chairman of the Shandong RC, was rotated to the 
Wuhan MR to be its Cdr. This breaking up of the MR leaders' power base 
also happened to Xu Shiyou, Ding Sheng, Han Xianchu and Zeng Siyu. 
Rotation was indeed a very tactful measure designed by Mao to end 
the excessive military power. This intermixing of posts removed these 
regional military leaders from their posts in PCs and RCs in early 
1974. In short, the 1973 reshuffling separated the PLA from their non-
military power. They were no longer permitted to hold concurrent 
civilian Party appointments. 
Another reason for the rotation was to destroy localism. Rotation 
made some of the Cdrs and the 1st Pol Cmrs isolated from their original 
followers who had spent more than a decade in their kingdoms. Chen 
Xilian had been the Cdr of the Shenyang MR for 14 years; Yang Dezhi in 
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Jinan for 17 years and Xu Shiyou in Nanking for 16 years (see 
Appendix). The one exception was Xian Henghan who spent 17 years in 
Lanzhou, the reason was perhaps Mao realized that the 1st FA had 
already been under a total control, he did not need to worry Xian's 
remain as a threat to provoke factionalism. , 
As seen in Table 4, those who stayed in their original posts had 
only spent a short time in that region which would not disturb Mao 
since it reduced the likelihood of the creation of mountain 
strongholds. For instance, Zhang Chunqiao was only appointed as the 1st 
Pol Cmr in August 1967 ； Liu Xingyuan in February 1972 ； Wang Liusheng in 
December 1971 ； Wang Bicheng in September 1971 and Zhou Xing in January 
1971 {refer to Appendix again). 
The 1973 reshuffling also reveals that Mao did not want to promote 
i 
any new blood into the regional leadership level. He preferred to 
maintain the personnel of the present leaders. By rotation, Mao could 
keep the same leaders who had the experience in handling the similar 
tasks but only in different settings. Apart from the rotated Cdrs, even 
the newly-appointed Cdrs of Chengdu and Xinjiang were neither new 
blood- Qin Jiwei was the former Cdr of the Kunming MR and Yang Yong was 
the former Cdr of the Peking MR. 
As for the 1st Pol Cmrs, Mao did not also make a great change. 
Shenyang and Fuzhou still remained vacant. He preferred to leave them 
empty than to hastily appoint the unreliable ones. Five of the eleven 
1st Pol Cmrs remained in the same posts. Wei Guoqing, the newly 
appointed 1st Pol Cmr of Guangzhou, was actually a liberated former 1st 
Pol Cmr of the same region. His return to the same post was aimed to 
make use of his relevant experience and to regain his power. Also 
Seypidin Aziz, the new 1st Pol Cmr of Xinjiang, was actually the Cdr of 
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Xinjiang. His transfer was made to assist Yang Yong who was not 
familiar with a new setting. Whereas there were only two new appointees 
added to this level, namely Ji Dengkui of Peking and Bai Rubing of 
Jinan. It was the first time for them to hold such posts. Although most 
scholars claim that the 1973 reshuffling was the most extensive and the 
first largest scale of reshuffling since the establishment of MRs in 
1954, there was actually only three Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs disappeared 
from their posts. Xie Fuzhi who was dead, Yuan Shengping who was 
liquidated and Zhang Zimin whose background was unknown were all 
dismissed. This reshuffling was more likely aimed to remove them from 
their command troops and power bases rather than as most claimed as to 
eradicate Lin's power base. The 1971 reshuffling was actually the one 
in eliminating Lin's associates and more general changes were made. 
Even though there were not much personnel changes in this 
reshuffling, the reinstatement of some 2nd and 3rd FA Cdrs and 1st Pol 
Cmrs increased their representation. Six of them were from the 2nd FA 
and another seven from the 3rd FA, while only two were from the 4th FA 
and two were from the 1st FA. The 1973 reshuffling benefitted the 
factions which had been suffered the most while Lin*s 4th FA had its 
glorious period. 
Apart from some of the above mentioned rehabilitees, Mao reinstated 
many former PLA men to leading military posts in order to fill the 
vacuum after the large-scale of reshuffling in 1971. It was the 
rehabilitation that really tremendously expand the proportion of 2nd 
and 3rd FAs. 
Another reason for the expanding proportion of these factions was 
because the one who appointed to carry out this reshuffling was the 
liberated Deng Xiaoping. Having close connection with both the 2nd and 
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3rd FAs, Deng would of course side with his supporters. Most of these 
rehabilitee were those who purged during the CR. All together there 
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were more than 88 rehabilitees after the rehabilitation began in 
January 1974. The most significant of these liberated PLA men were Yang 
Chengwu, former Acting Chief of the GSD, reinstated as Deputy Chief of 
the GSD in June 1974; Xiao Hua, former Director of the GPD was 
reinstated in September 1974； Zhang Aiping, former Deputy Chief of the 
GSD and now the Deputy Director of National Defense of Science and 
Technology Committee; Chen Zaidao, the former Cdr of Wuhan MR and now 
the Deputy Cmr of Fuzhou MR； Li Xuefeng, the former 1st Pol Cmr of the 
iQ 
Peking MR and now a responsible person in PLA. Although smaller in 
numbers, some 1st FA associates were also rehabilitated. They included 
Xiao Ke in March 1972, Li Da in November 1972, Teng Hua in September 
/ 10 , 1974 and Tan Cheng in January 1975. ^ 
Right after the 1971 reshuffling of MRs to eradicate Lin's power 
base and the 1973 reshuffling to destroy the domination of military 
regional leaders in Party's administration, the reshuffling of the 
central military organ occurred in mid-1975. More than 80 personnel 
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were reshuffled and most of the replacement were from the 2nd and 3rd 
FAs. The 2nd FA especially benefitted the most since Deng was the Chief 
of Staff to select and promote new personnel. 
After each reshuffling, there were normally a series of 
ideological indoctrinations and institutional changes to further 
solidify Mao's political legitimacy. With the deterioration of Mao's 
health and the taking over of power of the Gang of Four, such massive 
steps were not able to take place after a series of reshufflings in 
1971 and 1973. Step was only made to re-emphasize Mao's proletariat 
army-building line by launching massive criticism on Lin's bourgeois 
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military line which opposed party's absolute leadership. Throughout 
1974 and 1975, the PLA was ordered to take the lead and play the 
leading role to the criticism of "revisionism". The PLA was told that: 
It is essential to carry out ideological mobilization and 
firmly foster the thinking of fighting the enemy arduously 
and protractedly. Efforts must be made to conscientiously 
study the instructions of Chairman Mao and the CCP Central 
Committee in light of the current thinking among the PLA 
and militia units. 
Indeed, among all of the reshufflings in the Mao and Deng eras, this 
was the only period where reshuffling was made for the first step but 
left uncontinued for further steps in consolidating of the leadership 
power. 
The result of the 1971 and the 1973 reshufflings reflected the 
一 
result of political events• Also the new military rearrangement reveals 
( 
the persistence of the FA informal ties. The 4th FA, Which was at one 
time favoured by Mao when Lin Biao was his closest comrade, no longer 
gained an upper hand over the other FAs at both central and regional 
military command level. In the following chapter, politics behind 
reshufflings will continue to examine, to see whether a different 
political figure will handle reshufflings differently. 
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PAKT II 
RESHUFFLINGS OF REGIONAL MILITARY LEADERS 
IN THE DENG ERA 
CHAPTER 4 
THE 1980, 1982 AND 1985 RESHUFFLINGS 
In the Deng era, there has been altogether four major reshufflings 
of MRs. Unlike the previous ones which were done mainly after power 
struggles, the reshufflings were not conducted only for political 
reasons, but also out of professional considerations. 
Deng Xiaoping, the principal architect of these three 
reshufflings, introduced the 1980 reshuffling after he won the 
succession crisis over Hua Guofeng. The outcome of this reshuffling was 
similar to the prior reshufflings since it was also preceded by a 
political struggle — this time between Deng and Hua. The 1982 and the 
1985 reshufflings, in contrast, were part of an effort by Deng to 
consolidate his power to promote professionalism within the military. 
After briefly examining how Deng gained the support and control of 
the PLA, the manner in which Deng made use of his post to build up his 
power before the 1980 reshuffling will be examined which was a tactical 
measure used by Deng to provide himself with a pillar of support from 
the PLA. The following sections will analyze the three reshufflings as 
well as the steps following them. 
Deng Xiaoping and his PLA men 
Under the leadership of Hua Guofeng, the PLA still played a very 
significant role in the Chinese politics. At the 11th CCPCC, 34.8% of 
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the 201 full members were PLA soldiers, 22.4% of which were PLA Cdrs 
and 12.4% were PLA Pol Cmrs. In terms of civilian cadres, its 
representation increased from 44.6% at the 10th CC to 52.2% at the 11th 
1 I . CC. Eighteen new full members joined the Politburo, out of which 
eleven were generals, two were marshals and one was an admiral. 
Furthermore, five of these eleven military officials were from the 2nd 
FA, while two were from the 3rd and one was from the 1st FA. No one 
from the 4th FA was appointed. Out of the total of 23 full members, 
12 had military backgrounds while eleven had civilian background. Ten 
of these members also held military posts/ PLA soldiers were still the 
major representative in the Politburo, which suggests that Hua needed 
the PLA to consolidate his power. - 广, 
After Deng's second return to power in July 2,1, 1977 and his 
subsequent rapid expansion of power, differences surfaced between Hua 
5 
and Deng. Another power struggle for succession occurred. Their major 
differences concerned on the issues of normalization with the United 
States and the pace of modernization. In many apects, Hua was no match 
for Deng. Deng had the support of many civilian supporters and military 
loyalists. As Chief of GSD, Deng gained an upperhand in personnel 
appointments within the military. Deng was able to build his power-base 
through the appointment of his supporters and loyalists. Deng first 
replaced Zhang Chunqiao, the purged Director of GPD, with Wei Guoqing 
1 
in March 1977. Wei, who had been a close ally of Deng's in the 1970s 
and assisted Deng in regaining his power. Wei*s former experience as 
the 1st Pol Cmr of the Guangzhou MR gave him an upperhand in such post. 
Deng also appointed Zhang Aiping, another 2nd FA loyalist, as the 
Deputy Chief of the GSD in September 1977. Deng also appointed his 2nd 
FA colleague, Xu Jiangqian, as Minister of National Defence in March 
55 
1978. At the PLA service level, Deng replaced a pro-Deng 3rd FA 
loyalist Ye Fei who had also worked with Wei Guoqing in the Tenth Army 
Corps period as the 1st Pol Cmr of Navy. Yu Liqian, also a 
rehabilitated pro-Deng 3rd FA loyalist, was appointed as the Pol Cmr of 
the Air Force. Deng also had elected the liberated 2nd FA loyalist Chen 
Zaidao elected as the CMC of Railway Engineer Corporation, while he had 
a liberated 1st FA supporter Huang Xiating appointed as Pol Cmr of the 
Armoured Forces. 
At the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress, Deng 
added three civilian supporters to the Politburo and made nine new 
Q 
appointments to the CC. Of these nine, four of them were the 
reinstated PLA men. Song Renqiong and Chen Zaidao were 2n4 FA 
loyalists, while Huang Kecheng and Xi Zhongxun were followers of Peng 
Dehuai‘s 1st FA Army. At the Fourth Plenary Session, besides adding his 
close associates- Zhao Ziyang and Peng Chun to the Politburo, Deng 
Q 
appointed 12 reinstated military personnel to the CC. Of these twelve, 
only Hong Xuezhi, a 1st FA loyalist, was the only military officer. The 
rest were party officials and most of them were close associates of Lui 
Shaoqi. At the Fifth Plenary Session, Deng succeeded in removing Hua，s 
supporters Wang Dongxing, Chen Xilian, Wu Teh and Ji Dengkui, while 
promoting Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang to the Politburo Standing 
Committee. in the final step to secure his power, Deng had Hua 
dismissed from the Premiership at the Third Session of the 5th NPC in 
the summer of 1980.11 The 6th Plenary Session of 11th Party Congress 
approved Hua's resignation. Hu Yaobang was appointed Chairman of the 
CC, Zhao Ziyang and Hua Guofeng became its Vice Chairmen. Deng had 
himself placed as Chairman of CCPCCMC.^^ 
Although PLA was not the only force in helping Deng to win in this 
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political succession crisis, its role cannot be neglected. Without the 
assistance of Xu Shiyou and Wei Guoqing, Deng would not have been able 
to both reappear on the political scene and climb up the political 
ladder in mid-1977. As mentioned above, both Xu and Wu were from the 
13 
3rd FA, which had been closely connected with Deng. The reinstatment 
of 2nd FA loyalists was used to give Deng the necessary support to oust 
Hua. 
It is, however, more interesting to discern why the FA system was, 
in this period, not the major factor of in the military partition. For 
personal survival, some of the FA loyalists might have shifted sides. 
The most obvious examples were Chen Xilian and Li Desheng. While both 
from 2nd FA, they had, at one time or another, supported Lin JBiao 
and/or Hua. Chen, in particular, was strongly against the return of 
Deng to power, which might lead him to worry about Deng's possible 
revenge for his disloyalty. 
In the process of Deng's struggle to win the political succession, 
some of the PLA support came from those who were not Deng's military 
loyalists. Loyalists from the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th FAs also supported 
Deng. The one common factor to explain this phenomenon is that these 
non-Deng loyalists had been both purged in the CR and reinstated after 
the Lin Biao incident. These reinstatees seemed to show their gratitude 
by helping Deng in the political struggle with Hua. Deng may have 
realized that those who had undergone similar maltreatments and 
sufferings would share a similar reform mentality, thus becoming a 
coherent group beneath him.“ Hence, Deng's success in this political 
succession was not only with the support of his FA loyalists but his 




Deng's policy supported Tang Tsou's argument that "not all the 
informal groups disappear...[since] some of them become the component 
parts of the dominant informal group and formal structure." Since it 
was seldom for the authority to be absolute and power to be undivided, 
the supreme leader had to "resort to the methods of persuasion, 
negotiation, compromise, bargaining and cooperation.” Although Hua, 
who was the Chairman of both CCP and CCPCCMC, was the nominal leader of 
China, Deng had already begun to dominate Chinese politics. He made use 
of his post as the Chief of General Staff to install his own people to 
key military posts. Within the short period, Deng tried to transform 
the PLA away from being a revolutionary army. Unlike Mao who utilized 
ideological teachings to control the PLA, Deng applied professionalism 
in an attempt to govern the armed forces. ； 
1 
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At the Army's Political Conference on June 2, 1978， Deng asserted 
that iMao，s teaching about "seeking truth from facts", the "Three Main 
Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention" and the principle 
unity between the Army and the people should remain unchanged. He 
however suggested that in order to maintain a better relationship 
between the army and the people, the development of a collective 
economy was necessary. Deng argued that an army unit: 
should discuss whether it could help one or two communes or 
study how to help factories if there is any nearby. It is 
our duty to take account of the new conditions in trying to 
improve the army-people relationship in various ways and in 
correctly solving problems in these relations. 
Efforts to build up the economy was intended to not only to 
fulfill the goal of the Four Modernizations but also aim to eliminate 
the PLA roles in political power struggles. 
In the same speech, Deng also stressed the importance of 
modernizing of array. He argued that there are: 
58 
also continuous changes in the way of stocking war 
materials, our belongi^^gs used to be comparatively few. Now 
they have multiplied. 
Like Mao, Deng realized the importance of controlling the PLA through 
the promulgation of PLA political work regulations. The above-mentioned 
Army Political Conference was being held after 15 years from the 
previous one held in February 1963. Both conferences were held in order 
to remind the PLA of their position as a subordinate to the Party. From 
these conferences, we can see that whenever the Party regained its 
momentum and whenever the Party leaders did not need the PLA*s support, 
such regulations were promulgated to regain party control over the 
military. 
While intending to promote professionalism in PLA, .Deng was unable 
to have this policy to be fully implemented. In August 1978, the 
I ！ 
"Regulations on the Service of Officers of PLA" had already been 
drafted but not released. The reintroduction of PLA rank system had 
also been suggested, but was shelved due to the objection by several 
senior officers.�� 
Within this period, Deng's pragmatic line was already presented. 
It was only with the fall of Hua and his associates was Deng able to 
fulfil his goal. As pointed out earlier, with the convening of the 
Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Party Congress, which made a 
significant personnel arrangement in the composition of the CC and the 
Politburo, the reshuffling of regional military leaders had begun. It 
has been estimated that about 164 PLA personnel were reshuffled at the 
MR and MD levels.^ ^ 
The 1980 Reshuffling 
Similar to the previous reshufflings, the mid-January 1980 
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reshuffling was intended to expel the paramount leaders's challengers. 
The most obvious adversary to Deng was the supporters of the "Gang of 
Four". Lin Biao's supporters have been Deng's target if they had not 
already been banished in the 1971 reshuffling. 
Among those purged included Chen Xilian, the Cdr of the Peking MR; 
Ji Dengkui (replaced by Qin Jiwei in October 1978) and Ting Sheng 
(replaced by Nie Fengzhi in May 1977) since they were supporters of the 
"Gang of Four". The former two were even labelled by Deng as members of 
22 the "Little Gang of Four". Li Desheng was safe probably because he was 
flexible enough to support Deng again. He was regarded as an 
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opportunist and keened on shifting sides, which allowed him to remain 
at his post as the Cdr of the Shenyang MR. 
Table 5 shows that apart from Li Desheng, only Nie Fengzhi, the 
i -
Cdr of the Nanking MR and Yang Chengwu, the Cdr of Fuzhou stayed at the 
same post. Nie Fengzhi replaced Ting Sheng when the latter was purged 
on May 1，1977. Yang' Chengwu replaced Bi Dingjun when the latter was 
killed. Since both of them were newly appointed, reshuffling was 
unnecessary. Similarly, five of the 1st Pol Cmrs remained at their 
posts J namely Xiao Hua of Lanzhou, Li Cheng fang of Wuhan, Liu Zhijian 
of Kunming, Liao Zhiquo of Fuzhou and Tan Youlin of Urumqi. Again, they 
were also assigned to their posts for only a short period during which 
intermixing was not in need. They were also reinstated when Deng became 
Chief of GSD in 1977. More importantly, the appointment of these eight 
Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs was due to their close connection with Deng. Nie, 
Yang and Xiao became Deng loyalists after their reinstatements. Liao, 
Li and Liu were reinstated 2nd FA loyalists. In short, those who could 
remain in their positions did so because they were new-comers to their 
regions which made the possibility of making mountaintops extremely 
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low. More importantly, they were trusted by Deng. 
TABLE 5. THE 1980 RESHUFFLING 
COMMANDERS & 1ST POL COMMISSARS PREVIOUS POSTS OF THE 
MILITARY [ = = = j p = = = | COMMANDERS AND 
REGIONS BEFORE 1980 AFTER 1980 1ST POL COMMISSARS 
Chen Xilian 2 Qin Jiwei 2 1st Pol Cmr - Beijing MR 
BEIJING 
Qin Jiwei 2 Yuan Shengping 5 newly reactivated 
Li Desheng 2 Li Desheng 2 Unchanged 
SHENYANG 
Vacant Liao Hansheng 1 1st Pol Cmr - Nanjing MR 
Zeng Siyu 5 Rao Shoukun 3 Cdr - North Sea Fleet 
JINAN ： 
Bai Rubing Xiao Wangdong 3 Pol Cmr - Jinan MR 
Nie Fengzhi 3 Nie Fengzhi 3 Unchanged 
NANJING 
Liao Hansheng 1 Guo Linxiang 2 Pol Cmr - Uruunqi MD 
Xu Shiyou 3 Wu Kehua 4 Cdr - Urumqi MD 
GUANGZHOU 
Wei GUoqing 3 Xi Zhongxun 1 2nd Pol Cmr - Guangzhou MR 
Vacant You Taizhong 2 Deputy Cdr - Peking MR 
CHENGDU ； 
Zhao Ziyang Xu Liqing 1 Deputy Director - GPD 
Han Xianchu 3 Du Yide 2 Pol Cmr - Navy 
LANZHOU 
Xiao Hua 4 Xiao Hua 4 Unchanged 
Yang Chengwu 5 Yang Chengwu 5 Unchanged 
FUZHOU 
Liao Zhiquo 2 Liao Zhiquo 2 Unchanged . 
Wang Bicheng 3 Zhang Caiqian 4 Deputy Chief of Staff 
WUHAN 
Li Chengfang 2 Li Chengfang 2 Unchanged 
Yang Dezhi 5 Zhang Zhijian 3 Deputy Cdr - Kunming MR 
KUNMING 
Liu Zhijian 2 Liu Zhijian 2 Unchanged 
Wu Kehua 4 Xiao Quanfu 4 Deputy Cdr - Shenyang MR 
URUMQI* ； ~ — 
Tan Youlin Tan Youlin Unchanged 
* "Xinjiang" MR was renamed as "Urumqi" MR in May 1, 1979. 
Sources : China Official Annual Report 1981, pp.369-370. 
China : Facts & Figures Annualj 1981, p. 106. 
China Handbook, (Ta Kung Pao, 1982), pp.271-277. 
Trendt No.18, (16 March 1980), p.8. 
East & West, Vol.15 (10 March, 1980), p.25. 
Yearbook of Chinese Communism 1980, p.65-66. 
Unlike the 1973 reshuffling which was mainly based on rotation 
and exchanges of posts among experienced regional leaders, this 
reshuffling had a lot of new appointments. Out of the 22 Cdrs and 1st 
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Pol Cmrs, eleven of them were new appointees. These new appointees 
included Yuan Shengping, Rao Shoukun, Xiao Wangdong, Guo Linxiang, Xi 
Zhongxun, You Taizhong, Xu Liqing, Du Yide, Zhang Caiqian, Zhang Zhixiu 
and Xiao Quanfu (see Table 5). Of these eleven Cmrs and 1st Pol Cmrs, 
24 25 only three of them were from the 2nd FA, three were from the 3rd FA, 
？fl 27 and two were from 1st FA, and three were from 4th FA. Nearly all of 
these new appointees had been reinstated. The appointment of non-Deng 
loyalists suggests that a new type of military realignments was 
emerging with those who were both the victims in the CR and had been 
reinstated by Deng. 
We must not, however, be misled that these figures suggest that 
Deng was not worried about FA mentality within the PLA. Even thpugh 
these 4th FA new appointees had no overt connection丨 with Lin Biao 1 -
I 
00 , during the CR, Deng took measures to prevent them from creating their 
own independent kingdoms to challenge him. Although Table 5 shows that 
there were only two cases of transferals (i.e. Liao Hansheng and Wu 
Kehua), all of the 4th FA new appointees were actually transferred to 
other MRs before they were promoted to these posts. Cleverly enough, it 
seems Deng wanted these new appointees to serve their regional 
leadership in new settings. For instance, as seen in Appendix, before 
Yuan Shengping was reactivated and appointed as the 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Beijing MR, he had been the 1st Pol Cmr of the Jinan MR. As for Wu 
Kehua, he had been serving in two different MRs before he was shuffled 
to the Guangzhou MR in mid-January. He had been appointed as the Cdr of 
Chengdu MR in 1977 afterwhich he was switched to the Xinjiang MR as Cdr 
in 1979. Zhang Caiqian, who had been the Chief of Staff in Nanjing MR 
ever since 1955 and the Deputy Cdr of the same region from 1958 to 
1970, was then assigned to the Wuhan MR as Cdr in this reshuffling. 
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Xiao Quanfu, who became the new Cdr of the Urumqi MR, had been the 
Deputy Chief of Staff in the Shenyang MR since 1963 and the Deputy Cdr 
of the same region from 1965 to 1980. Despite Xiao Hua, another 4th FA 
member who was intacted from shuffling, he too had been transferred 
from his original "mountain stronghold" to the Lanzhou MR. 
In short, Deng was still aware of the FA mentality within the PLA. 
Even so Deng was not biased only in favour of his 2nd FA, he was 
reluctant to be confidence about the compliance of other FAs. As 
mentioned earlier Liao Hansheng, a 1st FA member, was shifted from 
Nanjing to the Shenyang MR as 1st Pol Cmr. Based on his case, we can 
surmise that Deng was very attentive to make sure that his power-base 
could not be controlled by "warlords". Liao had been stationed in 
Nanjing since 1957, was the Commandant Nanking Military 丨丨Academy, he was 
i -I 
later selected as Pol Cmr in 1975 of the same region. It was only in 
1977 when he became the 1st Pol Cmr. In this reshuffling, he was 
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transferred to Shenyang which destroyed his long-time fiefdom. Indeed, 
with the exception of Deng*s 2nd FA faction, all Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs 
of other FA affilations were curtailed from their vassalage in the 1980 
reshuffling. 
Despite the fact that the 2nd FA had a rather low percentage 
within these new assignments, when one includes all those transferred, 
reappointed and newly-appointed, its representation was not low at all. 
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Seven of the 21 Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs were from the 2nd FA, four from 
3rd FA，n three were from 1st FA^ ^ and five were from 4th FA.^ ^ In this 
reshuffling, Deng expanded his sphere of influence from five MRs in the 
1973 reshuffling to eight MRs. To a certain extent, Whitson's FA system 
of military alignments is still true in that the dominating leader 
expanded the influence of his FA loyalists. Yet, the distribution of 
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other FAs were also quite balanced. This is probably because Deng 
realized that it was necessary to reduce the factional disputes within 
the FAs while managing to build up his legitimacy. He needed the 
support of the entire PLA instead of only one portion. However, if the 
FA system still existed within the PLA, this phenomenon would be 
excepted to be temporary. Once Deng was able to solidify his power, 
after such a reshuffling, other FAs became less likely to challenge his 
power. 
This reshuffling also seems to reflect Deng's intention to lessen 
the power of the old-timers in order to allow some lower-level cadres 
to be promoted. This can be seen from some of those not reappointed. 
They were also the ones who had been serving at the regional leadership 
for a long period of time. They included Xu Shiyou whp had served for 
j -
24 years; Han Xianchu had officiated for 20 years, Wang Picheng was 
34 
with 10 years of service and Yang Dezhi had worked for 25 years. 
These old-timers were switched to the central military leadership as 
members of the Standing Committee of the CCPCCMC so that Deng could 
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retain these long-time experienced and loyal former Cdrs on his side. 
Having these old marshals on his side, Deng was also secured with the 
allegiance of these marshals， loyalists. 
Even though Deng had removed some old-timers, his rejuvenation 
policy was not introduced wholeheartedly. Deng stressed that he was 
worried about the domination of the elderly leaders in the army. While 
claiming that the promotion of new cadres must be needed by trimming 
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the top layers, so that the latter did not stand in their way, the new 
bloods were actually not all young in age. Implying that those who were 
over 63 were unfit, he noted that: 
How old will you (PLA) comrades here be in five years? I'm 
afraid most of you, though not all, will find it hard to 
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keep on working. Seven or eight years from now, you'll be 
past 70. How could you see things through on the battle 
field? If war should really breakout竹 could you fight for 
three days and nights without sleep? 
Even so, the new regional leaders were also quite old with the 
exception of Rao Shoukun and Guo Linxiang, whose age are unknown, Yuan 
Shengping, was 68 years old; Xiao Wangdong was 70; Xi Zhongxun was 67; 
You Taizhong was 66; Xu Liqing was 73; Du Yide was 68; Zhang Caiqian 
was 69; Zhang Zhixiu was 64 and Xiao Quanfu was 66. Not counting those 
already over the age of 70, all of them would pass 70 in seven or eight 
years time. The 1980 reshuffling did not rejuvenate the regional 
leaders, suggesting that rejuvenation was merely an excuse for Deng to 
redistribute the military power. � 
Apart from personnel rearrangement at the partyi level and the 
i I 
regional military level, there were also changes at the central 
military level in 1980. Deng relocated Xu Xiangqian, the 80 years old 
2nd FA leader and Minister of MND, to the Vice-Chairmanship of CCPCCMC 
and CMC. Xu was replaced by the younger Geng Biao who was from the 5th 
FA. Deng also appointed the reinstated 1st FA subordinate Hong Xuezhi 
as the Director of GLD in February 1980. In addition to these, Liu 
Huaqing, a reinstated 2nd FA loyalist, was elected as Deputy Chief of 
GSD and Ye Fei, a 3rd FA member, was promoted from 1st Pol Cmr to Cdr 
of the Navy in February 1980. 
Steps after the 1980 Reshuffling 
After the reshuffling of both regional and central PLA personnel, 
which was the most important step for Party control and the 
reinforcement of power, efforts were made by Deng to both further 
regulate and build an obedient, institutionalized, professional and 
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modernized army. 
Like Mao, Deng realized that a strong and united army was a 
prerequisite for the consolidation of power as well as for the 
fulfilment of national policy. Deng overtly argued that: 
Our Army is the firm pillar of the people's democratic 
dictatorship; it shoulders the glorious mission to defend 
the socialist motherland and the modernization program. 
Therefore, it is imperative to build our Army into a 
powerful, modern, and regular revolutionary Army… We 
must . . , strive to enable our troops to become a fine 
example in carrying out the Party's line, principles, and 
policies…[in order to] strengthen unity within the 
Army...[and] enhance military training 
The first step taken to reassert the Party's control over the PLA 
occurred at the Second PLA Political Work Conference in April 1980. 
Under the leadership of Deng, this conference emphasized the importance 
I 
of Party Committees at all levels of PLA. At another meeting, held by 
the GPD in 1981, efforts to strengthen the politico-ideological work 
and to push forward the Fourth Modernizations were emphasized. In 
another speech, Yang Dezhi, the new Chief of the GSD stated that： 
Historic experience, positive and negative, tell us that 
without the CCP，s absolute leadership, our people's army 
cannot exist even for a single day. . . • Any idea or action 
attempting to weaken or do away with the Party's absolute 
leadership in the Army is 济 x t r e m e l y the detrimental and 
must be resolutely opposed. 
Once again, the role of PLA was made clear. Its role had to be under 
the control of Party even under pragmatic leaders. In the same speech, 
Yang also clearly stressed that PLA*s main concern was to fulfil the 
duties promoted by the Party. He argued that: 
We are now at a new historic juncture. The army not only 
shoulders the tasks of building and defending the Fourth 
Modernization, but also has to do well in consolidating, 
improving and building itself... People of all 
nationalities in the country have entrusted to the people's 
soldiers and a great historical task that the party has 
41) assigned to our army. 
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In order to confirm Party control, the political commissar system was 
re-emphasised. While military commanders gave up their position as 
secretaries of the provincial or municipal Party Committees, these 
positions ironically were filled by the respective military Pol Cmrs. 
Unlike before (see Table 6), most of these 1st Secretaries were 
civilians and party officials career and were only later appointed as 
1st Pol Cmrs of PLA. In another words, they had no military 
background. They joined the CCP first while holding military career 
n 
concurrently. 
TABLE 6. FIRST SECRETARIES OF PROVINCIAL/MUNICIPAL PAETY 
COMMITTEES AND THE FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF 
MILITARY DISTRICTS OF 1982/83 
Provinces/ First First 
Municipalities Secretaries of Political Commissars 
and Military Party Committees of | 
Districts Military Districts 
Anhui Zhang Jingfa Zhang Jingfa 
Beijing Duan Junyi Duab Junyi 
Fujian Xiang Nan Xiang Nan 
Gansu Feng Jixin Feng Jixin 
Guangdong Ren Zhongyi Ren Zhongyi 
Guangxi Qiao Xiaoquang Qiao Xiaoquang 
Guizhou Chi Biqing Chi Biqing 
Hebei Jin Ming Jin Ming 
Heilongjiang Yang Yichen Yang Yichen 
Henan Liu Jie Liu Jie 
Hubei Guan Guangfu Guan Guanfu 
Hunan Mao Zhiyong Mao Zhiyong 
Inner Mongolia Zhou Hui Zhou Hui 
Jiangsu Xu Jiatun Xu Jiatun 
Jiangxi Bai Dongcai Bai Dongcai 
Jilin Qiang Xiaochu Qiang Xiaochu 
Liaoning Guo Feng Guo Feng 
Ningxia Li Xuezhi Li Xuezhi 
Qinghai Liang Buting Liang Buting 
Shaanxi Ma Wenrui Ma Wenrui 
Shandong Su Yiran Su Yiran 
Shanghai Chen Guodong Chen Guodong 
Shanxi Huo Shi1ian Huo Shi1ian 
Sichuan Tan Qilong Tan Qilong 
Tianjin Chen Weida Chen Weida 
Tibet Yin Fatang Yin Fatang 
Xinjiang Wang Enmao Vacant 
Yunan An Pingsheng An Pingsheng 
Zhejiang Wang Fang Wang Fang 
Sources : David Goodman, China. 's Provinicial Leaders Directory 
1949-1535, Vol.1, (New Asia Centre： University 
College, Cardiff Press, 1986), pp.13-152. 
The second step taken was to make some institutional changes in 
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order to streamline the PLA which was already a kind of revolution. 
Unlike Mao, Deng put more emphasis on practical changes than on 
ideological indoctrination. The first was the establishment of a state 
Central Military Committee (CMC) in December 1982 to direct the PLA in 
accordance with the 1982 Constitution. As many scholars revealed this 
committee within the state structure was virtually meaningless since 
I n 
the CCPCCMC still had the final say on military matters. ” In terras of 
membership, the composition of the CCPCCMC and CMC was relatively the 
u 
same. ‘ According to an official statement, the CCPCCMC: 
through consultation between our Party and the democratic 
parties and with the approval of the National People's 
Congress, can“concurrently become members of the Central … 
£ K Military Commission of the State.‘ 
In the eyes of the PLA, there were now two institutions to lead and 
control the army. The Party could no longer be the main beneficiary of 
commanding the gun, the state now had the same power. 
The second institutional change attempted concerned the separation 
of the party and the PLA. The appointment of Hu Yaobang as the Chairman 
of CC and Deng as the Chairman of CCPCCMC was meant to serve as a means 
to separate the original institutional structure. From another angle, 
the party-holder was no longer concurrently holding military power. The 
party-holder could now be seen more as the commander of the array. 
The third institutional change was the creation of the People，s 
Armed Police Force (PAPF), which was responsible to the Ministry of 
Public Security of the State Council. The task of internal security 
and police work was now transferred to the state. This force took over 
PLA's non-military duties of construction, security and police work. As 
it has been suggested, since the PLA had historically evolved as 
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encompassing both internal and external security affairs, it led to the 
46 
greater likelihood that the PLA intervene in politics. 
In seeking to build a more professional and institutionalize PLA, 
Deng hoped these changes would lead to a reduction in the role of PLA. 
The third measure taken to reassert the Party's control over the 
military concerned the effort to promote professionalism, in order to 
have a modern and trained military. As most scholars have argued 
professionalism was an attempt to depolitize the PLA. 
The promotion of a regulated, institutionalized and well-
disciplined armed forces was necessary for professionalism. On March 2 
1981， an Army men Oath was promulgated by the GSD and GPD. Starting 
from 1981, every new recruited PLA men had to take the oath so as to 
• • tn maintain the fine tradition of PLA. More severe Measure was the 
i 
"Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China for 
Punishment Armymen Who Commit Offences Against Their Duties" which was 
issued by the Standing Committee of the 5th NPC on June 6 1981. Within 
these regulations, the basic duties and limits of each PLA man was 
IQ 
clearly drawn. — 
Education and training were another criteria for professionalism. 
PLA men were encouraged to self-study and to attend night school and 
classes. They were even given financial support to study at middle 
iQ 
school or technical middle school. The merit system was also 
introduced in connection of promoting professional military education. 
Professional education was required for promotion, which was being 
announced at the 11th All PLA Conference on Military Academies•冗 
Military training was also heavily emphasized. The system of regular 
training was set by GSD in 1981 in order to regularize and standardize 
training. "Three Shiftings" were stressed to guide the principles of 
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training and encouraged to study foreign armies. These military 
training received great success. It has been estimated that an increase 
of 15,000 students were enrolled in military academies and school, an 
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increase of 10,000 graduates in 1981 than in the previous year. 
Going along side with the military professionalism was the 
research on military technology. Deng, as a modernization-conscious 
leader, encouraged the scientists, engineers, technicians, officers and 
PLA to participate in such research. On 18 May 1980，China's first 
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Intercontinental Ballistic Missile was tested. While it is beyond the 
scope of this study to go into further details on the R&D in China, it 
is important to emphasize Deng* s eagerness to have a modernization 
policy in China. Still, Deng's drive for modernization did not negJLect 
Mao's military thought on non-material ideological weapons. It has been 
argued that Mao Zedong military science: 
is the powerful ideological and theoretical weapon with 
which to strengthen the national defense, build a 
modernized revolutionary army and win victory in a future 
war against aggression. It will forever remain the treasure 
of the people of our country to defeat and to overcome over 
the enemy. 
This process of consolidation of the PLA seemed to have made another 
cycle by 1982. While most scholars had neglected it, there was another 
and rather major reshuffling in late 1982 and early 1983. This 
reshuffling affected six Cdrs and eight 1st Pol Cmrs. 
The 1982 Reshuffling 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, a pattern can already be 
seen in how the meetings of CCP National Congresses were usually 
scheduled after a power struggle in order to strengthen the winner's 
power. After the Congresses, personnel rearrangements were followed in 
order to fulfil this aim. 
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The 12th CCP National Congress of September 1982 was no exception. 
Immediately after Deng* s victory over Hua and the closing of the 12th 
National Congress, a series of personnel reshufflings were made within 
the State, Party and the military sectors. In the military sector 
alone, there were already around 297 PLA men reshuffled, of which about 
217 of them were at the MRs and MDs levels within the period between 
55 the end 1982 December and early 1983. It has also been calculated 
that about 28,000 PLA men were either required to join the advisory 
56 departments or retire. In another estimation, more than 60 PLA men 
were forced to join the Central Advisory Committee and about 10-15% of 
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PLA men were forced to retire. 
It is quite responsible to ask why another large scale personnel 
readjustment was launched only two years after the preyious one« Since 
( “ 
this reshuffling was planned by Deng himself, it may suggest that Deng 
used this as a means to remove his remaining opponents. At the 12th CCP 
National Congress on September 6, Chen reflected this situation when he 
stated that impending promotions should not include any of those: 
people who rose to prominence during the ‘cultural 
revolution' by following Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and their 
like in *rebellion'. .. Any of them who have already been 
promote^ must be resolutely removed from the leading 
bodies. 
Another reason was that more suitable PLA men were available to 
replace the old marshals. After rehabilitating such PLA men, Deng was 
allowed to gain full control over the military and party. In this 
reshuffling, professional soldiers also seems to gain priority. The 
third and the most important reason was to dismiss those who had 
engaged in the factional struggle against Deng over how to evaluate Mao 
and his theories.^^ 
While these is insufficient data, the first reason for reshuffling 
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was although officially hinted, no indication to pinpoint who had been 
promoted but need to be removed. There is information to provide 
insights into the second reason. Fu Chongbi, 1st Pol Cmr of the Peking 
MR was a professional soldier. Fu， a 66 year-old lieutenant general, 
replaced the 70 year-old Yuan Shengping. Another professional soldier 
was the 61 year-old Liu Zhenhua of the Shenyang MR who succeeded the 71 
year-old Liao Hansheng. Jiang Yonghui, the new 64 year-old Cdr of the 
Fuzhou MR, was another professional soldier succeeded the 68 years old 
Yang Chengwu. Zhou Shizhong, whose age was unknown but was also a 
professional soldier, was appointed as the Cdr of the Wuhan MR to 
replace the 71 year-old Zhang Caiqing.卯 These professional soldiers, 
who were not followers of Deng‘ s FA loyalist faction, were promoted due 
to their younger age and professional backgrounds. j 
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Other who were also dismissed due to their age were Liao Hansheng, 
the 72 year-old 1st Pol Cmr of Shenyang; Xiao Wangdong, the 72 year-old 
1st Pol Cmr of Jinan MR; Xu Liqing, the 75 year-old 1st Pol Cmr of 
Chengdu； Du Yide, 70, Cdr of Lanzhou; Liao Zhigao, 74, 1st Pol Cmr of 
Fuzhou MR; Li Chengfang, the 68 year-old 1st Pol Cmr of Wuhan MR and 
Liu Zhijia, the 70 year-old 1st Pol Cmr of Kunming MR. Although there 
was no official explanation given by Deng, it seems, especially with 
those who remained at posts while in their niid-60s, that it was 
primarily due to the effects of old age. 
Two regional Cdrs were dismissed for the third reason were Nie 
Fengzhi of the Nanking MR and Wu Keda of the Guangzhou MR.“ Their 
involvement in the factional struggle began with the conflict aroused 
from part of PLA men discontented with Deng's extreme anti-Maoist 
policies. Although Deng had adopted certain Mao*s ideologies, Deng had 
banned the formers for committing bourgeois liberalization. For 
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example, Wei Guoqing, the Director of the GPD and one of Deng's close 
proteges, was identified as the head of the anti-Deng faction. 
As seen in Table 7, it can be discerned that only You Taizhong and 
Tan Youlin were transferred from Chengdu to Guangzhou and from Urumqi 
to Lanzhou respectively. You, one of Deng's trusted men, was 
transferred to a more strategically important MR while Tan moved 
because he had been stationed in Xinjiang MR for already five years. 
The rest of the non-dismissed regional leaders were able to linger 
on their office. Evidently, Deng did not see the need to intermix posts 
for the sake of merely destroying "mountaintopisra". Even You Taizhong, 
who had been transferred to replace the dismissed Wu Kehua, was 
superseded by the Deputy Cdr of the Chengdu MR. Similarly Tan You1in, 
who had replaced Xiao Hua, was substituted by Wang j Enmao, a former 
I 
leader of the Xinjiang MR. Deng did not really seem to worry about the 
tendency of feudalism. Furthermore, we can see that 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Peking MR was actually replaced by the Deputy Pol Cmr of the same MR; 
1st Pol Cmr of Shenyang MR was replaced by the Deputy Pol Cmr of the 
same region; Cdr of Nanking succeeded by its Deputy Cdr and Cdr of 
Wuhan by its Deputy Cdr. This pattern shows that Deng had no intention 
in transferring the regional leaders to other MRs since he encouraged 
the promotion of the lower cadres to replace their superiors. 
This reshuffling also unveils the perenniality of FA system in 
military alignments within the PLA. Apart from Qin Jiwei, Li Desheng, 
Guo Linxiang and You Taizhong, Deng also promoted four other 2nd FA 
members to this level. They included Xiang Shouzhi of the Nanking MR, 
Wang Chenghan and Wan Haifeng of the Chengdu MR, and Xie Zhenhua 
of the Kunming MR. Whereas only four - Rao Shoukun (Jinan MR), Fu 
Kuiqing (Fuzhou MR), Zhou Shizhong (Wuhan MR) and Zhang Zhixiu 
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TABLE 7. THE 1982 RESHUFFLING 
COMMANDERS & 1ST POL COMMISSARS PREVIOUS POSTS OF THE 
MILITARY COMMANDERS AND 
REGIONS BEFORE 1983 AFTER 1983 1ST POL COMMISSARS 
Qln Jiwei 2 Qin Jiwei 2 Unchanged 
BEIJING 
Yuan Shengping 5 Fu Chongbi 5 1st Deputy Cdr-Beijing MR 
Li Desheng 2 Li Desheng 2 Unchanged 
SHENYANG 
Liao Hansheng 1 Liu Zhenhua 4 Deputy Cdr - Shenyang MR 
Rao Shoukun 3 Rao Shoukun 3 Unchanged 
JINAN 
Xiao Wangdong 3 Vacant 
Nie Fengzhi 3 Xiang Shouzhi 2 Deputy Cdr - Nanking MR 
NANJING 
Guo Linxiang 2 Guo Linxiang 2 Unchanged 
Wu Kehua 4 You Taizhong 2 Cdr - Chengdu MR 
GUANGZHOU 
Wang Meng Wang Meng Unchanged 
You Taizhong 2 Wang Chenghan 2 Deputy Cdr - Chengdu MR 
CHENGDU ： 
Xu Liqing 1 Wan Haifeng 2 Deputy P. Cmr-Beijing MR 
Du Yide 2 Zheng Weishan 1 newly reactivated 
LANZHOU 
Hsiao Hua 4 Tan Youlin 1st Pol Cmr - Urumqi MR 
Yang Chengvm 5 Jiang Yonghui 4 1st Deputy Cdr'-Shenyang MR 
FUZHOU 
Liao Zhiquo Fu Kuiqing 3 Deputy Pol Cmr-Shenyang MR 
Zhang Caiqian 4 Zhou Shizhong 3 Deputy Cdr - Wuhan MR 
WUHAN 
Li Chengfang 2 Vacant 
Zhang Zhixiu 3 Zhang Zhixiu 3 Unchanged 
KUNMING 
Liu Zhijian 2 Xie Zhenhua 2 Deputy Cdr - Shenyang MR 
Xiao Quanfu 4 Xiao Quanfu 4 Unchanged 
URUMQI 
Tan Youlin Wang Enmao 1 1st Pol Cmr - Jilin MD 
Sources : Directory of Chinese Official Provinicial Organization ;a 
reference aid, (Washington : CIA, 1984), pp.221-263. 
China Directory 1984, pp.293-311. 
see, Vol.17, No.2 (15 February, 1983), pp.36-37. 
(Kunming MR) - were from the 3rd FA. Three others - Liu Zhenhua 
(Shenyang MR), Jiang Yonghui (Fuzhou MR) and Xiao Quanfu (Urumqi MR)-
were 4th FA loyalists. Only two 一 Zheng Weishan (Lanzhou MR) and Wang 
Enmao (Urumqi MR) - were from the 1st FA and one - Fu Chongbi of 
(Peking MR) - was from the 5th FA. 
Especially the 4th FA which had decreased in representation as 
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compared to the 1980 reshuffling indicates that Deng did not want to 
see a strong 4th FA influence. Table 7 shows that the four replaced 4th 
FA old marshals were substituted by people from other FA factions. 
After the 1982 reshuffling, only three 4th FA assumed regional 
leadership positions. Although they were from the 4th FA, there is no 
information to suggest that they had supported and had been tixie 
(praised and raised) by Lin Biao. 
The 1982 reshuffling was no exception. The regional reshuffling 
was launched hand in hand with the central military reshuffling. Geng 
Biao, who had publicly insulted Deng for "speaking nonsense", was 
dismissed. Geng was actually the first civilian to head the MND. His 
dismissal proved that it was not easy for civilian to make military 
policies. Deng finally appointed Zhang Aiping to Replace Geng in 
November 1982. Although Zhang was not a 2nd FA loyalist, Deng saw the 
need to fill this post with a person who was familiar with defense so 
as to modernize national defense. Zhang was indeed the right person due 
to his technical background since 1958 while under the command of Nie 
Rongzhen. Deng may have preferred a younger Minister rather the 72 
years-old Zhang, a professional minister was the second best choice. 
Another important figure appearing in 1982 was Yu Qiuli, who had 
succeeded Wei Guoqing as the Director of the GPD. Wei, who was formerly 
a strong supporter of Deng, was now dismissed by Deng for his anti-Deng 
attitude. Besides from challenging Deng on the issue of spiritual 
pollution and criticizing Deng's anti-Mao attitude, he was forced to 
resign because, as the head of political and ideological work in the 
PLA, he failed to control "Leftist" tendencies when Bai Hua，s 
Unrequited Love was published. While Bai was forced to make a self-
criticism, Wei was then replaced by Yu. Although Yu had been linked to 
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the "oil faction" and was also an anti-Dengist, he was actually a good 
choice. He had already been the Director of the 358th Brigade‘s 
Political Department during the war with Japan and the Pol Cmr of 
another PLA unit during the KMT-CPP struggle. After the struggle, he 
was again the Pol Cmr of Southwest Military and Political College. He, 
therefore, could not be considered as new-blood to take charge of 
politico-ideological work within PLA. He had been purged in the CR and 
was only liberated and elected as the Director of GPD by Deng, it would 
then be hardly to expect him to harm his saviour. From these personnel 
shifts, Deng made practical choices in selecting the appropriate 
persons to fit important posts. He did not blindly rely on 2nd FA 
loyalists to fill these vacuums. � 
At the PLA service level, Deng also replaced his 2nd FA loyalists. 
Liu Huaqing as the Cdr of Navy had been the Deputy Pol Cmr of PLA Navy 
in 1965 but disappeared when the CR turned into a power seizure. With 
appropriate experience as well as a loyalist to Deng, Deng would not of 
course neglected him. 
Through the 12th CCPCC National Congress, we can see the continued 
decrease of the PLA in party affairs. Out of the 348 full and alternate 
ce 
members, only 75 of them were PLA men. Although the representation in 
the Politburo still remained high, eleven out of 28 members were PLA 
men. There was actually a decrease of 26.3%. This decrease shows that 
Deng no longer needed the PLA to consolidate his legitimacy. 
Furthermore, Deng had created his own faction within the Party 
especially his old 2nd FA henchman, Yang Shangkun and his associates. 
Yang was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of CMC and CCPCCMC. 
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The Continued Streamlining of the PLA after the 1982 Reshuffling 
Similar to the previous cycles, after personnel reorganization, 
measures to consolidate the supreme leader's position were followed. 
However, in this round, the promotion of political and ideological of 
PLA was not emphasized. Instead, institutional changes were implemented 
to achieve such a goal. 
While having already taken steps to consolidate his hold of 
political power, Deng declared at a forum in 1982 that the PLA was 
still confronted with problems. He stated that: 
the present structure, method of leadership and 
organizations of work in the arniY are not very 
satisfactory; they are too complicated. 
Institutional streamlining was therefore continued within PLA. � 
In terras of organizational changes, the Commission in charge of 
/ 
Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense was set up in 
August 1982. This Commission was actually the combination of the 
National Defense Science and Technology Commission and the National 
Defense Industrial Office. These two commissions had been headed by PLA 
leaders under the direct supervision of the CCPCCMC.^^ After this 
change, this new commission was placed under the leadership of the 
State Council and CCPCCMC, which were headed by Zhang Aiping.With 
such an organizational change, the state now had the administrative 
power over defense and R&D tasks. Furthermore, the abolishment of PLA 
Railways Corps in early 1984 was another example of reduction of PLA's 
role. 
As for regularization, the Military Service Law was promulgated on 
May 31, 1984. Within the 12 Chapters and 65 Articles, conscriptions, 
the rank system, the retirement system and so on were re-instituted 19 
71 years after they had been abolished by Mao and Lin Biao. 
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A lot of work had been done in the area of education and training 
after the GPD issued "The Decisions on Strengthening Education Among 
the Entire Army Cadres in Science and Culture and Political Theories" 
until 1985• The system of military academic degrees was introduced in 
1982 with bachelor, master and even doctoral degrees. In 1983, a 
conference decided that students with professional education were to be 
• . 7 9 
given priority for recruitment and promotion in order to encourage and 
promote higher educational levels within the PLA, Education became a 
requirement. In an All-Army forum, officers were even being criticized 
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for neglecting the importance of training. 
It is not the major interest of the present study to tackle the 
issues involved in military modernization (especially those dealing 
with technology, weaponry and equipment), but it is safe to assert that 
the previous measures of personnel rearrangement, promotion of 
politico-ideological work of PLA, institutional arrangement, 
regularization, promotion of education and training were intended not 
only to promote professionalism to disengage the PLA from politics, but 
also to upgrade China's military standards. 
Nevertheless, the overemphasis of professionalism had led to some 
side-effects. Some PLA elders, especially, Ye Jianying, Xu Shiyou, Li 
Desheng and Wei Guoqing, felt that Deng put less focus on Communist 
ideology. As Yii Yii-lin, a famous Taiwanese writer on the Chinese 
military had noted, these PLA men "considered themselves cornerstone of 
[the] proletarian dictatorship, as such they [had] a right to check 
"74 
unhealthy political trends. The dismissal of Wei Guoqing did not 
‘ really get rid of such politically conscious PLA men. Ye Jianqiang was 
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believed to be behind the dissent. This had however nothing to do with 
their disloyalty towards Deng. It was rather natural that there were 
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conflict of interests between those who spent most of their lives 
guiding with the Mao's principles and those new blood who wanted to 
have a modern and professional army. 
Such political disagreements did not hinder Deng's continuation in 
streamlining the PLA. At an enlarged CMC meeting on June 4， 1985, Deng 
even made a brave and major decision to reduce both the manpower of PLA 
by one million and the number of MRs from eleven to seven. Deng also 
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wanted to replace more Cdrs with younger men. In line with the latter 
two decisions, a reshuffling of military leaders was made in order to 
create a smaller, younger and more professional array. It was also used 
to exclude those who had different interests with Deng and, hence, 
favouritism still perpetuated. The regional leaders were less bound to 
oppose Deng since they must be seen as Deng，s trusted njen, at least for 
that moment. Such exclusion was more vivid at the central military 
level because the leaders at this level had more to say in terms of 
national policy and it would be a threat to Deng if he selected those 
who were untrustworthy. 
The 1985 Reshuffling 
In this mid-1985 reshuffling, those who retained their posts were 
mainly the 2nd FA loyalists. For example, in Table 8, Qin Jiwei 
remained as the Cdr of the Peking MR, Xiang Shouzhi as the Cdr of the 
Nanking MR, You Taizhong as the Cdr of the Guangzhou MR and Wan Haifeng 
still remained as the 1st Pol Cmr of Chengdu. These military leaders 
were not just Deng's loyalists but were all victims of the CR that had 
been and reinstated by Deng. They also were supporters of Deng and his 
policies. 
Apart from them, Deng also promoted two more 2nd FA subordinates 
7 9 
to regional leadership positions, namely Yang Baibing as the 1st Pol 
Cmr of the Beijijng MR and Liu Jingsong as the Cdr of the Shenyang MR. 
The representation of other FA factions were even lesser than the 
previous reshuf flings. Only one came from the 1st FA and the 3rd FA. 
Four came from the 4th FA (refer to Table 8). The rest did not have any 
FA identity. 
TABLE 8. THE 1985 RESHUFFLING 
COMMANDERS & 1ST POL COMMISSARS PREVIOUS POSTS OF THE 
MILITARY 丨丨 COMMANDERS AND 
REGIONS BEFORE 1985 AFTER 1985 1ST POL COMMISSARS 
Qin Jiwei 2 Qin Jiwei 2 Unchanged 
BEIJING 
Fu Chongbi 5 Yang Baibing 2 Deputy Pol Cmr-Beijing MR 
Li Desheng 2 Liu Jingsong 2 Nil 
SHENYANG , 
Liu Zhenhua 4 Liu Zhenhua 4 Unchanged 
Rao Shoukun 3 Li Juilong 4 Nil i 
JINAN 
Vacant Chi Haotian 4 V.Chairman-Greening Com. 
Xiang Shouzhi 2 Xiang Shouzhi 2 Unchanged 
NANJING 
Guo Linxiang 2 Fu Kuiqing 3 1st Pol Cmr - Fuzhou MR 
You Taizhong 2 You Taizhong 2 Unchanged 
GUANGZHOU — 
Wang Meng Zhang Zhongxian4 Deputy GPD Dir-Shenyang MR 
Wang Chenghan 2 Fu Quanyou 1 Nil 
CHENGDU 
Wan Haifeng 2 Wan Haifeng 2 Unchanged 
Zheng Weishan 1 Zhao Xianshun Deputy Cdr - Shanyang MR 
LANZHOU 
Tan Youlin Li Xuanhua Nil 
Sources : Directory of PRC Military Personalities, November 1985, 
(U.S.:Defense Liaison Office and Hong Kong： Consulate 
General.November 1985). 
China Handbook： 1985-86, (Hong Kong： Ta Kung Pao, 1985), 
pp.471-471. 
China in Crisis: The Role of Military, (Jane's Information 
Group, Ltd., 1988), pp.92-99. 
I&S, Vol.21, No.7 (July 1985), pp.1-2. 
I&5, Vol.21, No.12 (December 1985), p. 87. 
It can be argued that Deng did not really intend to favour his 2nd 
FA loyalists since it was just a coincidence that the non-2nd FA 
members belonged to the older generation. But to remind ourselves, 
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those who remained, but also were fellows of the 2nd FA, were over ‘ 
their 70s. Qin was 74 and You was 71, while the exact age of Xiang was 
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unknown but was definitely over 70s. 
Although there is insufficient data to examine the dismissal of 
non-FA belongers, (e.g. Wang Meng and Tan Youlin), it has nothing to do 
with their non-connection with FA as Yii Yii-lin has claimed. ^^ Yii 
suggested that their dismissal revealed the true factional nature of 
PLA reorganization. He seemed to neglect that Tan Youlin was replaced 
by someone without a FA background and that there were two new 
appointments made to non-FA PLA men. 
Out of these nine new appointees, most of them were professional 
soldiers who had direct battle experience and were also at the average 
I 
age of 56. Yang Baibing, 1st Pol Cmr of MR, was 65 yearfs old and was a 
full general. Liu Juisong, Cdr of Shenyang, was 52 and a lieutenant 
general. Li Juilong, the 56-year-old Cdr of the Jinan MR was a general; 
Chi Haotian, 1st Pol Cmr of the same region, was 57 years old and a 
general. Zhang Zhongxian, 1st Pol Cmr of Guangzhou, and Fu Quanyou, Cdr 
of the Chengdu MR, were both 55 years old and lieutenant generals and 
Zhao Xianshun, Cdr of Lanzhou, was 60 years old and a lieutenant. Fu 
Kuiqing was 64 and Li Xuanhua was 52, but both had no previous record 
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of any military status. Of these nine appointees, three of them were 
pure "new blood" with no previous experience at this level. Most of 
them only had joined the army shortly before the CR and did not really 
participate in any power struggle. This shows that Deng had at least 
built an army with younger, professional and neutral soldiers at his 
level. Li Desheng, who was only 59, was dismissed probably due to his 
support to Wei Guoqing's group criticizism of Deng's anti-Mao attitude 
since they had had strong links with Mao. Although Li was a 2nd FA 
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associate, he was a survivor and beneficiary of the CR. He had even 
been invited by Mao to become the Director of GSD in order to fight 
against Lin Biao and his associates. He then supported Ye Jianying to 
maintain Mao，s role in the h i s t o r y . 卯 
Unlike those like Qin, Xiang and You, who had supported Deng to 
oppose Deng's challengers, the ones who had remained neutral in Deng's 
fight against his challengers were also forced to retire. They included 
Wang Chenghan, 68; Zhang Weishan, 69; Jiang Yonghui, 69 and Zhou 
Shizhong (whose age was unknown). Even though younger than Qin, Xiang 
and You, they were made to retire. Deng still relied on his FA 
loyalists even though he had hoped to have a younger and professional 
leaders. It is, however, important to see that the 1982 and ‘this 
reshuffling did not discriminate against the 4th FA.丨 As long as they 
were young, professional and had no record in siding with Lin Biao, 
they were also being tixie by Deng. This supported Deng's famous saying 
that "whether it is white cat or a black cat, as long as it can catch 
mice, it is a good cat." 
At the central military level, only Zhang Dingfa, Cdr of the Air 
Force, was replaced by 60 year-old Wang Hai. The reshuffling of Air 
Force was actually the last one of the general departments and services 
being reshuffled by Deng since he resumed to power. Besides this 
change, no major personnel changes were made. However, a number of 
seniors officers in these departments and services were rejuvenated. 
According to official statements, the number of these officers were 
23.8% less and their average age was 10.6 years youngerFrom an 
average age of 64.9 to 56.7 and also 60% of these personnel received 
tertiary standard while 75% received military academy training^^ the 
PLA men was getting much younger and educated. 
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In terms of military representation in the civilian sector, a 
large scale readjustment was made after the 4th Plenary Session of the 
12th Congress of CCP in September 1985. With this conference, ten of 
the 18 Politburo members resigned, including the six military leaders, 
Li Desheng, Nie Rongzhen, Wang Zhen, Wei Guoqing, Xu Xiangqian and 
Zhang Tingfa. None of the six new members added to the Politburo, 
(i.e. , Li Peng, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi, Tian Jiyun and Wu Xueqian) were 
military men. Only three, (i.e. , Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi and Yu 
Qiuli), of the 19-member Politburo were associated with the PLA men. 
There was then a 17.6% decrease of military representation in the full 
membership of the Politburo. 
Among 183 members (including both full and alternate members) of 
J go the Central Commmittee, 64 were resigned from posjt. As already 
calculated by Yii Yii-lin, half of the resigned veterans were military 
men and out of the newly elected members, only 13 of them were PLA 
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personnel. Of these 13 newly appointed members of CC, they were 
considered to be Deng's trusted men and had been appointed by Deng as 
nr 
leaders of the general headquarters, the arm services or the MRs. 
The representation of PLA in the Party Congress seemed to be the 
lowest it ever had been since the 8th CCP Party Congress in 1956. 
The Continued Streamlining of the PLA After the 1985 Reshuffling 
With these structural reform and reorganization of the PLA, Deng 
and his allies then placed their focus on improving the PLA. 
In order to further improve the recruitment system, the 
"Regulations on Conscription Work" was issued by both the State Council 
and the CMC on October 24, 1985. These regulations were drawn in line 
with the Military Service Law so as further systematize the army-
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building. Like Mao who had the PLA men to change their uniform (e.g. , to 
wear a red star hat and a red collar badge), Deng had changed the PLA's 
uniform in May 1985, from a single red star as the cap insignia to a 
round badge inlaid with a five-pointed star with wheat ears and cog 
wheels to surround the two Chinese characters noting "August First" 
(China，s Array Day). They were also made to wear peaked caps, new collar 
badges and epaulets. Although changes in uniform did not signify 
reform, it symbolized that their army had entered a new era and under 
a new leadership. 
Among all the efforts made, military training and education were 
given priority to uphold professionalism. The famous National Defence 
Academy, which is regarded as the highest institution of military study 
： 
in China, was established in 1985. Aiming to train high-ranking 
military, political and logistical PLA personnel, the first strategy-
research institute was set up to study the strategies and national 
defence politics in China. Further more, 52 universities and colleges 
had also started compulsory military training for their students.^^ 
While other examples can be mentioned, the above two examples 
illustrate how Deng placed greater emphasis on structural and 
institutional reform within the PLA after he had installed trusted men 
in the PLA structure. To Deng, professionalization was a mean to 
upgrade the army-building in China and to separate the PLA from 
politics. 
In short, with reshufflings being followed by professionalization, 
Deng was able to build a reliable and professional army. In the 1980 
reshuffling, he dismissed all those who had not supported him, 
replacing them with military people who had been victims in the CR. In 
the 1982 reshuffling, he expanded the power of his 2nd FA loyalists. In 
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the 1985 reshuffling, he only retained the 2nd FA loyalists who were 
more liberal and supported him against the conservatives and political-
minded loyalists. Although there were political considerations behind 
these reshufflings, Deng was professional conscious in handling the 
1982 and the 1985 reshufflings. He promoted "new blood" to the regional 
command in the latter two reshufflings. His success for promoting this 




THE 1990 RESHUFFLING 
Ever since 1978, the PLA was gradually reduced to primarily having 
a military task. Yet after the PLA was ordered to brutally suppress the 
1989 prodemocracy movement, PLA returned to the political scene. Same 
as the past, a reshuffling was expected when party regained its impetus 
after the PLA's intervention. In short, the 1990 reshuffling was also 
followed by a political event. The present chapter will then first 
succinctly review the occurrence of the political events and study in 
detail the outcome of the 1990 reshuffling of MRs. In affecting ten out 
of 14 Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs of the seven MRs, this reshuffling will be 
examined in relation to whether the FA tradition remains- within the PLA 
and whether the methods used in the previous reshufflings were still 
used for the consolidation of power. 
Student Movements and Intra—Party Struggles 
As Tang Tsou has convincingly posited, it was the independent 
momentum of the 1989 student movement that exacerbates "the preexisting 
differences within the party and turned them into an open split between 
the reformers and the hard-liners.The prodomcracy movement was 
essentially used by various factions within the party. The reformers 
were sympathized with the students and also wished to make use of the 
students‘ demand to support and consolidate with their own policies. 
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While the hardliners opposed the prodemocracy movement since they 
feared that it may endanger their power. The existence of these two 
factions was most significant when the hardliners implemented the 
Martial Law to quell the student movement. Some reformers opposed it. 
Even Zhao Ziyang offered to resign. 
Like Hu Yaobang, Zhou Ziyang was reprehended for supporting the 
2 
students and took a soft approach to solve the crisis. Zhao's downfall 
was not solely related to the student movement. His reform policies 
were being attacked by the conservative leaders. More importantly, he 
made Deng tilted to the conservative line when Zhao claimed that the 
students were not opposing China's fundamental system and had the right 
to criticize the Chinese leadership,^ while Deng claimed that�the 
5 
democratic movement was counterrevolutionary. It was also believed that 
Zhao angered Deng when he revealed to Mikhail Gorbachev that the party 
consultated Deng on important issues even though Deng had retired from 
the PartyJ 
Although there were two different attitudes within the Party over 
how to manage this crisis, the hard-liners finally ordered the PLA to 
clear the Square in order to, as June Teufel Dreyer thinks, act as a 
1 "power broker" to resolve the conflict between these factions. 
The Behaviour of PLA in June 4 Incident 
In examining the role of the PLA within the political context of 
each reshuffling, the entire PLA never acted as an uniform entity when 
they intervened into politics. This event in 1989 is no exception. 
An unverified source suggest that some PLA officers wrote an open 
letter to the CMC, explaining that they could not suppress the 
students. They urged the government to hold a fair dialogue with the 
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students. In this open letter, these PLA officers appeared to side with 
the reformers, stating that: 
(We must teach the PLA officers and men) to strictly follow 
Central Military Commission First Vice-Chairraan Comrade 
Zhao Ziyang' s demand for reason, calm, restraint, an(| order 
in properly handling our relations with the masses. 
Besides refusing to suppress the demonstrations, over 1000 PLA men of 
the GLD even reportedly supported and joined the student protests. Even 
the top central military leaders voiced their opposition. According to 
another source, there were aboii匕 150 active and retired senior PLA Cdrs 
also wrote a letter to Deng and the CMC that PLA should not spill the 
people‘s blood. These military leaders included Qin Jiwei, the Minister 
of MND; Chi Haotian, Chief of GSD; Hong Xuezhi, Director of GLD; Zhang 
... ；々， Aiping, former Minister MND and Yang Dezhi, former Chief of GSD among 
others .ID ‘ 
At a meeting of party, government and army cadres on May 20，1989， 
Yang Shangkun officially proclaimed that the PLA was prepared to 
suppress the movement. He stated that: 
For the sake of restoring order and defending security, 
some of the PLA had to move to the outskirts of Beijing to 
maintain stability. The armoured carriers that you saw on 
your way” here were the troops that have just arrived in 
Beijing.u 
After Yang，s speech, Li Peng then issued martial law in the main areas 
of Beijing. The PLA was off icially ordered to stop the demonstration. 
In the Martial Order No. One, the sixth point declared that during the: 
period of martial law, security officers, armed policemen, 
and PLA soldiers have the right to employ any means, 
including the use of force to stop a violator. 
Some central military leaders reportedly opposed such moves, but they 
lacked political power since most had been retired. According to a 
source, seven senior military leaders, namely, Ye Fei, Zhang Aiping, 
Xiao Ke, Yang Dezhi, Chen Zaidao, Li Juqui and Song Shilun, wrote a 
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letter to Deng, the Chairman of CCPCCMC, and the Beijing Martial Law 
Headquarters not to instruct the army to enter the capital. They 
emphatically argued that: 
The People's Liberation Army is the people's army� It 
should never stand against its own people. It should never 
kill its own people, nor should it open fire on its own 
people. You must not create any bloodshed. To avoid 
furthering the complicated situation, the army must stay 
away from the city. 
It has also been suggested that two former PLA top leaders Xu Xiangqian 
and Nie Rongzhen called on Deng to convince him not to use military 
force against the students.^^ 
Apparently, all those who opposed the decision of PLA to suppress 
the demonstration were mainly the inactive military leaders. Their 
reason for doing so is that they considered themselves to be advisors 
I 
with the right to express their discontent. Secondly, ithey had no post 
to lose even though Deng did not accept and got angry with their 
advice. No matter what, their advice was futile. When the 38th Group 
Army reportedly refused to move against the students, the 40,000 strong 
27th Group Army, then stationed in the East and West of Beijing, stood 
by to obey any command to clean up the Square. 
While the PLA failed to enter the capital, it has been reported 
that Renmin Ribao, Guangming Ribao, Xinhua，and the CCTV were already 
15 
under PLA control. Such military control was, however, declared as 
rumours. But from their changing attitude of these media in their 
reports, the probability of military censors were rather high. 
Without gaining the support of the entire PLA, the central 
authorities had not yet ordered the several PLA units to force 
themselves into the Square. Especially when the Beijing MR refused to 
both biao-tai, (to make known their position) and its group army 
refused to obey the order, the central authorities found the urgency to 
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call for support from other MRs. The reason for their refusal was 
probably due to Qin Jiwei ‘ s influence, who had served in the Beijing MR 
16 
for nearly a decade. Qin was considered to be on the side of Zhou. It 
was likely that when Yang Shangkun, belonger of conservative faction 
proposed the martial law, Qin refused. 
When the PLA was asked to study the speech of Yang and Li Peng, 
more troops were mobilized and flown to Beijing. It has been reported 
n 
that this obedience was mainly due to Deng's personal order. Leaders 
of MRs began to biao-tai by sending telegrams. The first four MRs which 
supported the martial law were Shenyang, Nanjing, Chengdu and Guangzhou 
MRs. They claimed that it was "correct", "timely" and "wise" measure to 
• 18 
impose martial law in order to halt turmoil* Their obedience was 
probably expected because they were being appointed by Deng to these 
i 
！ 
posts and more importantly, they had nothing to do with the power 
struggle within the central CCP. On the following day, Lanzhou and 
10 Jinan also pledged to support the central authority，s decision. Apart 
20 
from them, the Air and Navy Headquarters also added their support. 
With the underpinning of six out of the seven MRs, Deng, as Chairman of 
MC and CMC, was confident enough to promise the "unresolved support" of 
21 
the PLA in the leadership crisis on May 23, 1989. On the same day, the 
GPD, GSD and GLD jointly urged the army to implement the martial law 
II decree without hesitation. It has been estimated that around 350,000 
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troops had been brought to the outskirts of Beijing. 
It can been said that the central authority was able to receive 
the submissiveness of, at least, the majority of the PLA. This support 
was actually only seeked to confirm the legitimacy of imposing the 
martial law; to really take action to quell the Square would have to 
rely on the newly-organized Group Armies of different MRs. Although the 
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38th Group Army from Baoding was the first deployed, it was reported 
that they refused to take action. The central authority had to employ 
the 27th and other Group Armies stationed farther away down from 
Beijing on the basis of an unconfirmed reports. The Economist reported 
that Deng had persuaded and ordered half of the 24 Group Armies to send 
24 
units to Beijing. The deployment of these Group Armies, which have to 
be personally approved by the Chairman of CMC, were not all agreed to 
pierce into the Square. First was the 38th Group Army. The 28th Group 
Army, which was believed to be closely-connected with Zhao, broke into 
OK ‘ 
a fight with the 27th Group Army. ' Although there is insufficient 
information, there should be some other Group Armies which were 
reluctant to extinguish the demonstrators. With ten Group Armies ^ sent 
from far-off parts and stationed at the outskirts of Bjeijing, only the 
I 
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39th, 24th and 28th Group Armies were reported to enter and occupy the 
Square after the 27th Group Army suppressed the movement. 
Although with divided loyalties, once the decision was made by the 
Chairman of CMC and agreed by most of the Cdrs of MRs, it was nearly 
impossible for the group armies to disobey. Through this June 4 
Incident, the political loyalty of PLA was tested. Except the Beijing 
MR, all of the MRs supported the central authority in words. Actually, 
not all of the MR group armies worked in accordance to Deng's order. 
Most of the MR leaders hesitated for nearly two weeks before they biao-
tai their support. Due to these problems, another reshuffling should 
then be expected. The 1990 reshuffling of MR leaders was not only the 
result of their behaviour in June 4 Incident, it was also aimed to 
introduce a system of reshuffling the MRs at regular intervals. By so 
doing, the regional leaders could always be kept at a younger age and 
more professionally competent. 
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The 1990 Reshuffling 
After the reorganization of the CCPCCMC at the Fifth Plenary 
Session of the 13th Party Congress严 reshuffling of two of the PLA 
27 ？fi general departments and the reshuffling of PAP, the reshuffling of 
regional military leaders occurred from the end of April to the end of 
May. In this round of the reshuffling, six Cdrs and four 1st Pol Cmrs 
of seven MRs were affected. The 1990 reshuffling was not officially 
announced by the CCPCCMC. Instead, it was only announced by Yang 
Baibing, who flew in person to each MR to relay the decisions of 
29 
personnel changes. 
Same as the former reshufflings, the 1990 reshuffling appears to 
have also provided an opportunity to reward those who had biao-tai 
their support and those who had really performed meritorious deeds to 
suppress the democratic movement of 1989. 
Zhang Gong, 1st Pol Cmr of Beijing MR was the most prominent 
example on whose promotion was based on his active role in the 
crackdown. As the Director of Political Department and Spokesman for 
the Martial Law Enforcement Troops (MEET) in Beijing, he publicly-
stressed to stifle the democratic movement. He also defended the 
on 
crackdown and protected the central authorities from time to time 
while most PLA men of Beijing MR expressed sympathy to the 
demonstrators. 
Other new appointees who had been upgraded due to their actions to 
suppress the prodemocracy movement were Guo Hui and Shi Yuxiao, the Cdr 
and the 1st Pol Cmr of Nanjing MR respectively. Guo was sent from the 
Jinan MR to become the Deputy Cdr of the MRET in June 1989, whereas Shi 
was the Deputy Pol Cmr of the MRET when he was sent from Nanjing MR 
Their obedience to implement the orders rewarded them to their 
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promotions. 
Zhu Dunfa, the newly appointed Cdr of Guangzhou MR, was also a 
beneficiary after his performance of meritorious duties in the 
32 
crackdown as the Deputy Cdr of a certain martial law unit. The 
elevation of Cao Pengsheng, the 1st Pol Cmr of the Lanzhou MR was again 
the result of his performance. He led his troops from Nanjing to 
Beijing, resulting in his appointment as the Deputy Pol Crar of MEET and 
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took the command to suppress the demonstrators. 
In this personnel rearrangement, only four of them remained in the 
same posts (see Table 9). Their retention was also probably due to 
their good service records in the June 1989 operation." Both Liu 
Jinsong and Song Keda, the Cdr and the 1st Pol Cmr of the Shenyang ^ MR, 
were not transferred to other MRs since Deng trusted their obedience. 
This was perhaps because they were one of the earliest to biao-tai in 
which other MRs followed. As for Song Qingwei, the 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Jinan MR, was not being reallocated since he was only freshly elected 
to this post in 1987. Deng would not agonize him to be able to build a 
strong local chauvinism within three years of time. Although the 
Guangzhou MR was the second latest to biao-tai, Zhang Zhongxian was 
able to retain his post without being transferred was probably because 
he backed the central authority as early as in May 1989. At a meeting 
with officer cadres in Guangzhou, he stressed that PLA should respond 
to the call of the CCP and CMC to stop the upheaval and to maintain 
stability•冗 
Apart from them, two remained in their commandership, but were 
reshuffled. The first one was Zhang Wannian, the ex-Cdr of the 
Guangzhou MR. His move to the Jinan MR was commented as a punishment 
in because of his belatedly biao-tai. However, as suggested in Tangtai, 
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TABLE 3. THE 1990 RESHUFFLING 
COMMANDERS & 1ST POL COMMISSARS PREVIOUS POSTS OF THE 
MILITARY - COMMANDERS AND 
REGIONS BEFORE 1990 AFTER 1990 1ST POL COMMISSARS 
Zhou Yibing 2 Wang Chengbin 3 Deputy Cdr - Nanjing MR 
BEIJING 
Liu Zhenhua 4 Zhang Gong Director of PD-Beijing MR 
Liu Jingsong 2 Liu Jingsong 2 Unchanged 
SHENYANG 
Song Keda 4 Song Keda 4 Unchanged 
Li Juilong 4 Zhang Wannian 4 Cdr - Guangzhou MR 
JINAN 
Song Qingwei 3 Song Qingwei 3 Unchanged 
Xiang Shouzhi 2 Guo Hui 4 Deputy Cdr - Jinan MR 
NANJING 
Fu Kuiqing 1 Shi Yuxiao 2 Deputy Pol Cmr-Nanjing MR 
Zhang Wannian 4 Zhu Donfa 2 Deputy Cdr - Shenyang MR 
GUANGZHOU 
Zhang Zhongxian4 Zhang Zhongxian4 Unchanged 
Fu Quanyou 1 Zhang Taiheng 3 Dpty Cdr - Chengdu MR 
CHENGDU 
Wan Haifeng 2 Gu Shanqing 4 Dpty Pol Crar-Guangzhou MR 
Zhao Xianshun Fu Quanyou 1 Cdr - Chengdu MR 
LANZHOU 
Li Xuanhua Cao Pengsheng 4 Pol Cmr - Jinan MR 
Sources ： Military Organization of People's Republic of China: 
a reference aid, (Washington ： CIA, 1990). 
Wide Angle, (June 1990), p.78. 
Ta Kung Pao, (May 3, 1990), p.1. 
Tangtai, (June 2, 1990), p.10-11. 
SCMP, (May 26, 1990), p.11. 
China Directory 1991, p.179. 
Jinan，s military power and its relations with Beijing was actually more 
important than the Guangzhou MR. Furthermore, the Cdrs of the Jinan MR 
017 
used to be Deng^s most trusted men. Zhang's transfer cannot be seen as 
a punishment. There was no reason for Deng to keep Zhang if he was 
disloyal to him. More appropriately, Deng did not want to create a 
region which could be a stronghold for any FA. Before the reshuffling, 
both the Cdr and the 1st Pol Cmr of the Guangzhou MR were from the 4th 
FA. As in other regions, the Cdrs and the 1st Pol Cmrs of the same 
region were from different FA backgrounds. If we look back to the 
previous reshufflings in the Deng era, we seldom find both Cdrs and 1st 
Pol Cmrs were concurrently from the 1st and 4th FAs. 
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The second one was Fu Quanyou, who went from Chengdu to the 
Lanzhou MR. His transfer was tended to a promotion for his official 
support of the central authority in April 1989. He claimed that PLA had 
to "take a clear-cut stand in opposing disturbances, and take the lead 
• . QQ in preserving the political situation.“ The first reason was because 
he was successful in suppressing the riots in the Lanzhou MR after he 
39 
was sent to Chengdu on May 1，1989. His success implied his ability to 
control the Lanzhou MR. The second reason was that the Lanzhou MR was 
the largest MR and all its previous Cdrs were Deng's most trusted men -
usually from his 2nd FA. 
Does it imply that those who did not remain in post were 
distrusted by Deng? The answer to this shows that this reshuffling ajso 
aimed to keep the military leaders at a younger age after a period of 
I 
I 
five years. Even though Zhou Yibing and Liu Zhenhua, the Cdr and the 
1st Pol Cmr of the Beijing MR, were believed to be dismissed as the 
result of the June 4th Crisis,^^ they had actually reached the 
retirement age of 65. This retirement scheme was restricted in the PLA 
Service Regulation which came into effect on January 1, 1989, which 
placed an age limit of regional leaders at 65 year-old. They would not 
be able to be reappointed to their posts. The former were 68 while the 
latter were already 69 years old. 
Xiang Shouzhi and Fu Kuiqing, the Cdr and the 1st Pol Cmr of the 
Nanjing MR, showed their strong support to the central authority but 
were dismissed on account of their old age. The former was over 75 
while the latter was 69. On the same token, Wan Haifeng, the 1st Pol 
Cmr of Chengdu and Zhao Xianshun, the Cdr of Lanzhou were made to 
retire for the same reason. Whereas Li Juilong, Cdr of the Jinan MR, 
who was still 61 but was actually promoted to the Deputy Director of 
9 5 
GLD but the status of Li Xuanhua, 1st Pol Cmr of Lanzhou remains. 
The newly-appointed Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs were much younger. Wang 
Chengbin was 62 years old. Zhang Gong was 55. Liu Jingsong was 57. Song 
Keda was 62. Zhang Wannian was also 62. Song Qingwei was 61. Guo Hui 
was 60. Shi Yuxiao was 57. Zhu Dunfa was 63. Zhang Zhongxian was 64. 
Zhang Taiheng and Gu Shanqing were both 59， while both Fu Quanyou and 
Cao Pengsheng were both 60 years old. Their average age was 60 years 
old. Unlike the previous reshuffling where the average age was even 
younger, few were in their 70s, (e.g. Qin Jiwei, Xiang Shouzhi and You 
Taizhong). This time, the oldest was 64. 
In terras of professional competency and education, most of them 
had war experience and were professional military graduates. For� the 
first time, all of the seven Cdrs were graduates ；of PLA Military 
n '' Academy. Guo Hui, Zhang Wannian, Zhu Donfa and Zhang Taiheng had 
i? graduated from the same department in 1961. As for the 1st Pol Cmrs, 
three of the seven, namely, Shi Yuxiao, Zhang Zhongxian and Cao 
‘ /• 
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Pengsheng were graduates of the PLA Political Academy. All of the 
seven Cdrs were professional soldiers and had practical war 
experiences. Wang Chengbin had once served under Qin to fight in the 
Liberation and Korean War•“ Liu Jinsong had participated in the Sino-
15 
Vietnam War. Guo Hui had fought in the war to assist Korea against 
United States and the Sino-Vietnara war. Both Zhang Wannian and Zhang 
Taiheng engaged in the Sino-Vietnam War while Zhu Donfa and Fu Quanyu 
J j? 
had fought against the United States. 
This recent reshuffling was also planned to avoid the creation of 
"mountaintopisra" by rotating the postings. Apart from transferring the 
above-mentioned two Cdrs, the rest of the newly-appointed Cdrs were 
actually promoted from deputy Cdrs. Nonetheless, they were not promoted 
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directly to their serving MRs. Instead, they were promoted and 
transferred to other MRs (see Table 9). Wang Chengbin was previously 
the deputy Cdr of the Nan j ing MR; Guo Hui was the deputy Cdr of the 
Jinan MR; Zhu Donfa was the deputy Cdr of the Shenyang MR and Zhang 
Taiheng was the deputy Cdr of the Chengdu MR. Whereas, Gu Shanqing was 
used to be the Deputy Pol Cmr of the Guangzhou MR and Cao Pengsheng 
was the deputy Pol Cmr of the Nan j ing MR. Obviously, Deng wanted to 
prevent the creation of local ties. 
From this pattern, we can see that the succession of Cdrs and 1st 
Pol Cmrs was now more systematic. The dismissal or retirement of the 
superiors was taken over by their deputies so that they had the 
experience to handle familiar tasks. Unlike before, the Cdrs and ^ 1st 
Pol Cmrs could remain in posts for a rather longj period and the 
I 
( 
subordinates had to wait for a long time before they could have any 
promotion. The present system provided a much better chance for them to 
climb the power ladder. 
More importantly, this reshuffling reveals that Deng no longer 
paid too much attention on his 2nd FA to dominate the MRs. Unlike the 
previous reshufflings in the Deng era, the representation of his FA was 
the least in the present reshuffling. As seen in Table 9, only two of 
the 14 military leaders were from his 2nd FA. On the contrary, the 4th 
FA represented the most. This implies that the high representation of 
Deng's non-FA loyalists no longer provide a threat to Deng. In other 
words, Deng no longer relied on his 2nd FA to support and strengthen 
his legitimacy as some scholars had still claimed. 
Steps After the 1990 Reshuffling 
Worrying about professionalism might lead to the formation of PLA 
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as an independent political entity and negate the Party leadership over 
the army as well as the traditional military ideology, PLA men in all 
levels and units were ordered to study the important speech made by-
Deng shortly after the June 4 incident to unite, to adhere the four 
cardinal principles and to oppose bourgeois liberation. An all-Army 
Political Work Conference was again held to strengthen and to remind 
the PLA of their political work. Furthermore, to make sure that party 
have further penetrated into the PLA, departmental party committees 
were set up in group armies, MDs and MRs so that party system had 
10 
controlled within the bottom to top levels of PLA. 
In the 1980s, Deng did not place great emphasis on ideological 
education. Such work was now heavily emphasized by Deng himself within 
the PLA after the June 4 movement. The June 4 movement was suggested as 
the result of "slackened ideological w o r k . P L A was urged to 
strengthen and maintain ideological and cultural positions immediately 
after the reshuffling. It has been explained that ideological work has 
to be done to stop the "spiritual poison (bourgeois liberalization) 
from spreading unchecked" and the minds of the officers and soldiers to 
51 be "contaminated" and so on. Instead of stressing "revolutionalizaton, 
modernization and regularization" as the three main aspects for 
52 streamlining the army-building, ideological and political work was 
considered a priority for army-building, training and educating PLA 
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after the June 4 turmoil. The entire PLA in which the GPD took the 
lead was ordered to study the new regulations - "Routines Service 
Regulations,” "Regulations on Discipline" and "Formation Regulations". 
These were known as the Common Regulations and later as "Interior 
Service Regulations of the People's Liberation Army". These new Common 
Regulations were aimed to uphold the Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
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Thought as well as party's absolute leadership.^^ These regulations were 
even implemented as the basic regulations within the PLA.^ ^ 
In order to maintain a stronghold over the PLA, eight more 
• C ( J 
important military laws and regulations were promulgated in mid-1990, 
focusing OB recruiting, training, legislative work, management of 
weaponry, and protection of military facilities. They were bound by 
laws within the PLA. In July 1990, the PLA's Legal Consultancy Office 
was even set up to further check and strengthen the legal usage and 
ty 
system within the PLA. 
After a series of measures to re-establish a firm control over the 
PLA, Deng finally resigned from the CMC on March 21, 1990 at the Third 
Plenary Session of the 7th NPC. He was succeeded by Jiang Zemin who j^ as 
now both Chairman of CCPCCMC and CMC. 丨  t -I 
To conclude, like most of the other reshufflings, after the 1990 
personnel rearrangement, a slight change on institutional changes and 
ideological reorientation were undertaken. But this time, it is obvious 
that the FA informal ties disappeared in the military elite assignment. 
Although this paper is not going to investigate the exact informal ties 
that has replaced the FA, I believe that the next reshuffling will also 





A basic common denominator in each of these seven major 
reshufflings of regional military leaders concerns l)how political 
factors influenced both the emergence of and the nature of these 
reshufflings and 2)how factionalism within the PLA was influenced by 
either FA loyalty system or other informal affiliations. 
After reassessing the five major arguments laid out in Chapter 1 
in relation to the seven reshufflings, this paper concludes by 
considering the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments. 
In having examined the seven major reshufflings since 1954, I will 
now overview the five major arguments of this paper. 
First, all of the three reshufflings in the Mao era were dictated 
by and reflected the results of political struggles. For instance, the 
1967 reshuffling proceeded by the political conflict between Mao and 
Liu Shaoqi at the CR. It is not a mere coincidence that this 
reshuffling followed political struggle since the 1967 reshuffli) 
disclosed the outcomes of the Mao-Liu conflict. The 1967 reshuff] 
saw the purges and disappearance of many 2nd and 3rd FA members whr 
sided with Deng and Liu. While from originally one member f 
regional military command level, seven members of the 4七h 
promoted and substituted the vacuities. This is mainly bee? 
superior, Lin Biao, had assisted Mao in the power struggle 
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Secondly, only two (the 1980 and the 1990 reshufflings) of the 
four reshufflings in the Deng era were dictated by and reflected the 
political struggle. The other two reshufflings in 1982 and 1985 were 
mainly targeted to promote professionalism at the regional military 
level. The 1980 reshuffling occurred after Deng's struggle for 
I political succession in 1980. The regional leaders who had, at one 
time, backed the "Gang of Four" and Hua Guofeng were dismissed and 
i � 
replaced by Deng's supporters and by those who had been neutral at the 
succession crisis. The 1990 reshuffling also came after a political 
event. My speculation is that this wave of personnel reorganization was 
due to both the hesitation of five MR，s leaders in their support to the 
suppression of the prodemocracy movement in 1989 and the refusal of 七he 
Beijing MR，s leaders to enter the Tienanmen Square even after 七he 
f 
declaration of the Martial Law. This speculation can be surmised from 
the 1990 reshuffling which saw the appointment and promotion of those 
PLA men who had first shown their support and those who had actively 
participated to quash the Square. Those who remained in posts were 
giving good service records in the suppression whereas those who were 
dismissed from the regional military level had no record of supporting 
the central authority. 
Deng promoted younger and professional soldiers to the regional 
military level in the 1982 and the 1985 reshufflings even though Deng 
still appeared to have practised favouritism. For example, in the 1985 
reshuffling, nearly all of the five Cdrs who were allowed to remain in 
their posts were the 2nd FA members who were already in their 70s while 
the rest of the old regional leaders were dismissed and succeeded by 
much younger and professional soldiers. 
Thirdly, most of the reshufflings in both Mao and Deng eras cannot 
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be seen as an independent variable to serve as an administrative 
policy. As shown in argument 1 and 2，reshuffling was rather a tool for 
Mao and Deng to accumulate their support at the regional military 
command level. Reshufflings were intended to create a loyalist base 
within the PLA and to strengthen the Mao and Deng control over the PLA 
by demoting or removing the intrusted and disloyal regional leaders and 
by replacing the vacuum by their supporters or at least by those who 
were neutral in the political struggle. For example, when Mao 
undermined Lin's position after their comradeship came to a standstill, 
the 4th FA loyalists associated with Lin Biao were all removed from 
their posts in the 1971 reshuffling. The empty posts were then taken 
over especially by the 3rd FA members who stood against Lin Biao and 
his 4th FA. 丨 
Fourthly, up until the 1990 reshuffling, military elite assignment 
was still mainly based on the FA tradition. Table 10, which summarizes 
the percentage of the five FA factions at the top regional military 
level, shows that after each reshuffling, the representation of FA 
loyalists seems to correlate with the results of the political 
struggles. 
TABLE 10. PERCENTAGE OF DIFFERENT FA FACTIONS AT THE TOP 
REGIONAL MILITAKY LEVEL IN THE MAO AND DENG ERAS * 
I Reshufflings 1st FA 2nd FA 3rd FA 4th FA 5th FA 
I prior to 1967 28% 28% 24% 4% 8% 
1967 8% 24% 20% 28% 8% 
1971 11% 22% 39% 6% 17% 
1973 10% 30% 35% 10% 10% 
I 1980 — 14% 36% 18% 23% 5% 
I 1982 10% 40% 20% 15% 5% 
1985 7% 43% 7% 29% 0% 
1990 7% 21% 21% 43% 0% 
* All figures are rounded to two significant figures 
1 0 2 
When Lin Biao enjoyed his glorious moments during the CR, his 4th 
FA loyalists gained the highest level of representation in the top MR 
leadership level. Whereas some of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd FA loyalists, 
whose superiors were Mao's challengers, decreased in representation. 
After the breakdown of the Mao-Lin harmony, the representation of 4th 
FA dropped to the lowest level after the 1971 reshuffling. The 3rd and 
5th FAs were promoted to substitute their dismissals. When Deng 
reinstated and took charge of the 1973 reshuffling, the 2nd and 3rd FAs 
dominated the top leadership of the MRs. After Deng won the post-1976 
succession crisis over Hua, the representation of his 2nd FA loyalists 
increased after each reshuffling. Their representation exceeded other 
FAs, even though the latter had also been the victims丨in the CR. 
I 
I 
In the 1990 reshuffling, the tradition of FA seems to be less 
important. Unlike the previous reshufflings, Deng's 2nd FA did not gain 
the highest percentage. On the contrary, the 4th FA had the highest. 
This implies that Deng was no longer conscious about the FA tradition. 
The military distribution, which was mainly based on the FA foundation, 
had come to an end. Its disappearance is probably due to both the age 
and the weak FA affiliation of the new and young regional military 
leaders. The regional leaders who still carry FA identities had 
actually joined their FAs for a very short period of time. They were 
less likely to have had a strong mutual trust and loyalty with their FA 
superiors.^ 
Even so, this study has found that the FA mentality had been 
existing in the Chinese military for nearly four decades. With the 
sporadic but frequent reshufflings, other strong loyalty systems were 
less likely to develop within the MRs. Althought the spirit of guanxi 
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(personal relationship) which was based on FA factionalism cannot 
explain all the power relations in the PLA, it can at least provide a 
rather large picture of this relation. As this study has shown, there 
were only a few exceptional figures who did not share common interest 
with their FA members or loyalty to 七 h e i r FA superior. 
Lastly, after installing their supporters to the top regional 
military positions, Mao and Deng made use of ideological indoctrination 
and/or institutional changes to ensure the Party control over the 
entire PLA. Reshufflings could accumulate the support on an important, 
but small, amount of PLA personnel. By means of ideological 
indoctrination or institutional changes, however, nearly the entire PLA 
was being affected. Mao favoured ideological indoctrination to unite 
the PLA while Deng preferred institutional changes to regulate PLA. In 
this way, the dictum of "party must always command the Army" could then 
be further achieved. For example, after the 1967 reshuffling, the 
"Better Soldiers and Simpler Administration,’ movement was propagated by 
Mao in attempting to establish a unitary leadership of administering 
the functions of PLA so as to check and destroy the concept of class 
within the PLA. Take for another example, after the 1980 reshuffling, 
Deng established the People's Armed Police Force so as to take over the 
PLA's original non-military duties over security and other police work. 
In considering the strengths of these arguments, this paper have 
highlighted the significance of political factors in determining the 
emergence and outcome of reshuffling rather than merely viewing 
reshuffling as an independent variable as most scholars of the Chinese 
• I -military did. These arguments also discovered that PLA is not only an 
instrument in Party power-seizure struggle as most scholars claimed,^ 
it is also being used to maintain power for the paramount leaders. That 
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is to say, PLA is also an instrument for the paramount leader to 
consolidate their political power. These arguments, which extended the 
study of Whitson's FA system up until 1990, also found out that PLA 
should not be seen as a unitary and unified force (of course, in the 
sense of domestic political development). In actuality, PLA is divided 
into informal factions and ties. As Lucian Pye had already convincingly 
claimed that "no figure among the Chinese leadership who could rally 
the support of all elements of the PLA,4 Mao who was no七 the superior 
of any FA faction, had to rely on one or two FAs at one time in 
attempting to control the entire PLA even though the PLA was always 
claimed to be under Mao's command. Whereas Deng, who was one of 七he 
prominent leaders of the 2nd FA, had to bias in favour of his loyalists 
in order to gain an upper hand over the other FA factions to maintain 
his control. 
This paper, however, suffers from some limitations. Firstly, these 
arguments might ignore some other factors that explain the emergence of 
reshufflings. For example, reshufflings might be made out of 
strategical and tactical considerations. It is possible that the 
skilful and capable Cdrs and 1st Pol Cmrs were reshuffled with the 
intention to promote military education, technique or tradition to 
different MRs. Secondly, FA factions might not be the only effective 
indicator to explain the military distribution as already suggested in 
this paper. For instance, inter-generational conflict, differences in 
policy lines or bureaucratic interests might probably be served as the 
basis of factions. Lastly, these arguments only based on the findings 
at the top regional military leaders. These arguments might conclude 
differently if sufficient and available data provide us to further 
investigate on Deputy Cdrs and 2nd or even 3rd Pol Cmrs as well as 七he 
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PLA personnel at the MD level. 
No matter what, this paper is only a preliminary study on the 
reshufflings of regional military leaders which based on simple and 
general observations. The arguments raised in this paper may, however, 
serve as some guidelines for further empirical research. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION (pp.1-8) 
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2. "Reshuffling", commonly, defines as redistributing the existing 
elements. That is to say, without the adding of new or the dropping of old 
elements within the process of redistribution. Most studies, however, regard 
this term as reorganization which involves most kinds of changes. Reshufflings 
that affected more than three regional leaders at approximately the same time 
would be studied in this paper. Personnel who disappeared at a very different 
timing should not be seen as a measure for the central authority to recognize 
a section or the entire distribution of the regional military leaders. These 
figures might be disappeared out of natural death, one's own choice of 
retirement or other political reasons. Hence, even though I mentioned "major’’ 
reshufflings in the text, the present study actually covers nearly all of the 
reshufflings of the Chinese regional military leaders from 1949-1990. 
3. "Reshuffling" hereafter implies the reshuffling of regional military 
leaders only, or else it will be stated clearly for the reshufflings of other 
levels. 
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4. William Pang-yu Ting has defined "factionalism" as those "struggles 
among interest groups within the PLA that band together in order to compete 
for favourable allocation of some goods or values desired by all the competing 
groups•“ He defined "the competition for goods and values" as ’’competition for 
allocation of elite positions within the PLA elite system." See "A 
Longitudinal Study of Chinese Military Factionalism, 1949-1973," AS, Vol.XV, 
No.10 (October 1975), p. 897. 
5. Chien T,ieh, "The Jiang Qing faction and Peking Military Factions," 
I&S, Vol.XII, No.l (January 1976), p.18. 
6. Deng Xiaoping, "The Task of Consolidating the Army，’’ July 14，1975 
in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) (Beijing: Foreign Language 
Press, 1984), p.36. 
7. It is questionable on why the Chinese leadership did not attempt to 
destroy "mountaintopism" did no七 need to be destroyed in 18 years between 1949 
and 1967. While two reshufflings suddenly took place in a short period of 
three years (1971 and 1973). 
. 8. Harry Harding, "The Role of the Military in Chinese Politics,” in 
Victor C. Falkenheim (ed.), Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China (Ann 
Arbor: Centre for Chinese Studies: The University of Michigan, 1987) , 250. 
9. People like Lucian Pye, Andrew Nathan, Harrying Harding were some of 
the most significant scholars who engaged in clientist debate to promote 
factionalism. 
10. William W. Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military 
Politics," CQ, No.37 (January-March 1969)， pp.1-30; The Chinese High Command: 
^ History of Communist Military Politics， 1927-1971 (London and Basingstoke: 
The Macmillan Press Ltd. , 1973) and Chinese Military and Political Leaders and 
the Distribution of Power in China, 1956-1971 (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 
1973). 
11. To Parish, different FA personnel had equal chance of being-
selected. See William L. Parish, Jr. , "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," 
CQ, No.51 (October/December 1973), pp.667-699. 
12. Harvey Nelsen, "Military Forces in .the Cultural Revolution," CQ, 
No.51 (July/September), pp.444-474. 
13. Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics’ (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1981), p.6. 
14. According to Whitson^s theory, each FA had their domination of areas 
as shown in the following: 
Area of Domination Dominant FA system 
Peking 5th FA 
Shenyang 4th FA 
Jinan 3rd, 5th FAs 
Nanking 3rd FA 
Guangzhou 4th FA 
Chengdu 1st, 2nd FAs 
Lanzhou 1st FA 
Fuzhou 3rd FA 
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Wuhan 2nd FA 
Kunming 2nd FA 
Xinjiang 1st FA 
Tibet 2nd FA 
Inner Mongolia 1st, 5th FAs 
15. Lucian Pye, op*cit,, p.7. 
16. The correlation of geography and military separatism has also been 
argued in C. Martin Wilbur's "Military Separatism and the Process of 
Reunification under the Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937," in Ping-Ti Ho and Tang 
Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, Vol.1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1968), pp.205-209. 
17. William Whitson, however, did not explicitly stated such approach 
in all his studies. 
18. Andrew Nathan, ”A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," CQ, No.53, 
(January/March 1973), p.59. 
19. While it is not the focus of this paper to investigate these new 
informal ties, many scholars had revealed that present Chinese politics is 
divided into Yang Shangkun‘s family and the non-Yang Shangkun faction. 
20. Parish, op.cit,, pp.670-671. 丨 
21. Gerald A. McBeath, "The Military Elite of Mainland China," I&s, 
Vol.XI, No.9 (September 1975), p.93. 
22. This paper interpret institutional changes as the significant 
practical changes which include the creations or reorganization of 
institutions. 
CHAPTER 2. THE 1967 RESHUFFLING (pp.9-30) 
1. There was only an announcement by a Deputy Chief of General Staff in 
April 1968 saying that "Chairman Mao has instructed other posts and the armed 
forces units must also be dispatched to other, places" but nothing has made 
known officially about the transfer of military cadres. See Survey of the 
China Mainland Press (Hong Kong: American Consulate General), No.4202 (16 July 
1968), p.8. 
2. Peng Dehuai，s complete petition to Mao can be found in, Mao's Purge 
of Senior Military Cadres (Taipei: World Anti-Communist League, China Chapter, 
1972). 
3. See The Case of Peng Dehuai, 1958-1968 (Hong Kong: Union Research 
Institute, 1968), p.21 and Jiirgen Domes, "Crisis Behaviour of the Chinese PLA 
1958-59, 1965-69, 1970-71," Harold Z. Schiffrin (ed.)， Military and State in 
Modern Asia (Mount Scopas, Jerusalem: Jersalem Academic Press, 1976) , p.134. 
4. Mao，s Purge of Senior Military Cadres, pp.14-15. 
5. Lee Luke Wen-Yuen, Role of Military in Mainland China's Power 
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struggle: 1966-1969, University of Idaho, Phd., 1975 (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
University Microfilms International, 1982), p.22. 
6. Chen Chien, "An Analytical Study of PLA Crises,,，I&S, Vol.V, No. 4 
(January 1968)，p.11. 
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regional leaders. See Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics", op.cit, 
p.697. 
10. "Two Recollections and Three Investigations" was an attempt to both 
strengthen Mao's power over PLA and restore the guerilla tradition. See L.S. 
Tao, "Lin Biao, Military Reforms, and Power Struggle in Mainland China,“ I&S� 
Vol.XIV， No.4 {April 1978)， pp.22-24. 
11. "Regulations for PLA Management and Education at Company Level" 
concluded that Mao,s thinking concerning the army building and the correct 
principle of handling the contradiction among the people. "Four Set of 
Regulations on Political Work in Company-Level Units of PLA,，were the 
regulations on the work of PLA Company Political Commissars, on the work of 
CCP Branches of Companies, on the work of YCL Branches in Companies and on the 
work of Revolutionary Servicement,s Committee of the PLA Company. 
12. Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army Under Lin Biao: Prelude to Political 
Intervention," in John M.H. Lindbeck (ed.)> China: Management of a 
Revolutionary Society, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 358. 
13. John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London, New York, 
.Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp.167, 169-170. 
14. James D. Jordan, "The Maoist Vs. The Professional Vision of a 
People's Army", in Amos Perlmutter and Valie Plave Bennett, The Political 
Influence of the Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p.491. 
15. For details on these regulations, see Communist China Yearbook 1962� 
(Hong Kong: China Research Associates, 1963) pp.229-230, 249-250. 
16. Altogether three All-Army Political Work Conferences in the 1960s. 
The second one was held in January 1964 and the third one was held in January 
1966. These Conferences discussed similar instructions on building up the 
army, upholding Maoist political thought and keeping politics in the 
forefront. 
17 • For further explanations of such political and ideological 
campaigns, see Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army Under Lin Biao: Prelude to 
Political Intervention," op.cit. , pp.359-361 and Feng We, "The ，Great 
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20. See RMRB, May 18 1965. 
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The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York, Washington, 
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Vol.3, No.5 (October 1966), pp.17-25. - ’ 
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1)struggle, 2)criticize and 3)reform. "Struggle" referred to 七he "struggle 
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"criticism against reactionary authoritarianism of the capitalist class" and 
the ”criticism against the ideology of the capitalist class and all other 
exploiting classes". "Reform" referred to "reform through education", "reform 
culture" and "reform all infrastructure which is not adaptable to socialist 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION (100-106) 
I 
1. I wish to thank Dr. Benjamin Ostrov for his suggestion to this point. 
… n For instance, Jurgen Domes in ,"Crisis Behaviour of the Chinese PLA, 
195^ = 9, 1965-1969, 1970-71”，op.cit•’ p.146, suggests that the 1973 
reshuffling enabled the PLA, once again, to become one of the three pillars 
on which the Chinese political system rested on. A.D. Barnet七 depicts in "The 
Changing Political Roles of the Military", Uncertain Passage: China Transition 
t� the Post-Mao Era, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 1974)， 
p 严 that reshufflings were made to strengthen PLA's main force and to decline 
the regionalforces influence over 七he central authority. Scholars like 
Ellis Joffe and Y.C. Chang posited reshufflings were aimed to reduce "mountain 
strongholds" by breaking the regional leaders' strong local ties. Dennis 
Woodward clarified reshufflings were needed to diminish military's 
independence and tendency towards warlordism. And also John Gittings and 
Harvey Nelsen regarded reshufflings as measure to avoid factionalism. 
3. Scholars, such as, Gerald Segal, Harry Hardings, Ellis Joffe, Jurgen 
Domes 了 June Teufel Dreyer believed that PLA was the most effective 
organization to gain power for Party leaders. 丨  
f 
4. See Lucian Pye, op.cit, ’ p.29. 
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APPENDIX 
COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS 
OF THE 13 MILITARY REGIONS (1954-1991) 
COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF BEIJING MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political ^ = = = : j p = = = 
Commissars From To 
Yang Chengwu Sep 1954 Jun 1958 
Yang Yong Jun 1959 Jan 1967 
Zheng WeiShan Aug 1967 Jun 1968 , 
Wen Yuzhen Jan 1968 Jan 1968 
Zheng WeiShan Mar 1968 D^c 1970 
Chen Xilian Jan 1974 J^n 1980 
Qin Jiwei Jan 1980 Oct 1986 
Zhou Yibing Dec 1987 May 1990 
Wang Chengbin May 1990 present 
Xie Fuzhi Dec 1967 May 1972 
Ji Dengkui Dec 1973 Oct 1978 
Qin Jiwei Oct 1978 Jan 1980 
Yuan Shengping Feb 1980 Oct 1982 
Fu Chongbi Oct 1982 Aug 1985 
Yang Baiping Aug 1985 Oct 1986 
Liu Zhenghua Dec 1987 May 1990 
Zhang Gong May 1990 present 
COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF SHENYANG MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political 
Commissars From To 
Deng Hua Sep 1954 Nov 1959 
Chen Xilian Nov 1959 Dec 1973 
Li Desheng Dec 1973 Feb 1985 
Liu Jingsong Jun 1985 present 
Zhou Huan Sep 1954 Nov 1959 
Song Renqiong Apr 1964 Dec 1965 
Pan Fusheng Jun 1967 Oct 1970 
Liao Hansheng Feb 1980 Oct 1982 
Liu Zhenhua Oct 1982 Sep 1986 
Song Keda Nov 1987 present 
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COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF GUANGZHOU MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political 
Commissars From To 
Yang Dezhi Dec 1956 Dec 1973 
Zeng Siyu Dec 1973 Feb 1980 
Rao Shoukun Feb 1980 Feb 1985 
Li Juilong Jun 1985 May 1990 
Zhang Wannian May 1990 present 
Shu Tong Sep 1956 Oct 1958 
Wang Xinting Aug 1958 Oct 1962 
Tan Qilong Nov 1963 Nov 1966 
Wang Xiaoyu Feb 1967 Oct 1969 
Yuan Shengping Feb 1970 Jun 1973 
Bai Rubing Dec 1973 Nov 1979 
Xiao Wangdong Nov 1979 Nov 1981 … 
Chi Haotian Jun 1985 Aug 1986 
Song Qingwei Nov 1987 p丨resent 
COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF NANJING MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political = = = ^ l = = = 
Commissars From To 
Xu Shiyou Jul 1957 Dec 1973 
Ding Sheng Dec 1973 May 1977 
Nie Fengzhi May 1977 Nov 1982 
Xiang Shouzhi Nov 1982 May 1990 
Gao Hui May 1990 present 
Tong Liang Jul 1957 Oct 1962 
Ke Qingshi Oct 1962 Apr 1965 
Zhang Chunqiao Aug 1967 Sep 1976 
Liao Hansheng Dec 1977 Feb 1980 
Guo Linxiang Feb 1980 May 1990 
Shi Yufa May 1990 present 
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COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF GUANGZHOU MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political —^ 
Commissars From To 
Li Tianyou Sep 1954 Dec 1955 
Huang Yongsheng Dec 1955 May 1970 
Ding Sheng May 1970 Dec 1973 
Xu Shiyou Dec 1973 Feb 1980 
Wu Keda Feb 1980 Oct 1982 
You Taizhong Nov 1982 Oct 1986 
Zhang Wannian Nov 1987 May 1990 
Zhu Dunfa May 1990 present 
Tao Zhu Sep 1954 Feb 1966 
Wei Guoqing Mar 1967 Dec 1969 
Liu Xingyuan Dec 1969 Feb 1971 
Wei Guoqing Dec 1973 Dec 1978 
Xi Zhongxun Dec 1978 Nov 1980 
Wang Meng Jul 1981 Jun 1985 
Zhang Zhongxian Jun 1985 I present 
I  -�l H '' 
COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF CHENGDU MR 
ir-
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political = = ^ 1 = = = 
Commissars From To 
He Bingyan Oct 1959 Jan 1960 
Huang Xinting Mar 1960 May 1967 
Liang Xingchu May 1967 Nov 1971 
Qin Jiwei Aug 1973 Apr 1976 
Liu Xingyuan Mar 1976 Sep 1977 
V^ u Keda Sep 1977 Apr 1979 
You Taizhong Jan 1980 Oct 1982 
Wang Chenghan Oct 1982 Apr 1985 
Fu Quanyou Jun 1985 May 1990 
Zhang Taiheng May 1990 present 
Li Jingquan Sep 1954 Feb 1967 
Zhang Guohua May 1967 Feb 1972 
Liu Xingyuan Feb 1972 Jan 1976 
Zhao Ziyang Jan 1976 Feb 1980 
Xu Liqing Feb 1980 Oct 1982 
Wan Haifeng Nov 1982 May 1990 
Gu Shanqing May 1990 present 
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COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF GUANGZHOU MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political 
Commissars From To 
Zhang Dazhi Sep 1954 Jan 1970 
Bi Dingjun Oct 1970 Dec 1973 
Han Xianchu Jan 1974 Feb 1980 
Du Yide Feb 1980 Jan 1983 
Zheng Weishan Jan 1983 Feb 1985 
Zhao Xianshun Jun 1985 May 1990 
Fu Quanyou May 1990 | present 
Xian Henghan Dec 1958 Jun 1977 
Wang Xiaoyu Jun 1977 Aug 1983 
Tan Youlin Nov 1983 Jun 1985 
Li Xianhua Jun 1985 May 1990 
Cao Pengsheng May 1990 present 
COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF FUZHOU MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political 
Commissars From To 
Ye Fei Apr 1957 Feb 1959 
Han Xianchu Nov 1960 Jan 1974 
Bi Dingjun Jan 1974 Jul 1976 
Yang Chengwu Jan 1978 Aug 1983 
Jiang Yonghui Nov 1983 Feb 1985 
Ye Fei Sep 1954 Feb 1966 
Zhou Chiping Aug 1969 Apr 1971 
Liao Zhigao Feb 1975 Aug 1980 
Fu Kuiqing Feb 1981 Feb 1985 
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COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF G U A N G Z H O U MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political . 
Commissars From To 
Chen Zaidao Apr 1955 Jun 1967 
Zeng Siyu Aug 1967 Dec 1973 
Yang Dezhi Dec 1973 Jan 1979 
Wang Bicheng Jan 1979 Jan 1980 
Zhang Caiqian Feb 1980 Nov 1982 
Zhou Shizhong iNov 1982 Feb 1985 
Wang Renzhong Sep 1954 Jun 1967 
Liu Feng Jul 1967 Oct 1971 
Wang Liusheng Dec 1971 Mar 1975 
Wang Ping Oct 1977 Dec 1977 





COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF KUNMING MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political = = = ^ 1 = = = = 
Commissars From To 
Xie Fuzhi Sep 1954 Aug 1956 
Chen Kang Aug 1956 May 1959 
Qin Jiwei Nov 1959 Oct 1967 
Lan Yinong Sep 1968 Sep 1968 
Wang Bicheng Sep 1971 Jan 1979 
Yang Dezhi Jan 1979 Jan 1980 
Zhang Zhixiu Jan 1980 Feb 1985 
Xie Fuzhi Sep 1954 Sep 1959 
Yan Hongyan Oct 1959 Jan 1967 
Tan Furen Jul 1968 Dec 1970 
Zhou Xing Jan 1971 Oct 1975 
Jia Qiyun Feb 1976 Nov 1976 
An Pingsheng Feb 1977 Oct 1978 
Liu Zhijian Feb 1979 Oct 1982 
Xie Zhenhua Oct 1982 Feb 1985 
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COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF GUANGZHOU MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political ^ = = = } P = = ] 
Commissars From To 
Wang Enmao Sep 1965 Aug 1968 
Long Shujin Aug 1968 Jul 1971 
Seypidin Azizi Jul 1972 Jul 1973 
Liu Zhen Jul 1977 May 1979 
如 Keda Jun 1979 Feb 1980 
Xiao Quanfu Feb 1980 Feb 1985 
Wang Enmao May 1954 Dec 1967 
Zhang Zimin Dec 1967 Feb 1973 
Seypidin Azizi Jul 1972 Dec 1977 
Wang Feng Jan 1978 Mar 1972 
Wang Enmao Mar 1982 Feb 1985 
COMMANDERS AND FIRST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF TIBET MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political = = ^ l = = = 
Commissars From To 
Zhang Guohua Feb 1952 Feb 1967 
Tan Guansan Sep 1954 Jan 1966 
Ren Rong Jan 1968 Oct 1968 
COMMANDERS AND FORST POLITICAL COMMISSARS OF 
INNER MONGOLIA MR 
First Duration in Office 
Commanders Political = = 1 1 = = = 
Commissars From To 
Ulanfu Oct 1949 Apr 1967 
Liu Xianquan Apr 1967 Jun 1967 
Teng Haiqing Jun 1967 Dec 1968 
Ulanfu Oct 1949 Apr 1967 
Wu Tao Apr 1967 Jan 1970 
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f 
CHRONOLOGY OF CHINESE MILITARY AFFAIRS (1949-1991) 
1949 Jan Six Military Regions were established. They were actually 
identical to the CCP Regional Central Committee Bureaus and 
the Large Administrative Regions which included 七he North 
China, Northeast, East China, Central-South, Northeast and 
Southwest. 
1949 Jan Nie Rongzhen became Commander of North China Military Region. 
1949 Lin Biao led his army out of Manchuria and the earlier 
Communist units were turned into the 4th FA. 
1949 Feb Reorganization of Army began. Northwest FA, was renamed as the 
1st FA; South China FA as 2nd FA; East China FA as the 3rd 
FA and the North China FA as the 4th FA. 
1949 Party established military governments called the Military 
and • Administrative Committees in four of the six 
milliprovince regions. 
1949 Dec The Chinese Communists set up the First-level Military Region 
in the occupied areas of various Field Armies. At the same 
time, they established large administrative regions and 
regional central committee bureaus of the party and appointed 
Commanders and Political Commissars of the FAes to be 
Commanders and Political Commissars of the large Military 
Regions concurrently. 
1950 Gao Gang became Chairman of People's Government in Manchuria 
1950 Sep Xiao Jingguang, the founder of the Chinese Communist navy was 
promoted as the Commander of PLA Navy. 
1953 Gao Gang openly proposed a programme to reshuffle the CCPCC 
and the Central Government. 
1954 The firs七 power struggle in post-1949 period broke out. Gao 
， n g and Yao Shushi were denounced for building an 
"independent kingdom" in Northeast engaging in anti-Party 
activities. 
1954 Feb The 4th Plenary Session of the 7th CCPCC was secretly 
convened. Gao and Yao were accused of conspiring against the 
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Party, and were expelled from all their posts. They were also 
denounced for building an "independent kingdom". 
1954 Feb At the Central Committee's Fourth Plenum, Liu Shaoqi stated 
that those who "look on 七 h e i r own region or department as 
personal property or an independent kingdom will be subjected 
to severe punishment" 
1954 Apr The regulation, "Draft Regulations Governing Political Work 
I in the Chinese People's Libera七ion Array," was issued by the 
CCPCCMC. 
1954 Sep The. designation of FAs was abolished. The six Military 
Regions were reorganized into 13 First-Level Military 
Regions, each known by the name of its chief town, which 
diverted one or several provinces as military districts. The 
ten Military Regions were Peking, Shenyang, Jinan, Nanking, 
Wuhan, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Kunming and Lanzhou while 
the other three Military Regions, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang 
and Tibet, were under the direct control of central 
authorities. 
1954 Sep The Chinese Communist promulgated the (bonstitution and 
reorganized their administrative machinery. They abolished 
the People's Revolutionary Military Council and established 
the National Defense Council under the State Council and 
general headquarters of the PLA. 
1955 Feb The adoption of the "Regulations on the Service of Officers" 
which also promoted distinctive uniforms and rank insignia. 
1955 Xu Shiyou was appointed as the Commander of Nanking Military 
Region. 
1955 Mar Qin Jiwei was appointed as Deputy Commander of Kunming 
Military Region. 
1955 Jul The introduction of Military Service Law which put an end on 
the voluntary nature of military service. 
1956 Jan A directive for all military cadres to study a new system of 
political theory. 
1956 Feb On the 9th, the "Implementation Plan for the Army's 
Participation in and Support of the Agricultural 
Cooperativization Movement and Agricultural Production，’ was 
promulgated. 
1956 Mar The CCPCCMC held an Enlarged Conference of leading cadres to 
discuss the need for rectification of various undesirable 
tendencies in the PLA, and to decide on new measures to 
improve the quality of political work. 
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1958 The beginning of the "Everyone a Soldier" movement. 
1958 Sep "Go down to the companies and soldier" was launched. 
1958 Sep On the 20th, the whole campaign against professionalism was 
epitomized in the "Officers to the Rank" movement which laid 
down by a General Political Department directive which 
required every officer to spend a month as an ordinary 
soldier. 
1958 Sep National Defence Council was established with Liu Shaoqi as 
Chairman which superseded the People's Revolutionary Military 
Council. 
1958 Dec Liu Shaoqi, a prominent leader of 3rd FA became the Chairman 
of the Republic. 
1959 Feb "An Outline for the Participation of the Armed Forces in the 
Socialist Construction Work" was issued. 
1959 Mar Mao stated at the Zhengzhou Conference that "In the past, 
there were many mountain strongholds in our Party and also 
a few in the armed forces: two in the First Front Army, two 
in the Second Front Army, two in northern Shansi and four in 
the Fourth Front Army in the Yenan party school, there were 
mountain strongholds among those taking a walk as well as 
among those going to eat. Within a mountain stronghold 
nothing was forbidden as a discussion topic The mountain 
strongholds were formed due to historical and geographical 
reasons. At that time the Communist Party had a common 
programme, and the Central Committee was in fact a league of 
associations.“ 
1959 Apr Failures of the "Three Red Banners" at 七he Lushan Conference. 
1959 Qin Jiwei became Commander of Kunming Military Region. 
1959 Jul The Lushan Conference was held. The immediate spark of Peng 
Dehuai,s bitter indictment of the Great Leap Forward and its 
economic consequences. 
1959 Aug On the 16th, the "Resolution Concerning the Anti-Party Clique 
Headed by Peng Dehuai", adopted at the Eighth Plenary Session 
of the CCP and listed Peng's crimes as opposition to the 
Great Leap Forward and the people's communes. 
1959 Sep Peng Dehuai was purged. Including Chief of Staff, Huang 
Kecheng; Director of General Rear Services, Li Da; Wang 
Shusheng, Vice Minister of National Defense, and Commander 
of Shenyang Military Region, Deng Hua. 
1959 Sep Luo Ruiqing was appointed as Chief of General Staff. 
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1959 Sep On the 17th, Lin Biao was appointed and replaced Peng as the 
Minister of National Defence while Xu Shiyou as Deputy Chief. 
1959 Sep Lin Biao's article "March Ahead Under The Red Flag Of The 
General Lin And Mao Zedong's Military Thinking" was published 
to review Maoist line of army-building. 
1959 Sep Huang Kecheng and two other Vice-Minister of National 
Defence- General Li Da and Xiao Ke were dismissed. Yang 
Chengwu, Commander of Peking Garrison was transferred to the 
Ministry of Defence. General Deng Hua, Commander of Shenyang 
Military Region was dismissed. 
1960 Aug On the 1st, PLA Navy established North China Sea Fleet. 
I960 The issue of "Directive of the Enlarged Meeting of the 
Central Military Affairs Commission on Ideological and 
Political Work in the Armed Forces." 
1960 Sep Lin Biao launched the "Four Firsts", "Three-eight Work Style" 
and "Five Good Soldier". 
1960 Oct On the 20th, The "Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the 
Military Affairs Commission，，which criticized Peng Dehuai was 
revised by Mao and approved by CCPCC. 
1961 Feb The play "Hai Jui's Dismissal" which was claimed to be an 
allegorical attack on Mao's purge of Peng Dehuai. 
1961 Mar The establishment of Party Committees in all companies were 
completed. 
1961 Mar "The Ten Experiences in Grasping Living Thought" was issued. 
1961 Jul The "Regulations for PLA Management and Education on the 
Company Level" was promulgated. 
1961 Oct On the 20th, the "Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the 
Military Affairs Commission" was adopted by the Enlarged 
Meeting of the CCPCCMC. 
1961 Nov The "Four Sets of Regulations on Political Work in 
Company-Level Units of the PLA" was also to promulgate to 
strengthen the Party's political and organizational power 
over the basic-level units of the PLA. 
1962 Apr "Seven Measures for Improving the Leadership for the Armed 
Forces Organizations over Companies" was issued. 
1962 Sep Mao renewed the call for "class struggle" at the 10th Plenum 
of the Central Committee. 
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3 The "Socialist Education" campaign which was aimed to remould 
the outlook of the Chinese masses reviewed the important role 
played by the PLA. 
1963 Feb "Twelve Basic Experiences in Improving 七he Work of Companies" 
were made. 
1963 Feb "All-Army Political Work Conference" was held. 
1963 Mar The publication "Regulations Governing Political Work in the 
People’:s Liberation Army". It enabled the "political work 
system" of PLA to revive and concurrently a series of mass 
movements were carried out to involve such slogans as the 
"Four”Good Company", "Five Good Soldiers", "Three-Eight Work 
Style" and 七he "Four Firsts" were placed in command and the 
thought of Mao was made prominence. 
1964 Jan Luo.Ruiqing, made the decision to carry the competition in 
military technique throughout the army. 
1964 Jan Wang Bicheng was appointed as Deputy Commander of Nanking 
Military Region. ； 
I 
1964 Feb On the 1st, the "Learn from PLA" campaign was launched with 
stress on the unity of both PLA and the people and to 
reinforce the principle of "putting politics in command." 
1964 Feb Zhang Dingfa promoted to Deputy Air Force Commander. 
1964 Sep Xiao Hua replaced Liu. 
1964 Sep On the 25th, Wu Kehua was appointed as Deputy of Jinan 
Military Region. 
1965 Lin Biao was promoted to the Senior Vice-Premier of the State 
Council, 
1965 Apr The appointment of a General and a senior Commissar as 
Vice-Ministers of Culture. 
1965 May On the 22nd, the Ninth Session of the 3th National People's 
Congress decided to abolish the military rank system. 
1965 May On the 25th, the Liberation Army Daily in an editorial 
claimed the abolition of the military rank system and the 
change of the military uniforms to a red-star hat insignia 
and a red collar badge. 
1965 Sep At a meeting of the CCPCC, Mao introduced the need of the 
Cultural Revolution, "to subject reactionary bourgeois 
ideology to criticism.“ 
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1965 Sep Lin Biao's article, "Love Live The Victory Of People's War'', 
was published to update Mao concept of theory and strategy 
of revolutionary war. 
1965 Ye Fei, the Commander of the Fuzhou Military Region was 
replaced by Han Xianchu, one of Lin's trus七ed man. 
1965 Nov Luo Ruiqing was apprehended in Shanghai. 
i 1965 Dec Xiao Quanfu was promoted to Deputy Commander of Shenyang 
I Military Region, i -i 
1963 Dec On the 8th, Luo Ruiqing's mistakes were exposed in the CCPCC 
was then dismissed. 
1966 The "Put Into Application Thinking of Mao Zedong" campaign 
was carried intensively in the PLA 
1966 Mar When a five-men work group was summoned to dig out Luo 
Ruiqing's crime, he committed suicide by jumpiTig from a 
building. 
1966 Apr Liang Biye, Deputy Director of GPD, was丨 charged by Mao-Lin 
faction as being sworn as Luo Ruiqing，s follower. 
1966 Apr On the 18th，the PLA called to "Hold High the Great Red 
banner of Mao Zedong's Thought and Positively Participate in 
the Socialist Great Cultural Revolution.’’ 
1966 May On the 8th, PLA called "Fire at the Anti-Party and Anti-
Socialist Black Front." 
1966 Jun The 38th Army which was loyal to Lin Biao was ordered to move 
into Peking Military Region. 
1966 Jul On the 12th, Yang Chengwu was claimed as the acting Chief of 
General Staff to take overt Luo Ruiqing. 
1966 Jul The NCNA claimed Ye Jianying as the secretary of the CCPCC 
Secretariat. 
1966 Aug At the 8th Plenum of 七he 11th CCPCC, Lin Biao was elected as 
First Vice-chairman of CCP. 
1966 Aug On the 5th, Mao wrote the big-character poster, "Bombard the 
Headquarters" which aimed to attack Liu Shaoqi when the CCPCC 
was holding its Eighth Plenary Session of the 11th CCPCC. 
1966 Aug On the 18th, Cultural Revolution Group was established with 
Chen Boda as the Head. 
1966 Aug On the same day, a mass rally of a million people was staged 
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at Peking in the celebration of the Cultural Revolution. 
1966 Aug There were eight former Marshals on the list of numbers of 
the new Politburo of the Party. Six of the eight had 
continued to play major military roles and in terms of 
political realities. 
1966 Aug PLA Cultural Revolution Group was assembled to take over the 
GPD. 
1966 PLA received significant concessions from Mao and Lin in 
return for its support, three senior PLA Marshals: Ye 
Jianying, Xu Xianqian and Nie Rongzhen were named to the 
Politburo. 
1966 The Red Guards replaced the Young Communist League. 
1966 Attacks against the party apparatus reached a climax； purges 
were taken place in the Politburo and the Central Committee. 
1966 Nov All-Army Cultural Revolution Group was established with Liu 
Zhijian. 丨 
1966 Dec Liang Biye, Deputy Director of General Political Department, 
was removed from his post. 
1966 Dec Mao disbanded the All China Federation of Trade Unions. 
1967 Jan In the "January Storm", Xu Xianqian, Chief of PLA Cultural 
Revolution Group accused Su Zhenhua for organizing anti-Mao 
faction. 
1967 Jan Huang Xinting, Commander of Chengdu Military Region, was 
purged. 
1967 Jan Liao Hansheng, Vice-Chairman of MND and 2nd Political 
Commissar of Beijing MR was purged. 
1967 Jan Zhang Tingfa, Deputy Commander of Air Force, was purged by 
Mao and Lin Biao. 
1967 Jan On the 11th, the reorganization of All-Army Cultural 
Revolution Group with Xu Xiangqian. 
1967 Jan On the 12th, Zhou Enlai declaring that the CCPCCMC was the 
headquarters of the Cultural Revolution. 
1967 Jan On the 14th, "Order Forbidding Attack on Army Organs" was 
issued. 
1967 Jan On the 15th, Mao gave orders to Public Security and Array 
units in various Military Regions to suppress anti-Maoist 
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masses. 
1967 Jan On the 21st, PLA was called to intervene to impose military 
control. 
1967 Jan On the 23th, MC revised its earlier decision to avoid the 
use of PLA in the Cultural Revolution. It suggested that "all 
the earlier orders that the armed forces should not intervene 
in the Cultural Revolution should be void.” And PLA was 
ordered to intervene in order to aid the "revolutionary". 
1967 Jan On the same day, the "Three Support, Two Militaries" was 
launched. 
1967 Jan On the 28th, the CCPCCMC issued an eight-point order as 
guideline for PLA to handle chaos. 
1967 Jan PLA was called to intervene to impose military control. 
1967 Jan The removal of the First Party Secretaries who -were held 
concurrent posts as Military Regions 1st Political 
Commissars. Only two of 13 regional 1st Political Commissars 
remained in that jobs by June 1967. 
1967 Jan Xiao Hua was purged. 
1967 Jan Yan Hongyan, First Political Commissar of Kunming Military 
Region and the First Secretary of Yunnan Provincial Party 
Committee committed suicide. 
1967 Jan On the 25th, Huang Xinting, Region's Commander, is reported 
to have involved in a power seizure in Chongqing which had 
been organized by Li Jingquan, First Secretary of Southwest 
Party Bureau and concurrently the First Political Commissar 
of Chengdu Military Region. 
1967 Jan Peking Military Region Commander, Yang Yong, with his 
Political Commissar, Liao Hansheng fell. 
1967 Jan On the 31st, the first Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established in the Manchurian province of Heilongjiang with 
Pan Fusheng as Chairman. 
1967 Feb On the 3rd, Shandong Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Wang Xiaoyuan. 
1967 Feb On the 5th, Zhang Chunqiao was appointed as First Secretary 
and Chief of Shanghai Commune. 
1967 Feb On the same day, Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee 
was established with Zhang Chunqiao as Chairman. 
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1967 Feb On the 13th, Guizhou Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Li Zaihan as Chairman. 
1967 Feb On the Cultural and Athletic Alliance carried out a power 
seizure of the Military Region Headquarters but was 
shortlived. 
1967 Feb The Revolutionary Committee form of government was accepted 
as the standard form for political reconstruction of the 
Cultural Revolution. 
1967 Mar On the 2nd, Shandong Provinical Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Wang Xiaoyu as Chairman and Yang Dezhi as 
Deputy Chairman. 
1967 Mar The Red Flag outlined a blueprint for the organizations of 
Revolutionary Committee, indicating that these committees 
should be based on a "Revolutionary Triple-Alliance", 
consisting of "revolutionary mass organizations", the local 
PLA and "revolutionary cadres’,. 
1967 Mar The PLA's "Suppor 七一to—七 he—Lef t" wjas expanded to 
"Three-Support and Two-Military" missions. They are support 
the left, support the workers, support the peasants, 
military control and military training. 
1967 Mar Mao gave instructions that "the armed forces should carry out 
military training in stages and in groups of the faculty and 
students in colleges and universities, middle and senior 
primary schools.” 
1967 Mar On the 18th, Shanxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Liu Keping. He was concurrently the 2nd 
Political Commissar of Peking Military Region and 1st 
Political Commissar of Shansi Military District. 
1967 Apr On the 6th, a central directive began to remove much of 七he 
civil authority from the PLA administrative network. 
1967 Apr On the 9th, the reorganization of the All-Army Cultural 
Revolution Group with Xiao Hua as Acting Chief. 
1967 Apr The CCPCCMC restricted the PLA to use force against the 
masses. 
1967 Apr Ulanfu， Commander of Xinjiang Military Region and First 
Party Secretary of Inner Mongolia was dismissed. 
1967 Apr On the 16th, MC of CCPCC underwent reorganization. Xu 
Xianqian was promoted to one of the six Vice-Chairman. The 
other five are: Lin Biao, Chen Yi, Lin Bocheng, Nie Rongzhen 
and Ye Jianying. 
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1967 Apr On the 20th,the last Revolutionary Committee was formed in 
Peking with Xie Fuzhi as Chairman. 
1967 May Huang Xinting and Li Jingquan were dismissed and Chengdu 
Military Region was thoroughly reorganized. 
1967 May The Sichuan Revolutionary Committee was established with 
Zhang Guohua as Chairman. 
1967 Jun It was reported that only two of the 13 1st Political 
Commissar remained concurrently as the First Party 
Secretaries, the rest were being removed from such dual 
posts. 
1967 Jul On the 18th, a "Meeting to Criticize Liu Shaoqi" was 
organized. In the meantime, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Tao 
Zhu were persecuted and their homes were ransacked. 
1967 Jul On the 20th, the occurrence of Wuhan Mutiny in which Chen 
Zaidao reappeared, 
1967 Jul On the 30th, the document, "On Shanghai 丨Worker's Request to 
Establish an Armed Organization" was submitted by Zhang 
Chunqiao. 
1967 Aug Lin Biao reportedly warned his Military Regions Commanders 
to take no action in civil disturbances without central 
approval. 
1967 Aug On the 12th, a second wave of forma七ion of Revolutionary 
Committees was started in the western province of Qinghai. 
1967 Aug On the same time, Jinan Provincial Revolutionary Committee 
was established. 
1967 Aug On the 17th, CCPCCMC was set up. 
1967 Aug Reorganization of All-Army Cultural Revolution with Wu Faxian 
as Chief. 
1967 Sep On the 5th, the army was authorized for the first time in 七he 
Cultural Revolution to open fire against mass organizations 
or individuals who resisted arrest on fight back and "to hit 
back in self-defence.” 
1967 Sep The policy of attacking and supplanting the provinical 
military bureaucracy was suddenly dropped which took the 
worst of the pressures off the regional PLA. 
1967 Sep Xu Shiyou, who was stubborn in the Cultural Revolution, was 
persuaded to attend "Mao Zedong's Though七 Study Class,’. 
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1967 Nov On the 1st, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region 
Revolutionary Committee was established with Teng Haiqing as 
Chairman. 
1967 Dec On the 6th, Tianjin Municipal Revolutionary Committee was 
established. 
1968 Jan On the 5th, Jiangxi Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established. 
1968 Jan On the 25th, Jiangsu Provincal Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Xian Henghan as Chairman. 
1968 Jan On the 27th, Henan Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Liu Jianxun as Chairman. 
1968 Jan The PLA was ordered to "Suppopt 七he Left, but not any 
particular faction." 
1968 Feb On the 3rd, Hebei Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Li Xuefeng as Chairman. 
I 1968 Feb On the 5th, Hubei Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Zeng Siyu as Chairman. 
1968 Feb On the 21st, Guangdong Provincial Committee was established 
with Huang Yongsheng as Chairman. 
1968 Feb "Yang Chengwu Incident" occurred. Yu Lijin, the Political 
Commissar of Chinese Communist Air Force Headquarters was 
arrested on the charges of plotting to smuggle Liu Shaoqi and 
Deng Xiaoping to the Soviet Union by air. 
1968 Mar On the 6th, Jilin Provinical Party Committee was established 
with Wang Huaixing as Chairman. 
1968 Mar On the 22nd, the CCPCCMC, the State Council and the Cultural 
Revolution Group issued the dismissal of Yang Chengwu, Yu 
Lijin and Fu Chongbi. 
1968 Mar On the 23rd, Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee was 
established with Xu Shiyou as Chairman. 
1968 Apr On the 8th, Hunan Provinical Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Li Yuan as Chairman. 
1968 Apr On the 10th, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region Revolutionary 
Committee was established with Kang Qianmin as Chairman. 
1968 Apr On the 18th, Anhui Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Li Desheng as Chairman. 
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1968 Apr The National Party Congress was finally opened formally eight 
years later. 
1968 Apr Song Renqiong, First Political Commissar of Shenyang Military 
Region, was purged. 
1968 Apr In a directive, Mao announced that military cadres must be 
transferred to other posts and the armed forces units must 
also be dispatched to other places. 
1968 May On the 1st, Shanxi Revolutionary Committee was established. 
1968 May On the 10th, Liaoning Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Chen Xilian as Chairman. 
1968 May On the 31st, Sichuan Provincial Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Zhang Guohua as Chairman. 
1968 Jun Nearly all kinds of organizations from central to local and 
from urban to rural were placed under the PLA.；、 
1968 Jul Mao ordered the de facto end of the Cultural Revolution. 
1968 Aug On the 4th, the People's Daily published a major editorial 
entitled, "Unite Under The Leadership Of The Proletarian 
Headquarters Headed By Chairman Mao". 
1968 Sep On the 5th, the formation of the Revolutionary Committees was 
completed in all of the 29 provinces, municipalities and 
regions, 
1968 Aug On the 13th, Yunnan Provinical Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Tan Fujen as Chairman. 
1968 Aug On the 19th, Fujian Provinical Revolutionary Committee was 
established with Han Xianchu as Chairman. 
1968 Aug On the 26th, Guangxi Chuang Autonomous Region Revolutionary 
Committee was established with Wei Guoqing as Chairman. 
1968 Sep On the 5th, Tibet Autonomous Region Revolutionary Committee 
was established with Zeng Yongya as Chairman. 
1968 Sep On the same day, Xinjiang Autonomous Region Revolutionary 
Committee was established with Long Shuj in as Chairman. 
1969 Jan Yang Yong, Commander of Peking Military Region, was purged. 
He was being condemned as a "loyal running dog of Peng 
Dehuai, 
1969 Apr The 9th Congress of the CCP was held. Out of the 279 full 
member, 123 were military men. And Lin Biao was proclaimed 
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as Mao's heir. At the same time, Lin stated the "the Chinese 
PLA is built and led by Chairman Mao in person, and is 
commanded by Vice-Chairman Lin in person•“ 
1969 The Party Reconstruction Movement stated in 1969 demanded an 
end to the military control. 
1969 Jun On the 9th, He Long, Vice-Premier, was persecuted to death. 
1969 Nov Huang Jiyong was promoted as Deputy Director of General 
Political Department. 
1969 Nov On the 12th, Liu Shaoqi died. 
1969 Nov On the 30th, Tao Zhu, Vice-Premier was also persecuted to 
death. 
1970 May Wang Bicheng was shifted to the first Deputy Commander of 
Kunming Military Region. 
1970 May On the 20th, Mao stated that "the danger of a new world war 
still exist; and the people of all cjountries must get 
prepared. But revolution is the main trend in the world 
today." 
1970 Aug From the 23th to the 25th, Chen Boda and seven top military 
leaders probably acting at Lin Biao,s initiative launched an 
unexpected attack on Mao to his authority. 
1970 Sep On the 15th, Mao issued a "Letter To The Whole Party’’ 
demanding the launch of a "criticize Chen Boda Rectification 
Campaign". 
1970 Dec Mao called an Enlarged Politburo Conference at Peitaibo, 
insisting on criticism and self-criticism for the seven "big 
generals" who supported Lin. 
1971 Jan Mao transferred the 38th Army which had been moved into 
Peking in June 1966, out of the Peking Military Region. 
1971 Feb It was reported that Lin Biao entrusted his son, Lin Liguo, 
to begin a secret plan of military coup against Mao. 
1971 Mar From the 22nd to the 24th, an outline plan for a military 
coup called "Project 571" was drafted in Shanghai area. 
1971 The Peking Military Region was thoroughly reorganized. The 
38th Army (reportedly loyal to Lin) was transferred. The 
Commander and the second Political Commissar were both 
replaced. 
1971 The 13 Military Regions were reduced into eleven. 
144 
1971 Jun On the 30th, Zhang Zaiqian, former Deputy Commander of 
Nanking Military Region, became Chief of the General Staff 
of PLA. 
1971 Aug On the 1st, at the commemorate of the 44th Anniversary of the 
Founding of PLA, it was again claimed that "Party commands 
the gun and the gun must never be allowed to command the 
Party and places itself under the Party's absolute 
leadership, going where the Party directs and acting as 
Chairman Mao teaches.,, 
1971 Sep On the 13th, Lin Biao died. 
1971 Sep Lin Feng, political commissar of Wuhan Military Region, Zhou 
Chiping, political commissar of Fuzhou Military Region was 
purged. 
1971 Dec On the 11th, CCPCC published circular on "Struggle to smash 
the Lin Biao and Chen Boda anti-Party clique's counter-
revolutionary coup d，etat.，’ -
1971 Lin Biao was purged. Together with him, 33 high-level 
officers were removed. 25 Military Regions and Districts 
leaders were purged too. 
1971 Sep On the 13th, Lin Biao died. 
1972 Jan On the 6th, Chen Yi died. 
1972 Feb Zhang Guohua, First Political Commissar of Chengdu, died. 
1972 Feb Liang Xingchu, Commander of Chengdu Military Region was 
purged on charges that Chengdu was a base area for 
Lin-Biao-Chen Boda an七i_party clique. 
1972 Feb Yan Cheng, Deputy Political Commissar of Fuzhou Military 
Region was reassigned as third Political Commissar of Chengdu 
Military Region. 
1972 Apr On the 7th, Ding Sheng, Commander of Canton Military Region, 
took over Liu's position. 
1972 Apr Liu Xingyuan, First Political Commissar of Guangzhou Military 
Region was transferred to serve as First Political Commissar 
of Chengdu Military Region. 
1972 Jun On the 30th, Kang Lin, who formerly served in the 3rd FA, 
promoted to Deputy Commander of Beijing Military Region. 
1972 Jul Yang Yong, Liao Hansheng, Du Yide, Chen Zaidao, Su Zhenhua, 
Liu Huasheng and Li Da, who were purged in 1967, were 
instated. 
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1972 Jul On the 29th, Seyipidin, Deputy Commander of Xinjiang Military 
Region, was promoted to the 1st Political Commissar of 
Xinjiang Military Region. 
1972 Sep On the 29th, Long Shujin, Commander of Xinjiang Military 
Region, was disappeared. He was replaced by Seyipidin. 
1972 Nov On the 18th，Hua Guofeng was identified was the Commissar of 
Guangzhou Military Region. 
1972 Nov Wang Bicheng was promoted to the Commander of Kunming 
Military Region. 
1972 Nov Mao arranged Liu Xingyuan, Lin Biao's ally, to be 1st 
Political Commissar of Guangzhou Military Region. 
1972 Dec On the 14th, Guangdong Provinical Revolutionary Committee 
issued a directive demanding that Revolutionary Committee at 
all levels to mobilize the masses to carry our activities 
to support the army during the New Year and tile Spring 
Festivals. 
I I 
1972 Dec In a New Year message, Mao announced that "the Liberation 
Army should learn from the people of the whole country" and 
emphasized 七he "Three Great Democracies" of the Army in order 
to protect the CCP leadership. 
1973 Jan Li Zimin, was appointed as Political Commissar of Fuzhou 
Military Region. 
1973 Jan Chen Zaidao was identified in Fozhou as the Deputy Commander 
of Fuzhou Military Region. 
1973 Apr On the 10th, Deng Xiaoping reinstated the post of Vice-
Premier. 
1973 Apr On 七he 16th, He Guangyu,. Commander of Guizhou Military 
Districts and a 2nd FA associate was reinstated. 
1973 At the levels of Military Regions and Districts, more than 
25 Commanders and Political Commissars had been removed. 
1973 May Qin Jiwei was reinstated and appointed as the Commander of 
the Chengdu Military Region. 
1973 May Ma Ning promoted to Deputy Air Force Commander. 
1973 Jun Zhang Tingfa was reinstated as Deputy Commander of Air Force. 
1973 Jun Yuan Shengping, political commissar of Jinan Military Region, 
was purged. 
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Jun Yang Yong was reinstated and assigned as the Commander of 
Xinjiang Military Region. Whereas Seiyipidin, the Deputy 
Commander, was promoted to the First Political Commissar. 
1973 Jun On the 25th, Zheng Mingyi, the Commander of the Tibet 
Military Districts, who was last noted on August 12 1971， 
reappeared. 
1973 Aug Qin Jiwei was appointed as Commander of Chengdu Military 
Region. 
1973 Aug Ye Fei was reinstated. 
1973 Aug People 's Daily claimed that the "Three Supports, Two 
Militaries" was brought to an end. 
1973 Aug The 10th Party Congress of CCP was held from the 23rd to 
the 28th, in which Lin Biao and his anti-party clique was 
denounced for its crimes. 
1973 Aug Mao reinforced the doctrine of "the Party commands the gun, 
and the gun must never be allowed to coraraand the Party" in 
the Party Congress. ‘丨 
1973 Aug On 七he 20th, Xiao Ke, who was at one time, served as 4七h FA's 
Chief of Staff, was reinstated as President of PLA Military 
and Political College. 
1973 Aug On the 30th, the 10th Central Committee held its First 
Plenary Session and elected Mao as the Chairman of the 
Central Committee. Zhou Enlai, Wang Hongwen, Kang Sheng, Ye 
Jianying and Li Desheng were elected as Vice-Chairmen. 
1973 Sep At the meeting of the CCPCCMC, Mao announced a reshuffle of 
leaders of the Military Regions. 
.1973 Dec Deng was admitted to the CCP Politburo and elected as the 
Vice-chairman of the Party,s MC. 
1973 Dec On the 12th, the reshuffling of eight of the eleven Military 
Regions was decided in an Enlarged meeting of CCPCCMC after 
Mao Zedong asked the generals to sing the song "The Three 
Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points for Attention." 
1973 Dec Yang Dezhi, Commander of Jinan Military Region, exchanged 
post with Zeng Siyu, Commander of Wuhan Military Region. 
1974 Jan Han Xianchu was shifted to Lanchow Military Region as 
Commander. Chen Xilian, Commander of Shenyang was transferred 
to Peking. 
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1974 May Ma Ning was promoted to Air Force Commander. 
1975 Jan Liang Biye was reinstated as Deputy Director of General 
Political Department. 
1975 Jan Huang Xinting was appointed as Armoured Force Commander after 
such post has been vacated for eight years. He was ex-
Commander of Chengdu Military Region and was purged during 
the Cultural Revolution. 
1975 Jan The Second Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee and 
the 4th National People's Congress were held. 
1975 Jan Yang Dezhi was made member of the Presidium of the 4th NPC. 
Jan Constitution of the 4th NPC proclaimed that "The Chinese 
People's Liberation Army and the people's militia are the 
workers' and peasants, own armed forces led by 七he Communist 
Party of China, they are the armed forces of the people of 
all nationalities. The Chairman of CC of the CPC commands the 
country，s armed forces". 
I 
I 
1975 Jan Deng was promoted to the Vice-Chairmanship of the Party, 
membership of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and 
the posts of senior Vice-Premier of the State Council and PLA 
Chief-of-Staff. 
1975 Jan Zhang Chunqiao was appointed as the Director of 七he General 
Political Department after such post Has been vacated for two 
years. 
1975 Zheng Wenbi was transferred back to military as Commander 
of Zhejiang Provinical Military Districts. 
1975 Apr The death of Tong Biwu. 
1975 Oct Wang Liusheng, the First Political Commissar of Wuhan 
Military Region, was transferred to a new post and was 
replaced by Yang's old colleagues in Shansi-Chehar-Hopei 
Military districts, Wang Ping. 
1975 Nov On the 3rd, Mao called "to criticize Deng and counter right 
deviationist trend to reverse correct verdicts." 
1975 Dec The death of Rang Sheng. 
1975 Dec Qin Jiwei was appointed as Political Commissar of Beijing 
Military Region. 
1976 Jan Zhao Ziyang was appointed as 1st Political Commissar of 
Chengdu Military Region. 
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1976 Jan Liu Xingyuan, 1st Political Commissar of Chengdu Military 
Region, was appointed as Commander of Chengdu Military Region 
to replace Qin Jiwei. 
1976 Jan On the 8th, Zhou Enlai died. 
1976 Feb On the 7th, Hua Guofeng was identified as the acting premier 
of the State Council. 
j 
j 1976 Feb Deng was under intensive criticism. 
1976 Mar On the 29th, Tiennanmen Incident occurred in which a huge 
crowd staged an anti-Maoist demonstration when paying homage 
to the memory of the late Premier Zhou. 
1976 Apr Qin Jiwei was promoted to the Second Political Commissar. 
1976 Apr On the 3rd, first clash occurred be七ween demonstrators and 
police. 
• • ； ‘ 
1976 Apr Nie Fengzhi was appointed as Deputy Commander of Nanking 
Military Region. ； 
I f 
1976 Apr On the 5th, around 100,000 people rioted for the whole day 
and 20,000 policemen and soldiers were authorized to restore 
order at late evening. 
1976 Apr On the 7th, the CCPCC announced its resolution on dismissing 
Deng from all of his Party and government posts. On the same 
day, Hua Guofeng promoted as First Vice一Chairman of Party and 
Premier of State Council. 
1976 Jul On the 6th, Zhu De passed away. 
1976 Jul On the 7th, Bi Tingxun, former Commander of Fuzhou Military 
Region, died in an airplane clash. 
1976 Jul Yang Dezhi, Commander of Wuhan Military Region, became First 
Party Secretary of Wuhan Military Region. 
1976 Sep Mao died. 
1976 Oct On the 6th, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and Yao 
Wenyuan were arrested and removed from their posts. 
1976 Oct On the 6th, Politburo of CCPCC appointed Hua Guofeng as 
Chairman of CCPCC and CCPCCMC. 
1976 Oct Zhang Tingfa, Deputy Commander of PLA Air Force, appointed 
as Political Commissar of PLA Air Force. 
1976 Oct On the 22nd, Hua Guofeng was appointed as the new Party 
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Chairman. 
1976 Oct On the 23rd, a mass rally in Peking which consisted more 
than half as soldiers celebrated the new Party leader, Hua 
Guofeng, who appeared in PLA uniform. 
1976 Oct Ding Sheng, Commander of Nanking Military Region disappeared. 
1976 Oct Wei Guoqing and Xu Shiyou gave strong support to Deng's 
rehabilitation. 
1977 Feb A new model company, "Hardbone Sixth Company" was introduced. 
1977 Apr On the 22nd, Zhang Tingfa, Political Commissar of Air Force, 
was promoted to Air Force Commander. 
1977 May On the 1st, Ding Sheng, Commander of Nanking Military Region, 
was purged and his post was taken over by Nie Fenzhi, a close 
associate of Xu Shiyou. 
1977 May Yang Yong, former Commander of Xinjiang Military Region was 
transferred as Vice-Chief-of-Staff and Lui Chen became his 
successor. 丨  
1977 Jul Deng Xiaoping returned to power the third time by the Third 
Plenum of the 10th CCPCC. 
1977 Aug The 11th CCPCC was held. 
1977 Aug Hua Guofeng announced in his political report to the 11th 
Party Congress that, "with the smashing of the 'gang of four， 
as a symbol, our country's first Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution which lasted for eleven years, is herewith 
pronounced as victoriously completed". 
1977 Aug On the 23rd, Deng Xiaoping as the Chief of General Staff, 
announced the readjustment in the military leadership. 
1977 Sep Wei Guoqing replaced Zhang Chunqiao as Director of General 
Political Department. 
1977 Sep On the 19th, Xu Xianqian, Vice-Chairman of CCPCCMC, published 
an article, "Always Uphold the Principle that Party Commands 
the Gun", in the People，s Daily, 
1977 Oct Liu Xingyuan, Commander of Chengdu Military Region was 
replaced by former Commander of Railway Troops, General Wu 
Kehua. 
1978 Jan Wu Qing, Commander of Beijing Garrison, was transferred to 
Deputy Commander of Guangzhou Military Region. 
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1978 Jan Deng launched a campaign against many Cultural Revolution 
beneficiaries, including secretaries and first secretaries 
at the provincial level. 
1978 Mar The revised Constitution adopted at the Fifth NPC and 
reiterated that "The Chairman of the Central Committee of 七he 
Communist Party of China commands the armed forces of the 
People's Republic of China." 
1978 Jun On the 3rd, Luo Ruiqing, Secretary General of CCPCCMC, died. 
1978 Dec The Third Plenary Session of the 11 七h Party Congress was held 
and marked the turning point for Deng's consolidation of 
power. 
1979 Feb On the 7th, Su Zhenhua, 1st Political Commissar of PLA Navy, 
died. 
1979 Feb Yang Dezhi, Commander of Wuhan Military Region, exchanged 
position with Wang Bicheng as the Kunming Military Region. 
1979 Jul The "All-Army Conference of Directors of Mass Work 
Department" was held. 丨 
1980 Jan An overall military reshuffle was taken place on the 
initiative of Deng and Hu. Eight of the 11 Military Regions 
were changed. 
1980 Jan On the 23th, Qin Jiwei was appointed as Commander of Beijing 
Military Region to replace Chen Xilian. 
1980 Jan Xian Quanfu was transferred from Shenyang to Urumchi as the 
Military Commander. 
1980 Feb On the 25th, Yang Dezhi, Commander of Kunming Military 
Region, was appointed as Chief of General Staff. Han Xianchu, 
Xu Shiyou and Yang Yong were also appointed as new members 
of MC. 
1980 Feb Liu Shaoqi was rehabilitated. 
1980 Feb Hong Xuezhi was appointed as Director of General Logistics 
Department. 
1980 May PLA Political Conference was held. 
1980 Aug At the Third Session of the 5th NPC, Zhao Ziyang was named 
to succeed Hua as Premier. 
1980 Sep On the 10th, the 5th NPC approved the resignation of Nie 
Rengzhen, Liu Bocheng, Zhang Tingcheng and Zhou Qianren; they 
were replaced by Peng Chong, Xi Chongxun, Su Yu and Yang 
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Shangkun. 
1980 Nov Wuhan All-Military Training Conference was held. 
1981 Feb The issue of "Outline on Military Training" by the General 
Staff Department. 
1981 Mar On the 6th, Keng Biao, was appointed as Minister of National 
Defence. 
1981 Jun The end of the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th CCPCC adopted 
2 important decisions : 1. Hua Guofeng's replacement by Hu 
Yaopang as Chairman of the Party, 2. Deng's concurrent 
chairmanship of the CCPCC Military Commission. 
1981 Dec Bai Hua, a cadre in PLA, was criticized by the Party for the 
famous film， Bitter Love. " 
1982 Aug Chen Ping, director of the National Defense Commission of 
Science, Technology and Industry has been elected to the 
Central Committee. 
1982 Aug National Defense Scientific and Technological Commission 
merged with the National Defense Industry Office. 
1982 Sep The 12th Congress of CCP was held. Since this Congress, 
Deng，s s七rategy has crystallized into 3 plans :1. personnel 
changes, 2. reduction of PLA's internal role and 3. 
institutional change. 
1982 Sep Reorganization of military leadership began. 
1982 Oct Ye Fei was replaced by Luo Weiqing. 
1983 Jun Deng Xiaoping began Chairman of CMC. 
1983 Jun The establishment of the Central Military Commission. 
1983 The regime began to transfer public security functions from 
PLA to the civilian Ministry of Public Security. 
1983 Jul The publication of The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping in 
which Deng Xiao-ping criticized that the PLA was swelling, 
undisciplined, arrogant, extravagant and lazy. 
1983 Oct On the 6th, Jiang Yonghui was appointed as Commander of 
Fuzhou Military Region, 
1983 Oct The Three-year Party Rectification was launched. 
1984 Jan PLA,s Railway Engineer Corps was abolished as a military 
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unit and was transferred to the Ministry of Railways. 
1984 May On the 31st, a new Military Service Law was introduced. 
Article 9 of this law stipulates a system of military ranks 
in the PLA. 
1984 Oct On the 31st, an overall army consolidation including the 
reshuffle of PLA, the reform of military system and the 
reduction of one million troops was called by the CCPCCMC. 
1984 Dec 40 high-ranking military cadres, including Deputy Chiefs of 
General Staff were retired. 
1985 Jan On the 3rd, Yang Dezhi, PLA's Chief of Staff, announced that 
a troop reduction plan had already been formulated. 
1985 May On the 1st, the PLA began to wear new uniform with flat top 
caps. 
1985 Jun On the 4th, Deng Xiaoping announced 七he cutting-’of army by 
one million men. 
I 
1985 Jun Eleven Military Regions were reduced into seven by merging 
Jinan Military Region with Wuhan, Nanjing with Fuzhou, 
Lanzhou with Urumqi and Chengdu with Kunming. Beijing, 
Guangzhou and Shenyang Military Regions remained unchanged. 
1985 Jun Li Desheng, was dismissed from his post of Commander of 
Shenyang Military Region. 
1986 Mar The transfer of People's Armed Departments to the civilian 
executive system. 
1986 Jul On the 4th, according to the NCNA report, military officers 
were replaced by civilian officers. 
1986 Dec The adoption of the "Decision on Political Work in the Army 
in the New Period". 
1987 Jan "Concerning the Resolution on Political Work in the Army in 
the New Era" was issued by the CMC. 
1987 Jan On the 16th, the Politburo of the CCPCC accepted Hu Yaopang，s 
request to resign as General Secretary of the Party but 
remained his post in the CCPCC Politburo. 
1987 Nov On the 27th, a series of top level personnel changes in the 
PLA began. 
1987 Nov At the First Plenary Session of the 13th Party Congress, only 
Yang Shangkun and Qin Jiwei are military men in the CCPCCMC• 
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1988 Nov PLA's military rank system was restored. 
1989 Feb Reorganization of the leading Armed Police Force, Zhou Yushu 
as Commander and Xu Shouzong as Political Commissar. 
1989 May On the 17th, some senior PLA Commanders submitted a letter 
to Deng and the CMC to declare that PLA should not spill the 
people's blood. 
1989 May On the 19th, Yang Shangkun, Vice-Chairman of CCPCCMC, 
declared that the moving of PLA from other parts of the 
country to Beijing aimed at maintaining the capital's 
security and social order and claimed that by no means 
directed against students. 
1989 May On the 20th, Martial Law was executed in part of Beijing. 
1989 May On the 25th, six of the seven Military Regions accepted the 
Beijing command. 
1989 Jun On the 9th, Deng, Chairman of CCPCCMC, delivered a speech to 
praise the contributions made by the PI^ in quelling the 
rebellion. 丨 
1989 Jun On the 30th, Zhou Ziyang, Vice-Chairman of CMC, was being 
dismissed. 
1989 Sep On the 4th, Deng resigned from the CCPCC Politburo. 
1989 Nov From the 6th to the 9th, the 5th Plenum of the 13th CCPCC was 
held. 
1989 Nov On the 9th, Jiang Zimin became Deng's replacement as 七he 
Chairman of the CCPCCMC at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 
13th Party, Congress. 
1989 Nov On the same day, Yang Shangkun became the First Vice-Chairman 
of CCPCCMC. Luo Weiqing was appointed as the Vice-Chairman 
of the CCPCCMC and Yang Baiping as the Secretary. 
1990 Feb On the 14th, the People's Daily announced a major reshuffle 
of the People's Armed Police leadership Commander. 
1990 Mar On the 13th, the decision of the reshuffling of Military 
Regions was confirmed by Yang Shangkun in the 6th Plenum of 
CCPCC. 
1990 Mar On the 21th, Deng resigned from the Chairman of the State 
Military Commission at the Third Session of 7七h NPC. 
1990 Apr Jiang Ziraen appointed as Chairman of CMC. 
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1990 Apr The reshuffle of the seven Military Regions began through the 
end of May. 
1990 Aug The reshuffle of the leading Naval organs. 
1990 Nov On the 16th, a Collective Merit Citation Class II was awarded 
by the CMC in the Beijing Military Region. 
1991 Jan On the 12th, the "Program for Building Up Basic Army Units" 
was implemented in Fuzhou which aimed to build up the Armed 
Police Force. 
1991 Oct On the 31st, it has been announced 七hat the high-level 
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